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RÉSU1VIÉ 
Cette thèse comprend trois articles qui portent sur les changements dans le marché 
de travail aux État s-Unis, et de leurs effets sur le comportement dynamique des 
salaires réels moyens en particulier et le cycle économique en général. Le pre-
mier article documente de façon dét aillée l 'augmentation de volatilité relative des 
salaires réels aux États-Unis qui a eu lieu durant la Grande Modération et propose 
une explication théorique pour ce phénomène. Le deuxième article se penche sur 
la divergence marquante au niveau de la tendance et du cycle des deux mesures 
agrégées les plus populaires de salaire moyen aux États-Unis, et offre des expli-
cations pour ces divergences. Finalement, le troisième chapitre tente d 'ét ablir un 
lien théorique entre deux phénomènes qui sont survenus dans le marché du t ra-
vail lors des trente dernières années, soit l'augmentation de volatilité relative des 
salaires réels (documentée dans le premier art icle) et l 'augmentation de l 'incidence 
de la rémunération liée à la performance dans l'économie américaine. 
Le premier article documente qu 'au cours des 25 dernières années, la volatilité 
du salaire réel horaire moyen a augmenté subst antiellement par rapport à la celle 
du PIB réel aux États-Unis. Utilisant des micro-données provenant du Current 
Population Survey (CPS) nous montrons que cette augmentation est principale-
ment due aux augmentations de volatilités rela tives des salaires horaires moyens 
de différents groupes de travailleurs dans la force de travail et non pas à cause 
de biais de composition dans celle-ci. Des simulations provenant d 'un modèle 
d 'équilibre général dynamique stochastique (DSGE) illustrent qu'il est très peu 
probable que l'augmenta tion observée de la volatilité relative des salaires moyens 
provienne de changements à l 'ext érieur du marché de travail (e.g. de chocs ex-
ogènes moins fréquents ou d'une politique monét aire plus agressive) . Par cont re, 
une plus grande flexibilité dans la détermination des salaires, due à la baisse du 
niveau de syndicalisation et à l'augmentation de l'incidence de la rémunération 
liée à la performance tels qu 'observées dans les données du marché de travail 
américain, est capable d'expliquer une portion substantielle de l'augmentation 
de volatilité relative des salaires moyens. Cette plus grande flexibilité dans la 
détermination des salaires implique aussi une diminution de la volatilité du cycle 
économique, suggérant ainsi une nouvelle explication à la Grande Modération. 
Le deuxième article documente la divergence graduelle, autant en taux de crois-
sance qu'en volatilité cyclique, des deux mesures de salaires moyens les plus util-
isées pour l'économie américaine: les revenus horaires moyens provenant du Labor 
Xlll 
Productivity and Cast (LPC) program and les revenus horaires moyens du Current 
Employment Statistics (CES). Pendant que le salaire horaire LPC augmentait de 
70% durant les quatre dernières décennies et devint beaucoup plus volatile au 
début des années 1980, le salaire horaire CES crü de seulement 20% durant la 
même période et a vu sa volatilité réduire après le début des années 1980. Nous 
avons déterminé que la divergence entre les deux mesures de salaire est due à une 
évolution très différente des revenus moyens par travailleur, et non à cause des 
heures travaillées (ces dernières évoluent de façon similaires). Nous utilisons en-
suite des données sur les salaires provenant du CuTrent Population Survey (CPS) , 
des National Income and Product A ccounts (NIPAs), et de Piketty et Saez (2003) 
pour tenter de réconcilier la divergence entre les revenus moyens par travailleur. 
Notre analyse indique que des différences dans la définition des revenus et clans les 
populations échantillonnées peuvent expliquer une grande partie de la divergence. 
Notre analyse montre aussi que les différences entre les revenus provenant du CPS 
et du LPC peuvent être attribuées presqu'entièrement par les revenus des indi-
vidus très fortunés ainsi qu'aux suppléments aux salaires tels que les contributions 
des employeurs aux pensions de retraite, qui sont inclus dans LPC mais pas dans 
CPS. Ce résultat est intéressant en soi étant donné l'utilisation très répandue dans 
les études utilisant les données en coupes transversales du CPS. 
Le troisième article considère un modèle de type du "cycle réel" (RBC) avec des 
frictions sur le marché du travail où sont introduites deux types de rémunération · 
liée à l'effort. L'idée derrière ceci suit de près les travaux de la littérature mi-
croéconomique sur le performance-pay ( e.g. Lazear, 1986). Dans le modèle, la 
négociation se fait avant d 'observer les chocs à la période t pour les deux types de 
rémunération, mais l'objet de la négociation est très différente sous chaque type. 
La première forme de rémunération est une sorte de salaire d 'efficience suivant 
l'intuition derrière le modèle de shiTking de Shapiro et Stiglitz (1984), tandis que 
la seconde est apellée performance-pay car la négociation se fait autour d 'une for-
mule salariale qui lie le salaire à la production du travailleur . L'élément-clé ici est 
que le t ravailleur peut ajuster son effort (et donc sa performance) à chaque période 
étant donné l'ét at de l'économie. J 'utilise le modèle pour simuler un changement 
dans l'incidence de la paie-à-la-performance tel qu'observé dans le marché du 
t ravail américain et j 'évalue si ce type de changement structurel peut expliquer si-
multanément les deux phénomènes documentés ci-haut: la Grande Modération et 
l'augmentation de volatilité relative des salaires réels moyens. Alors que le mod-
èle implique un salaire moyen plus volatile lorsque l 'incidence de la rémunération 
à la performance est plus élevée, il implique aussi une plus grande volatilité de 
l'output et une plus grande corrélation entre le salaire réel moyen et l'output, deux 
résultats contrefactuels à l'expérience vécue par l'économie américaine durant la 
Grande Modération. Ces résultats posent un grand défi à l 'idée qu 'une plus grande 
flexibilité des salaires due à une plus grande incidence de la paie-à-la-performance 
XlV 
peut répliquer les statistiques du cycle économique observées avant et pendant la 
Grande Modération. 
Mot-clés: cycle économique, salaires, volatilité des salaires, Grande Modération, 
rémunération liée à la performance, marché du travail, modèle d'appariement. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three chapt ers related to structural changes in the U.S. labor 
market and their effects on the business cycle behavior of average real wages in 
particular and macroeconomie variables in general. The first chapter documents 
in details the increase in real wage volatility during the Great Moderation period 
and puts forward a theory to explain this new stylized fact. The second chapter 
looks into the divergence both in terms of trend and business cycle of two of the 
most popular and readily available average hourly wage series in the U.S., and 
offers explanations to explain the divergent behavior of the two series. Finally, the 
third chapter builds on the first and tries to develop a theory linking the increase 
in wage volatility to the increase incidence of performance-pay schemes in the U.S. 
economy. 
The first chapter documents that over the past 25 years, real average hourly 
wages in the United States have become substantially more volatile relative to 
output. Microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) is used to show 
that this increase in relative volatility is predominantly due to increases in the 
relative volatility of hourly wages across different groups of workers. Composi-
tional changes of the workforce, by contrast , account for only a small fraction of 
the increase in relative wage volatility. Simulations with a Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model illustrate that the observed increase in rela-
tive wage volatility is unlikely to come from changes outside of the labor market 
( e.g. smaller exogenous shocks or more aggressive monetary po licy). By con-
trast, greater flexibility in wage setting due to deunionization and a shift towards 
performance-pay contracts as experienced by the U.S . labor market is capable 
of accounting for a substantial fract ion of the observed increase in relative wage 
volatility. Greater wage flexibility also decreases the magnitude of business cycle 
fluctuations, suggesting an interesting new explanation for the Great Moderation. 
The second chapter documents the graduai divergence in trend growth and busi-
ness cycle volatility of two popular aggregate ho url y wage series for the U .S. econ-
omy: average hourly compensation from the Labor Productivity and Cost (LPC) 
program and average hourly earnings from the Current Employment Statistics 
(CES). While the LPC wage increased by about 70% over the past four decades 
and became markedly more volatile starting in the 1980s, the CES wage grew by 
only about 20% over the same period and experienced a large drop in volatility 
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post-1980. We establish that the divergence between the two aggregate hourly 
wage series is due to the different evolution of average labor earnings. Average 
hours worked, by contrast, evolve very similarly. We then use labor earnings data 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the National Incarne and Product 
Accounts (NIPAs), and Piketty and Saez (2003) in an attempt to reconcile the 
divergence between LPC and CES labor earnings. Our analysis indicates that dif-
ferences in earnings concept and population coverage can account for a large part 
of the divergence. Our analysis also shows that earnings differences between the 
CPS and the LPC can be attributed almost entirely to earnings of high-income 
individuals and supplements such as employer contributions to pension and health 
plans, which are included in the LPC but not in the CPS. This result is interesting 
in its own right given the widespread use of micro earnings data from the CPS in 
cross-sectional studies. 
The third and last chapter considers a real business cycle model with labor search 
frictions where two types of incentive pay are explicitly introduced following the 
insights from the micro liter at ure on performance-pay ( e.g. Lazear, 1986). While 
in both schemes workers and firms negotiate ahead of time-t information, the ab-
ject of the negotiation is different . The first scheme is called an 'efficiency-wage' 
as it follows closely the intuit ion of the shirking model by Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984), while the second is called a 'performance-pay' wage as the negotiation 
occurs over a wage schedule that links the worker 's wage to his output. The key 
feature here is that the worker can then adjust his effort (i.e. performance) level 
in any period. I simulate a shift towards performance-pay contracts as experi-
enced by the U.S. labor market to assess if it can account simultaneously for two 
documented business cycle phenomena: the increase in relative wage volatility 
and the Great Moderation. While the model yields higher wage volatility when 
performance-pay is more pervasive in the economy, it produces higher volatility 
of output and higher procyclicality of wages, two results counterfactual to what 
the U.S. economy has experienced during t he Great Moderation. These results 
pose a challenge to the idea that higher wage flexibility through an increase in 
performance-pay schemes can account for business cycle statistics observed over 
t he last thirty years. 
Keywords: business cycle, wages, wage volatility, Great Moderation, performance 
pay, labor market, search and matching. 
INTRODUCTI 0 N 
This thesis actually started sorne years ago when I was an M.A. student at UQAM, 
when we found one single, puzzling observation: during the Great Moderation, a 
period of unprecedented macroeconomie stability in the U.S. and in many indus-
trialized countries, the business cycle volatility of real hourly wages in the U.S. 
has increased significantly such that the relative volatility of real hourly wages to 
output became 2.5 to 3.5 t imes larger than before the Great Moderation period. 
The three chapters all tackle this observation in one way or another, trying to 
seek what we can understand on the labor market from wage dynamics and vice 
versa. 
The first chapter, coauthored with Andre Kurmann, aims directly at this observa-
tion and documents that over the past 25 years, real average hourly wages in the 
United States have become substantially more volatile relative to output. Micro-
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) is used to show that this increase 
in relative volatility is predominantly due to increases in the relative volatility of 
hourly wages across different groups of workers. Compositional changes of the 
workforce, by contrast, account for only a small fraction of the increase in rela-
tive wage volatility. Simulations with a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model illustrate that the observed increase in relative wage volatility is 
unlikely to come from changes outside of the labor market ( e.g. smaller exoge-
nous shocks or more aggressive monetary policy). By contrast, greater fiexibility in 
wage setting due to deunionization and a shift towards performance-pay contracts 
as experienced by the U.S. labor market is capable of accounting for a substantial 
------------------------
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fraction of the observed increase in relative wage volatility. Greater wage fiexi-
bility also decreases the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations, suggesting an 
interesting new explanation for the Great Moderation. 
The second chapter (also coauthored with Andre Kurmann) builds on the first 
chapter as it documents the gradual divergence in trend growth and business 
cycle volatility of two popular aggregate hourly wage series for the U.S. econ-
omy: average hourly compensation from the Labor Productivity and Cost (LPC) 
program and average hourly earnings from the Current Employment Statistics 
(CES). While the LPC wage increased by about 70% over the past four decades 
and became markedly more volatile starting in the 1980s, the CES wage grew by 
only about 20% over the same period and experienced a large drop in volatility 
post-1980. We establish that the divergence between the two aggregate hourly 
wage series is due to the different evolution of average labor earnings. Average 
hours worked, by contrast, evolve very similarly. We then use labor earnings data 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPAs), and Piketty and Saez (2003) in an attempt to reconcile the 
divergence between LPC and CES labor earnings. Our analysis indicates that dif-
ferences in earnings concept and population coverage can account for a large part 
of the divergence. Our analysis also shows that earnings differences between the 
CPS and the LPC can be attributed almost entirely to earnings of high-income 
individuals and supplements such as employer contributions to pension and health 
plans, which are included in the LPC but not in the CPS. This result is interesting 
in its own right given the widespread use of micro earnings data from the CPS in 
cross-sectional studies. 
F inally, the third chapt er aims at first defining a more "serious" theory of performance-
pay in general equilibrium and then takes this theory to the data. It considers a 
real business cycle model with labor search frictions where two types of incentive 
3 
pay are explicitly introduced following the insights from the micro literature on 
performance-pay (e.g. Lazear, 1986) . While in both schemes workers and firms 
negotiate ahead of time-t information, the object of the negotiation is different. 
The first scheme is called an 'efficiency-wage' as it follows closely the intuition of 
the shirking model by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), while the second is called a 
'performance-pay' wage as the negotiation occurs over a wage schedule that links 
the worker's wage to his output. The key feature here is that the worker can then 
adjust his effort (i. e. performance) level in any period. I simulate a shift towards 
performance-pay contracts as experienced by the U.S. labor market to asses if it 
can account simultaneously for two documented business cycle phenomenons: the 
increase in relative wage volatility and the Great Moderation. While the model 
yields higher wage volatility when performance-pay is more pervasive in the econ-
omy, it produces higher volatility of output and higher procyclicality of wages, two 
results counterfactual to what the U.S . economy has experienced during the Great 
Moderation. These results pose a challenge to the idea that higher wage fiexibility 
through an increase in performance-pa y schemes can account for business cycle 
st atistics observed over the last thirty years . 
CHAPTER I 
THE GREAT INCREASE IN RELATIVE WAGE VOLATILITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
1.1 Introduction 
The 25 years prior to the most recent recession were a time of unprecedented 
macroeconomie stability for the United States. During that period, referred to by 
many as the 'Great Moderation' , the business cycle volatility of output declined 
by more than 50% and the volatility of many other macroeconomie aggregates fell 
by similar proport ions.1 
This paper documents that the Great Moderation does not apply to one of the 
most prominent labor market aggregates: real average hourly wages (or 'hourly 
wages' for short ). Specifically, we document that from 1953-1983 to 1984-2006, 
the business cycle volatility of hourly wages increased by 15% to 60%, depending 
on the dataset and filtering method used. As a result, the business cycle volatility 
of hourly wages relative to the volatility of aggregate output became 2.5 to 3.5 
times larger over the two sample periods. 
The increase in volatility of hourly wages raises several related questions . First, 
1See for example McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) or Stock and Watson (2002). 
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does this increase apply similarly for different groups of workers? Second, how 
much of the increase in volatility is due to compositional changes; i.e. a shift of 
the workforce towards jobs with more volatile wages? Third, to what extent is 
the increase in volatility related to structural changes in the U.S. labor market? 
Fourth, how do these labor market changes contribute to our understanding of 
the Great Moderation? 
To answer the first and second question, microdata from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) is used to construct hourly wage series for different groups of work-
ers. This data reveals that the increase in absolute volatility of hourly wages is 
larger for male, skilled and salaried workers. Also, there are sizable differences 
across industries, with absolute volatilities of hourly wages decreasing in sorne 
industries. However, these decreases are generally modest and thus, the volatil-
ity of hourly wages relative to the volatility of output increases substantially for 
all worker groups considered. We call this phenomenon the 'Great Increase in 
Relative Wage Volatility'. 
Based on the CPS data, a volatility accounting method is developed to quantify 
how much of the increase in the relative volatility of average hourly wages is due 
to composit ional changes of the workforce towards jobs with more volatile wages 
and howmuch is due to increases in the relative volatility of hourly wages across 
the different worker groups. The main result coming out of this exercise is that 
the latter accounts for 69% or more of the increase in the relative volatility of 
average hourly wages. Compositional changes, by contrast, account for at most 
12%. This suggests that the increase in relative wage volatility is due to structural 
changes in the economie environment that affect wage dynamics of different groups 
of workers in similar ways although to varying degrees. 
To address the third and fourth question, the paper develops a Dynamic Stochastic 
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General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to quantify t he effects of two particular struc-
tural changes in the U.S. labor market: deunionization and increased incidence 
of performance-pay. The focus on these two changes is motivated by a combina-
tian of empirical observations. First , over the past decades, the U.S. experienced a 
marked decline in private-sector unionization (e.g. Farber and Western, 2001) and 
a shift towards performance-pay contracts (e.g. Lemieux et al. , 2009a). Second, 
the comparison of different datasets reveals that the increase in wage volatility 
is largest for workers who are on average more likely to have experienced deu-
nionization and a shift towards performance-pay. Third, Lemieux et al. (2009b) 
show that wages are most responsive to locallabor market shocks for non-union 
workers with performance-pay contracts and least responsive for union workers 
without performance-pay. Exactly the opposite is the case for hours worked. To-
gether, these observations suggest that deunionization and increased incidence of 
performance-pay result in great er wage flexibility, making wages more and hours 
(and output) less responsive to business cycle shocks. 
Simulations with the DSGE model illustrate that while reasonable changes in the 
(absolu te and relative) importance of exogenous shock pro cesses can have a siz-
able effect on the absolute volatility and cyclicality of wages, their effect on the 
relative volatility of wages is small. By contrast, a decrease the proportion of 
unionized workers and an increase the incidence of performance-pay cont racts as 
observed in U.S . data leads to greater wage flexibility in equilibrium, accounting 
for a substant ial fraction of the observed increase in relative wage volatility while 
simultaneously decreasing the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations. This sug-
gests that deunionization and a shift towards performance-pay contracts are at 
least partially responsible for the observed changes in wage volatility and the 
Great Moderation.2 
2Increased wage flexibility does not render t he economy immune to large business cycle 
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The paper contributes to a recent literature on changes in U.S. labor market 
dynamics. Most notably, Gali and Gambetti (2009) and Stiroh (2009) document 
that the Great Moderation period is characterized by an increase in the relat ive 
volatility of hours worked and a fall in the correlation of labor productivity with 
output and hours. Gali and Van Rens (2010) argue that a decrease in labor 
hoarding due to decreased hiring costs accounts for both of these changes in labor 
market dynamics.3 Gali and Van Rens (2010) also note the increase in relative 
wage volatility and show that under certain assumptions about wage setting, a 
decrease in hiring costs increases wage flexibility.4 Alternatively, Nucci and Riggi 
(2011) argue that an increase in the sensitivity of the effort component of wages 
to current economie conditions, interpreted as a shift towards performance-pay, 
is capable of accounting for the empirical evidence in Gali and Gambet ti (2009) . 
Compared to these studies, the present paper focuses more squarely on wage 
volatility. In particular , the paper first documents that the increase in relative 
wage volatility is not due to compositional changes but generalized across the 
workforce. This result is important because it directs the search for possible 
explanations towards structural changes that have a similar impact on all workers. 
Furthermore, the proposed DSGE model explicit ly distinguishes between union 
and non-union workers that either receive performance-pay or not . While the 
model does not propose a new theory of the equilibrium existence of unions and 
shocks such as the ones experienced during the recent financial crisis. The simulation results 
suggest , however , that the effects of t hese large shocks would have been even more severe if wage 
sett ing had been as rigid as in t he early 1980s. 
3In relatee! work, Barnichon (2010) documents t hat the correlation of labor productivity 
with unemployment has switched from mildly negative to significantly posit ive. He proposes 
a combination of changes in t he relative importance of business cycle shocks and lower labor 
search fr ictions as an explanation. 
4To our knowledge, the increase in relat ive wage volatility was first observee! in unpub-
lished manuscripts by Champagne (2007) and Gourio (2007). 
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performance-pay cont racts, it can be calibrated with actual data on unionization 
and performance-pa y to provide a quantitative assessment of the effects of these 
two structural changes for U.S. labor market dynamics.5 
The rest of t he paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents the increase in 
volatility of different aggregate hourly wage measures. Section 3 presents changes 
in relative wage volatility across different worker decomposit ions and implements 
t he volatility accounting exercise. Section 4 describes the DSGE model and sim-
ulates t he effects of deunionization and increased incidence of performance-pay. 
Section 5 concludes. 
1.2 Hourly wages during the Great Moderation 
This section documents t he increase in volatility of average real hourly wages in 
the United States. First, the construction of t he preferred measure of hourly wages 
is described and the main result s are presented . Then, robustness with respect 
to alternative measures of hourly wages is discussed. For the sake of brevity, the 
description of t he data is kept to a minimum, with an extensive on-line appendix 
providing more detailed information. 
1.2.1 Data 
The most comprehensive measure of average hourly wages in the non-farm business 
sector cornes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Labor Productivity and 
5 A number of other recent papers conjecture t hat different struct ural changes in t he U.S . 
labor market have led to greater wage fiexibility. Prominent examples are Blanchard and Gali 
(2007); Davis and Kahn (2008); and Lemieux et al. (2009a,b) . Davis and Kahn (2008) conclude 
that greater wage fiexibility "· .. off ers a unified exp la nation for the rise in wage and earnings 
inequality, fiat or rising volatility in household consumption, a decline in the job-loss rate, and 
declines in firm-level and aggregate volatility measures." However , none of these papers proposes 
a mode! t hat would permit an explicit quantitative assessment. 
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Costs (LPC) program.6 The measure is computed as total compensation divided 
by a corresponding series of total hours worked and is available quarterly start ing 
in 1948. Total compensation is comprised of wage and salary disbursements (in-
cluding executive compensation , commissions, tips and bonuses) plus supplements 
such as vacation pay or employer contributions to pension and healt h plans. The 
wage and salary portion of total compensation is based on t he Quarterly Census 
of Employment and Wages (QCEW), a mandatory employer-based program for 
all employees covered by unemployment insurance (UI) that spans about 98% 
of U.S. establishments and jobs. The supplements portion, in turn, is compiled 
from different sources by t he Bureau of Economie Analysis (BEA) . To obtain real 
hourly wages, the LPC measure is defiated by the Personal Consumption Expen-
diture (P CE) index from the National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA). 
All results are robust to the use of other defiators. The resulting series is com-
pared to the non-farm business real chain-weighted GDP per capita, which is also 
computed from the NIPA tables. All series are logged and filtered to extract t he 
business cycle component. T hree filtering methods are considered: (i) quarterly 
first-difference fil tering; (ii) Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering; and (iii) Bandpass 
Filtering (BP) as proposed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) . 
1.2.2 Main resul ts 
Table 1.1 shows the standard deviation of output and real hourly wages for the 
periods 1953:2-1983:4 and 1984:1-2006:4, with standard errors for each estimate 
provided in brackets. 7 The sample split is motivated by the Great Moderation 
1iterature that estima tes a break in output volatility in 1984 ( e.g. McConnell and 
Perez-Quiros, 2000). While output volatility decreases by about 50% over the 
6The analysis is confined to the non-farm business sector because it is unclear how to 
interpret public-sector wages in a market-based economy such as the one presented in Section 
Relative 
Standard Deviation Standard Devia ti on 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 ,:rvalue Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 
Flrst-Difference 
Output 1.52 0.68 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.10) (0.07) 
Wage 0.50 0.68 1.37 0.01 0.33 1.00 3.04 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.12) 
Hodrick-Prescott filter 
Output 2.57 1.28 0.50 0.00 1. 00 1.00 1.00 
(0 .24) (0.14) 
Wage 0.63 1.02 1.62 0.00 0.24 0.80 3.33 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12) 
Bandpass fi l ter 
Output 2.50 1.16 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.26) (0 .11) 
Wage 0.62 0.94 1.52 0.00 0.25 0.81 3.24 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.02) (0.13) 
Nole. Standard dev.atJOns (left panel} and standard dev.attons relatrve lo standard deviatiOn of output (nght panel) are reported for different f11tenng 
methods. AU wage series are PCE-deflated. 'FbsUpre-84' colunn reports post-84 divided by pre- 84 measure of volatil~y . Total sarrple ex tends from 
1953:2 to 2006:4 w ~h split in 1984:1 using quarterty data for the non-farm business sector. P.. values are reportee! for a test of equality of variances 
across the two subsatTples. Standard errors are COfll)Uted via the delta method from G~based estimates and appear in parenlheses below 
estirmtes . 
Table 1.1 Changes in volatility 
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two periods (i.e. the Great Moderation), the volatility of hourly wages increases 
by 40% to 60% depending on the filtering method. According to the p-value 
of Levene's (1960) test of equal variance, this increase is highly significant. As 
the last column of Table 1 shows, the volatility of hourly wages relative to the 
volatility of output therefore increases more than three-fold over the two periods. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates this result by plotting the volatility of output and hourly 
wages over 8-year rolling windows.As the first panel shows, the volatility of output 
falls precipitously in the 1980s whereas the volatility of hourly wages increases 
during the 1980s and 1990s. As shown in the second panel, the relative volatility 
of hourly wages thus increases dramatically from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. 
Thereafter, the relative volatility of hourly wages returns to an intermediate level 
4. Results would be very similar for economy-wide hourly wages, however. 
7The sample starts in 1953:2 to avoid the extreme swings in inflation during the Korean 
War. Starting the sample in 1948 does not change any of the results. Standard errors are 
computed via the delta method from GVIM-based estimates. See the appendix for details. 
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Figure 1. 1 Standard deviations of output and real hourly wages and relative 
standard deviation 
that remains, however, more than twice as high as the level before t he mid-1980s. 
The two graphs make clear that t he increase in relative volat ility of hourly wages 
is to a large part driven by the decline in output volatility. 
1.2.3 Evidence from alternative hourly wage measures 
The hourly wage from the LPC is based on a very broad measure of compensa-
t ion t hat includes employer contributions to pension and healt h plans and gains 
from exercising certain stock options. Both of these components have grown im-
portant ly over the past decades, raising t he question of whether they drive the 
documented increase in wage volatility. The question is particularly relevant for 
stock options because they are likely to be exercised in upturns when their value 
is higher than their fair-market value at t he time they were granted (i. e. the 
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t ime when they should have been recorded as compensation).8 A related but at 
the same time more general concern is that since the QCEW includes wages and 
salaries of the quasi-totality of employees, the increase in wage volatility may be 
due to the emergence of a small fraction of individuals with very large and variable 
earnings who account for an increasing share of totallabor income.9 
To address the concern about contributions to pensions and health plans, we con-
sider labor earnings data from the NIPA tables that only cont ains t he 'wages and 
salary' portion from the QCEW. As results reported in the Appendix show, the 
increase in hourly wage volatility computed from this wages and salary port ion 
is even slight ly larger t han the one from the LPC that includes supplements. To 
address the concern about stock options and more generally the role of high-
earning individuals, we construct an alternative hourly wage measure from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) . The CPS is the BLS' monthly household sur-
vey and collects, among other information, data on labor earnings and hours 
worked. Labor earnings in the CPS has two advantages for our purpose. First, 
t ips, commissions and bonuses are counted only if earned and paid in each period. 
The CPS therefore provides a more conservative source of earnings that ignores 
irregular compensation, including deferred stock option disbursements. Second, 
the publicly available earnings data from the CP S is topcoded. Swings in earnings 
for individuals above t he topcode therefore leave t he average hourly wage unaf-
fected.10 A disadvantage of the CPS is that hourly wages can be computed only 
8 Mehran and Tracy (2001) argue that t he growth of stock options in t he 1990s and their 
inclusion in compensation at t he time of exercise has biased the evolut ion of compensation up-
wards. The au thors also conjecture that increased use of stock options may render compensation 
more variable. 
9 See Piketty and Saez (2003) on the important increase in labor income share of high-
earning individuals. 
1
°For hourly-paid workers, the CPS topcodes earnings at $99.99 per hour , a threshold 
rarely crossed. For salaried workers, the CPS topcodes weekly earnings at $999 unti l 1989; 
13 
from 1973 onwards with the introduction of the CPS May supplements, and this 
only at an annual frequency. Starting in 1979 then, hourly wage information is 
available monthly from the Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG) filesY Following 
Lemieux (2006) and others, an annual series of the average hourly wage corn-
bining the May supplements for 1973-1978 with annual averages of the monthly 
ORG files for 1979-2006 is constructed. In order to obtain a non-farm business 
equivalent, all unemployed; self-employed; individuals under 16 years old; govern-
ment, agricultural and private household workers; and armed force personnel are 
removed.12 
The top panel of Table 1.2 presents the results for hourly wages from the CPS 
along with the annualized series for output and hourly wages from the LPC.13 
$1923 between 1989 and 1997; and $2884 from 1998 onwards. For certain years, t his puts 
a substantial share of workers above the topcode. To reduce t he risk of spurious volatility 
induced by topcode adjustments , topcoded earnings are mult iplied by a factor of 1.3. While 
this correction is standard in the labor literature, we also experiment with alternative topcode 
adjustments and find al! results to be robust. See the appendix for details on these and other 
robustness checks int.ended to minimize spurious volat ility in t he post-1984 period. 
11 An interviewed individual appears in the CP S for two periods of four consec ut ive 
months, separated by eight months during which the individual is left out of the survey. Before 
1979, the earnings questions were asked only once a year (the May supplements). Thereafter , 
t he earnings questions are asked each month to the individuals who are at t he end of a four-
mont h rotation (the ORGs). The March supplements of the CPS provides an alternative source 
of information about (annual) labor earnings . This data would have the advantage t hat it is 
available from 1963 onward. However, t he March supplements only started to collect informa-
tion on total hours worked in 1976, which makes it impossible to compute hourly wages before 
that year. Furthermore, Lemieux (2006) argues t hat the annual earnings data of t he March 
supplements ar e subject to measurement errors not present for the weekly earnings data of t he 
CPS May / ORG files . See Lemieux' (2006) paper for a detailed discussion. 
12For 1973-78, the sample from the May supplements averages 30406 observations per 
year. From 1979 onwards, t he combination of 12 monthly ORG files averages 139230 observations 
per year. Measurement error should therefore not be an issue. If at al!, measurement error is 
smaller in the,post-84 sample, which would lead to an understatement of t he increase in wage 
volatility. 
13 Ail series in Table 1.2 are HP filtered , with the constant set to 6.25 for annual data as 
recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Results are robust to alternative filters. 
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Both absolute and relative volatilit ies of the LPC measure mcrease m similar 
Relative 
Standard Deviation Standard Devi ation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Pos//Pre-84 p-value Pre-84 Post-84 Post/ Pre-84 
An nua i 
Ou put 2.90 1.15 0.40 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0. 19) (0.13) 
LPC wage 0.60 0.93 1.55 0.14 0.21 0.80 3.89 , 
(0.08) (0 09) (0.04) (0.13) 
CPS wage 0.63 0.72 1.14 0.57 0.22 0.62 2.86 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.03) (0.15) 
Quarterly 
Output 2. 73 1.28 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.31) (0.14) 
LPC wage 0.65 1.02 1.58 0.00 0.24 0.80 3.38 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.03) (0.12) 
CES wage (AHE) 1.11 0.45 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.36 0.87 
(0. 19) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Note : Standard deviations (left panel) and standard dev1atbns relative ta standard deviatiOn of output (nght panel) are reported for 1-P-filtered 
data. All w ages are FCE-defla ted. 'R>sVpre-84' colurm reports pos t-84 divided by pre-84 measure of volaü1ity. Total sarrple ex tends from 1964 
to 2006 for quarterty data and 1973 ta 2006 for annual data, both for the non-farm business sector. P-values are reported for a test of equality 
of variances across the two subsafll)les. Standard errors are corrputed via the delta method from Gf..!t.A.based estimates and appear in 
parentheses below es timates . 
Table 1.2 Changes in volatility 
proportions as in Table 1.1. Interestingly, for the pre-84 period, the absolute 
volatility of the CPS measure is almost identical to the volatility of the LPC 
measure. For the post-84 period, the volatility of the CP S wage also increases but 
the increase is smaller and insignificant . This comparison suggests that higher 
wage volatility at the top end of the income distribution - possibly due to t he 
increased importance of irregular compensation, including deferred stock options 
disbursements - drives part of the increase in absolute volatility of the LPC wage. 
At the same t ime, the volatility of the CPS wage relative to the volatility of 
output still displays an almost three-fold rise, confirming the main finding from 
above: while the volatility of output has decreased substantially during the Great 
Moderation, the volatility of the aggregate hourly wage has remained constant or 
even increased. 
Another popular measure of hourly wages 1s Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) 
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from the BLS' Current Establishment Survey (CES), which is available monthly 
and starts in 1964. The lower panel of Table 1.2 presents the results for AHE 
averaged to quarterly frequency along with the corresponding series for output 
and LPC hourly wages. The absolute and relative volatility of the LPC wage 
increase in similar proportions as before. By contrast, the absolute volatility of 
AHE is higher in the pre-84 period and then declines significantly in the post-84 
period, so much that its volatility relative to the volatility of output becomes 
in fact smaller. This stark difference in hourly wage dynamics is not limited to 
the business cycle. As Abraham et al. (1998) document in earlier work, AHE 
also diverges greatly from other hourly wage measures in terms of its trend. For 
example, whereas the LPC hourly wage increases by about 7% between 1973 
and 1993, AHE falls by about 10% over the same period. Given the frequent 
use of AHE in both academie research and the business press, it is important to 
investigate this striking difference and explain why the LPC and CPS measures 
of hourly wages should be preferred. 
Conceptually, differences between AHE and the LPC measure of hourly wages 
can come from either total compensation, total hours or both. Since total hours 
in the LPC are constructed primarily from CES hours (which underlies AHE), 
the business cycle components of total hours in the LPC and the CES are al-
most identical (see appendix). Hence, the divergent business cycle dynamics of 
AHE and the LPC wage must be due to differences in total compensation. As 
described above, the LPC wage is mostly based on the QCEW, which is manda-
tory and covers 98% of all private-sector jobs. By contrast, AHE is constructed 
from compensation of production and nonsupervisory workers as reported on a 
voluntary basis by establishments in the CES sample. AHE therefore covers only 
a subset of the workforce that, according to Abraham et al. (1998), represents 
approximately 60% of total private-sector compensation. These differences make 
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for a very strong argument in favor of the LPC. 
Determining the exact reasons for the divergence of AHE is complicated by many 
data issues and is therefore pursued in a separate paper (Champagne and Kur-
mann, 2012). In what follows, the main findings of this investigation are briefl.y 
summarized. First, to assess the role played by the lack of representativeness of 
AHE, Champagne and Kurmann (2012) follow Abraham et al. (1998) and use the 
occupational information provided in the CPS to recreate an hourly wage series 
for production and non-supervisory workers from the May/ORG dataset.l4 Abra-
ham et al. (1998) show that this simulated AHE series accounts for about 60% of 
the above mentioned decline in actual AHE between 1973 and 1993. Champagne 
and Kurmann (2012) find that the same simulated AHE series almost exactly 
replicates the higher volatility of actual AHE in the pre-84 period and generates 
about 35% of the decline in volatility reported in Table 1.2. Renee, the lack of 
representativeness of AHE seems to play a substantial role for its divergence from 
other wage measures, not only in terms of trend but also in terms of volatility. 
The second issue with AHE examined in Champagne and Kurmann (2013) con-
cerns sampling problems. In particular, the CES sample underwent a substantial 
expansion from about 160,000 to 400,000 establishments between 1980 and 2006. 
A large part of this expansion occurred for young and small establishments in ser-
vice industries, which were severely underrepresented in the 1970s and early 1980s 
(see Plewes, 1982).15 The resulting improvement in the sample properties of the 
CES is likely to have led to spurious changes in AHE, both because measurement 
HThe definit ion of compensat ion in t he CES and t he CPS is very s imilar. One difference 
is that CP S compensation includes tips. However , as Abraham et al. (1998) report, t ips account 
for a mere 0.3% of total compensation in 1993. 
15Employment numbers in the CES are benchmarked to t he UI records, which are t he 
source of t he QCEW. Earnings and hours are, however , not benchmarked and therefore do not 
undergo a regular bias correct ion. 
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errors for wages in service industries decreased substantially and because small 
and young firms in service industries hire on average less skilled workers for which 
hourly wages have become less volatile (see Section 3). Together with the lack of 
representativeness of AHE, these sampling problems lead us to conclude that the 
LPC and CPS measures of hourly wages should be unambiguously preferred over 
AHE.16 
1.2.4 Other changes in labor market dynamics 
Table 1.3 reports changes in business cycle dynamics of other prominent labor 
market aggregates. The first four rows show relative volatilities for the pre-84 and 
post-84 period. The relative volatility of both aggregate hours and labor pro-
ductivity ( computed as output divided by total hours) in creas es, a result first 
uncovered by Gali and Gambetti (2009). Compared to the more than three-fold 
increase in the relative volatility of real hourly wages, these changes are, however, 
modest. The relative volatility of nominal hourly wages also increases substan-
tially but not by as much as the relative volatility of real hourly wages. 
The last four rows of Table 1.3 report changes in different correlation coefficients. 
The correlation of labor productivity with both output and hours declines sub-
stantially during the Great Moderation, a phenomenon documented by Gali and 
Gambetti (2009) and Stiroh (2009). A similar decline in cyclicality also applies 
to real hourly wages. Finally, the correlation of nominal hourly wages with priees 
turns from strongly positive to almost zero. To our knowledge, this result is new 
and provides an interesting perspective on the increase in volatility of real hourly 
wages. Since real hourly wages equal nominal hourly wages divided by the priee 
16 Moreover, as shown in the appendix, the increase in relative wage volatili ty is confi rmed 
by two othcr hourly wage measures, one from the NBER manufacturing productivity database; 
and t he other from t he PELQ database, which combines data from the CPS and the Census. 
Pre-84 Post-84 Relative 
Relative Standard deviations 
cr(n)lcr(Y) 0.78 1.15 1.47 
(0.04) (0.09) 
cr(v.:)lcr(Y) 0.24 0.80 3.33 
(0.02) (0.12) 
cr(yln)l cr(Y) 0.49 0.59 1.20 
(0.04) (0.08) 
cr(Wnomina/)1 cr(Y) 0.37 0.80 2.16 
(0.04) (0.12) 
Correlations 
p(y,w) 0.37 -0.14 -0.50 
(0.14) (0.15) 
p(y,yln) 0.65 0.01 -0.64 
(0.07) (0.14) 
p(n,y!n) 0.21 -0.50 -0.71 
(0.11) (0.11) 
p(Wnominai,P) 0.82 0.26 -0.57 
(0.04) (0.15) 
Note: The four first rows report the standard deviations relative to standard deviation of output respectively for hours per 
capita, real average hourly w age, output per hour, and norrinal average hourly w age. The next tvv o row s report the 
correlations betw een output and respectively the real average hourty w age and output per hour. The last two rows report 
the correlation betw een hours and output per hour, and betw een the norrinal average hourly w age and the priee lev el. Ali 
series are HP..filtered, and real w ages are FC:E-deflated. 'Relative' colurm reports post-84 divided by pre-84 relative standard 
deviations or the difference between post-84 and pre-84 for correlations. Total sarrple extends from 1953:2 to 2006:4 using 
quarterly data for the non-farm business sec tor. P-values are reported for a test of equality of variances ac ross the two 
subsarrples. Standard errors are co/Tl)uted via the delta method from GI\ITv1-based estimates and appear in parentheses below 
estimates. 
Table 1.3 Changes in labor market dynamics 
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level, changes in the volatility of real hourly wages can be decomposed into changes 
in the volatility of nominal hourly wages; changes in the volatility of the priee level; 
and changes in (the negative of) the correlation between the two variables.17 The 
(absolute) volatility of nominal hourly wages has remained roughly constant and 
the volatility of the priee level has fallen substantially. Renee, the increase in the 
(absolu te) volatility of real hourly wages is to a large part accounted for by the 
drop in correlation between nominal hourly wages and the priee level. 
17The variance of t he business cycle component of log real hourly wages is approximately 
v ar (w):::::; var (wnom) + v ar(p)- 2corr(w" 0 m, p) x J var(wnom)v ar(p) 
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1.3 A doser look at disaggregated data 
The documented increase in the relative volatility of hourly wages raises two im-
portant questions. First , did this increase occur across different groups of workers? 
Second, what is the role played by changes in workforce composition? The answers 
to these questions provide valuable elues in the search for possible explanations. 
If, for example, the relative volatility of hourly wages increases in similar pro-
portions for many groups of workers, then this directs us towards changes in the 
economie environment that affect different labor markets alike. If, to the contrary, 
the relative volatility of hourly wages remains approximately constant for most 
groups of workers, then the focus turns to other explanations such as the role 
played by changes in workforce composition towards jobs with historically more 
volatile wages. 
1.3.1 Wage volatility across different decompositions 
Information in the CPS May/ORG dataset can be used to decompose the work-
force into groups with different characteristics . Following Krusell et al. (2000) , 
we choose education as one of the characteristics, with a 'skilled worker' being 
someone with a college degree (bachelor) or more, and an 'unskilled worker' being 
someone with less than a college degree. On top of education, we distinguish in 
rotating order by gender , age, compensation status (hourly paid or salaried), and 
industry affiliation. T his yields four different decomposit ions: (i) gender j educa-
tion; (ii) age j education; (iii) compensation status / education; and (iv) industry 
affiliation j education.18 For each decomposition, we compute the average hourly 
wage; filter the series to extract the business cycle component; and compute the 
18The appendix reports an additional decomposition with respect to gender and occupa-
tion, which yields similar results as the decomposition for gender and education. 
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volatility both in absolute terms and relative to the volatility of aggregate output 
for the pre--1984 and the post-1984 periods. 19 
Relative 
Standard Deviation Sta nda rd Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 p-value Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 
Educa tion 1 Ge nd er 
Male unskilled 0.71 0.83 1.16 0.55 0.25 0.72 2.92 
(0.081 (0.161 (0.03) (0.17) 
Male sk illed 0.41 1.11 2.71 0.10 0.14 0.96 6.80 
(0.04) (0.23) (0.01) (0.26) 
Female unskilled 0.78 0.73 0.94 0.90 0.27 0.63 2.35 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.05) (0.15) 
Female skilled 1.47 0.84 0.57 0.11 0.51 0.73 1.43 
(0.31) (O.lO) (0.13) (0.14) 
Education 1 Age 
16-29 Unskilled 0.98 1.00 1.02 0.85 0.34 0.87 2.56 
(0. 14) (0.16) (0.05) (0.18) 
16-29 S killed 1.13 1.45 1.28 0.32 0.39 1.26 3.23 
(0.17) (0.22) (0.07) (0.24) 
30-59 Unskilled 0.80 0.76 0.95 0.93 0.28 0.66 2.37 
(0.09) (0.16) (0.04) (0.17) 
30-59 Ski ll ed O. 75 0.94 1.25 0.46 0.26 0.82 3.15 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.07) (0.21) 
60-70 Unskilled 1.35 0.97 0. 72 0.15 0.47 0.85 1.81 
(0.20) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
60-70 Skilled 2.65 1.63 0.62 0.03 0.92 1.42 1.55 
(0.48) (0. 19) (0.20) (0.26) 
Education 1 Compe nsation sta tu s 
Houri y, unskilled 0.96 0.89 0.92 0.60 0.33 0.77 2.32 
(0.1 7) (0.16) (O.Q7) (0.18) 
Houri y, skilled 1.48 1.48 1.00 0.61 0.51 1.28 2.51 
(0.22) (0.29) (0.10) (0.34) 
Salaried, unski lled 1.21 0.85 0. 70 0.24 0.42 0.74 1. 76 
(0.21) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) 
Salaried, skilled 0.44 0.91 2.09 0.14 0.15 0.79 5.24 
(0.04) (0. 19) (0.01) (0.22) 
Note . Standard devtatlons (left pane~ and relative standard devléltons to standard dev~aton of output (~hl panel) are reportee! for different la bor force 
decorrpositK:ms. Ali w age series are PC&deflated and t-P-fi~ered . 'PosVpre-64' colurm reports post-84 divided by pre-84 rreasure of volatility . Total sarrple 
extends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984 using annual data for the non-farm business sector. P.values are reported for a test of equal~y of variances 
across the Iwo subsarrples. Standard errors are corrputed via the delta rœthod fromGM.+based estirretes and appear in parentheses bebw estirretes. 
Table 1.4 Changes in average hourly wage volatility 
19 In light of the prominent role t hat performance-pay and unionizat ion play in the mode! 
of Section 4, it would be interesting to decompose the workforce along these two dimensions as 
we il. Unfortunately, the CP S does not contain information to distinguish between regular pay 
and performance-pay. Moreover , while the CPS does contain a union indicator, t his information 
is missing for 1982; and for 1979 to 1981, the number of individuals in the CPS :vlay with 
both wage and union information is on ly about one quarter of t he regular sample and not 
representative of the U.S. workforce. Since the years 1979-1983 are very important for the 
determination of wage volat ility in the pre-84 period, t his makes it impossible to compute 
reliable results for a union / non-union decomposition. As discussed below, the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (P SID) wo uld be an alternative source of individual earnings data that 
contains information on unionization and performance-pay. However , the PSID covers a much 
smaller cross-section, which ' would make cel! sizes for certain decompositions too small to be 
reliable. Moreover , annual data with information on both earnings and performance-pay extends 
only from 1976 to 1996. 
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Gender 1 education decomposition. As the first panel of Table 1.4 shows, the ab-
solute volatility of hourly wages increases strongly for skilled males, stays approx-
imately constant for unskilled males and females, and drops for skilled females . 
Relative to the volatility of output, the volatility of hourly wages increases sub-
stantially across all groups. Most notable is the more than six-fold increase for 
skilled male workers. 
Age 1 education decomposition. Following Jaimovich and Siu (2008), we create 
three age groups: 16-29 year olds ('young workers'); 30-59 year olds ('middle-age 
workers'); and 60-70 year olds ('old workers'). As the second panel of Table 1.4 
shows, the absolu te volatility of hourly wages increases for both young and middle-
aged skilled workers; remains approximately constant for young and middle-aged 
unskilled workers; and declines for old workers. Similar to the previous decompo-
sition, the relative volatility of hourly wages increases substantially for all groups, 
especially for the young and middle-aged skilled workers. 
Compensation status 1 education decomposition. As the third panel of Table 1.4 
shows, the absolu te volatility of hourly wages remains constant or falls slightly for 
all but the salaried skilled group, for which the volatility doubles. The relative 
volatility of hourly wages increases again markedly for all worker groups but is 
most pronounced for the salaried skilled group. 
Industry 1 education decomposition. The industry decomposition contains ten 
private sectors.20 As Table 1.5 shows, the absolute volatility of hourly wages in-
creases for unskilled workers employed in manufacturing and other services as well 
as for skilled workers in wholesale trade and finance, insurance and real estate 
20 See appendix for industry classification. For this decomposition, the sample stops in 
2002 because the industry reclassification in 2003 (from SIC to NAICS) makes mat ching of sorne 
3-digit industries difficult . 
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Relative 
Standard Deviati on Sta nda rd De via tio n 
Pn:H34 Post·84 Pre/Post-84 -value Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 
Education /lndustry 
MiningOilGas unskilled 2.40 1.71 0.71 0. 16 0.83 1.53 1.85 
(0.3 2) (0.30) (0.15) {0.34) 
Construction unskilled 1.33 0.96 0.72 0.17 0.46 0.86 1.87 
(0.15) (0.14 ) (0.07) (0.11) 
Manuf-Durables unskil led 0.81 1.04 1.27 0. 49 0.28 0.93 3.30 
(0.10) (Q.25) (0 .04) (0.24) 
Manut-NonOurables unski11ed 0.78 1.23 1.57 0.32 0.27 1.10 4.07 
(0.08) (0.30) (0.03) (0 .3 l) 
Transportation&Util ilies unskilled 1.13 0.87 0.77 0.39 0.39 0.78 2.00 
(0.16) (0.13) (0.07) {0 .19) 
Communications unskilled 2.22 1.29 0.58 0.02 0.77 1.15 1.51 
(0. 19) (0.13) (0. 11) (0 .23) 
Wholesale Trade unskilled 1.18 0.89 0.75 0.11 0.41 0.79 1.95 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.12) 
Retail Trade unskilled 1.11 1.01 0.91 0.83 0.38 0.90 2.35 
{0.18) (0. 26) (0.08) (0.27) 
FIRE unskilled 1. 26 1.01 0.80 0.49 0.43 0.90 2.08 
(0.25) (0.11) (0.08) (0.18) 
Other sef'\lices unskilled 0.56 0.68 1.21 0.51 0. 19 0.61 3.15 
(0.05) (0.15) (0.02) {0.18) 
MiningûiiGas skilled 5.31 3.86 0.73 0.38 1.83 3.45 1.88 
(0.97) (0.89) {0.3 3) (1 .07) 
Construction ski lled 2.38 1.88 0.79 0.35 0.82 1.68 2.05 
{0.27) {0.37 ) (0. 12) (0.46) 
Manuf-Durables skilled 1.26 1.24 0.98 0.99 0.44 1.11 2.53 
(0.11) (0.24) (0 .05 ) (0 .31) 
Manuf-NonDurables skilled 1.53 1.18 0.77 0.21 0.53 1.05 1.99 
(0. 15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15) 
Transportation&Utilities skilled 2.74 2.26 0.83 0.46 0.94 2.02 2.14 
(0 .44) (0.19) {0.17) (0 .37) 
Communcations skilled 4.76 2.17 0.46 0.16 1.64 1.94 1.18 
{1.37) (0.24) {0.53) (0.42) 
Wholesale Trade skilled 1.02 1.47 1.44 0.26 0.35 1.31 3.73 
(0.15) (0 .25) (0.07) (0.37 ) 
Retail Trade ski lied 3.04 1.90 0.63 0.04 1.05 1.70 1.62 
{0.29) (0.22 ) (0 .10) (0.26) 
FIRE ski1led 0.89 1.25 1.40 0.29 0.31 1.11 3.63 
{0.23) (0.20) (0.09) (0.27) 
Other services ski lied 1.52 1.13 0.74 0.19 0.52 1. 01 1.92 
(0.1 5) (0.22 ) (0.07) {0.29) 
Note : Standard deviations (left panel) and relative standard deviations lo standard deviation of output (righi panel) are reported for the educationlindustry 
de<:Oill>OSition. An wage series are f'CE..deflated and 1-!flfil tered. 'A>stlpre-64' colurm reports post-84 divided by pre-64 measure of volatility. Total SS!Tllle 
extends from 1973\o 2002 wilh split in 1984 using annual data for the non-farm business seclor . P.values are reported for a lest of equality of variances 
across the tw o subsafT1lles. Slandard errors are corrputed via the delta method from GM\i.based estirretes and appear in parentheses bek::lw estinates. 
Table 1.5 Changes m average hourly wage volatility 
(FIRE) . For all other groups, the absolute volatility of the hourly wage decreases. 
Compared to the decline in out put volatility, t hese decreases in volatility remain 
modest, however. The increase in the relative volat ility of wages therefore remains 
pervasive. 
We take away two stylized facts from these decompositions. First, there is sub-
stantial heterogeneity in how the absolute volatility of hourly wages of different 
worker groups changes over t ime. The largest increases in volatility occur for 
skilled workers that are either male, young or middle-aged or salaried. Many 
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other groups, especially in the industry 1 education decomposition, experience a 
dec~ine in wage volatility. Second, the decrease in wage volatility for these latter 
groups is generally modest relative to the decrease in the volatility of output. 
Hence, t he volatility of hourly wages relative to the volatility of output increases 
substantially for almost all worker groups. This phenomenon is what is called in 
the introduction 'The Great Increase in Relative Wage Volatility'. 
1.3.2 Volat ility accounting 
While the increase in relative wage volatility is pervasive across worker groups, 
it might still be the case that a substantial part of the increase in the relative 
volatility of aggregate hourly wages is driven by changes in workforce composition 
towards jobs for which hourly wages are historically more volatile. To assess this 
question, we develop a volatility accounting method that allows us to quantify 
how much of the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate hourly wages is 
due to changes in workforce composit ion and how much is due to increases in the 
relative volatility of hourly wages across the different worker groups. 
By definition, the aggregate hourly wage Wt equals the sum of average hourly 
wages wi,t across worker groups i of sorne decomposit ion ( e.g. gender 1 education) , 
weighted by the respective hours shares h i,t = H i,t/ H t; i.e. Wt = ~i wi,thi,t· Next, 
let xi,t = w i,th i,t be the 'wage component of group i' and express the growth rate 
of t he aggregate hourly wage as 
1\ l ~ Wt- Wt-1 _ ~ Xi,t-1 Xi,t- Xi,t-1 ~ ~ 1\ l 
u og Wt ~ - ~ -- ~ ~ Si,t-1 U og Xi,t, 
Wt-1 i Wt- 1 Xi,t-1 i 
(1.1) 
where si,t-1 = Xi ,t-dWt-1 = (wi ,t-1Hi.t-d / (wt-1Ht-1) denotes the 'wage share' 
of worker group i; i.e. the weight with which growth in group i's wage component 
affects aggregate hourly wage growth. Since the wage shares of the different worker 
24 
groups evolve slowly over time, approximate si,t- 1 by its average for the subsample 
under consideration (e.g. the pre-84 period); i.e. si,t- 1 ~ 3;. Numerical checks for 
the different decomposit ions shows that the error induced by this approximation 
is negligible. The change in t he relative variance of aggregate hourly wage growth 
between sorne subsample a and another subsample b ( e.g. betwe~n the pre-84 
period and the post-84) can thus be expressed as21 
By adding and subtracting different elements on the right-hand-side, this equation 
can be expanded as 
CJ~( b) CJ; (a) 
-----(J~ ( b) O"~ (a) 
The first line on the right-hand-side represents the effect of changes in workforce 
composition on the relative variance of aggregate hourly wages, weighted by the 
average covariances of the wage components Xi over the two subsamples. The 
second line captures the effect of changes in the covariances of the different wage 
components on the relative variance of aggregate hourly wages, weighted by the 
average wage shares si over the two subsamples. 22 Since by definition 6.log xi,t = 
21 While the foc us is on accounting for changes in relative volat ility of aggregate hourly 
wages, the same exercise could be performed for changes in absol'Ute volati li ty. As documented 
in Section 2, however, the increase in absolute volatility of aggregate hourly wages in the CPS 
is modest at most. Decomposing this small increase in volatili ty into its different sources woulcl 
not be very informative. 
22 While this choice of 'average base periocl ' for the weighting is arbitrary, none of t he 
results woulcl change if averages over the first subsample or the second subsample were usee! as 
weights instead. 
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6log wi,t + 6log hi,t , the changes in the different covariances can be decomposed 
further. For example, for i = j (such that ax;xj = a;J 
a;;(b) _ a;;(a) 
a~(b) a~(a) 
where p( wi (a), hi (a)) denotes the correlation coefficient between wi and hi for 
subsample a and so forth. Expressions (1.3) and (1.4) make clear that changes 
in the relative variance of average hourly wage growth can be decomposed into 
four different sources: (i) changes in average wage shares (i.e. the effect of com-
positional changes); (ii) changes in the relative variance of hourly wage growth of 
the different groups; (iii) changes in the relative variance of hours share growth 
of the different groups; and (iv) changes in the different correlation coefficients. 
The appendix provides an explicit formula of this decomposition. 
Table 1.6 reports the results of the volatility accounting exercise for each of the 
decompositions analyzed ab ove. 23The second line shows that changes in wage 
shares play only a modest role, contributing at most 12% to the increase in the 
relative variance of average hourly wages. Changes in the relative variance of 
hourly wages of the different worker groups, by contrast, explain 69% or more of 
the increase in the relative variance of average hourly wages. The rest is accounted 
for by changes in the relative variance of hours shares and changes in the different 
correlation coefficients. This shows that the widespread increase in t he relative 
volatility of hourly wages across different worker groups is the main source of 
the increase in the relative volatility of average hourly wages. The absence of 
23 Ail results pertain to HP-filtered data. This introduces an additional approximation 
error since the decomposition in (1.1) is based on growth rates . This error t urns out to be 
minimal, however. 
Decomposition Education/ Education/ Education/ Education/ 
Gender Age/ Comp. Status lndustry(22) 
CPS wage 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Changing S; 6.08% 6.49% 12.28% 6.73% 
Changing a(hourly wages) 2 77.94% 71.05% 70.28% 69.06% 
Changing a(hours shares)' -6.30% -6.40% -2.64% -4.88% 
Changing correlations 22.28% 28.86% 20.09% 29.09% 
Note : Contributions to changes in relative volatility of rea l average hourly w age across different labor force deco~osition. The first row 
reports the change in real average hourly w age volatility for a given deco~osition , w hile the next four report contributions of changes 
in (respectively) w age shares, volatilities of real average hourly w ages. volatilities of hours ' shares , and various correlations . Wages are 
FCE-deflated and ali series are HP-filtered. "Co~ensation status" stands for hourly-paid or salaried workers . Total sa~le ex tends from 
1973 to 2006 (Except for hdustry(22)/Education. w hich stops in 2002) w ith split in 1984 using an nuai data for the non farm business 
sec tor. 
Table 1.6 Relative volatility accounting across different decompositions 
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sizable effects from structural changes in workforce composition directs the search 
for possible explanations towards changes in the economie environment that have 
similar effects on wage setting in different labor markets .24 At the same time, 
sorne worker groups experience a larger increase in relative wage volatility than 
others, which suggests t hat these structural changes do not occur to the same 
extent for everyone. 
1.4 Wage volatility in general equilibrium 
This section develops a DSGE model to quantitatively assess two possible expia-
nations for the increase in relative wage volatility. First, the model is used to 
assess the role of the 'good luck hypothesis ' , i.e. a decrease in the importance of 
2-iSince the CPS does not fo llow individual workers over time, we cannot rule out that 
composit ional effects play a role within worker groups. Starting with Gottschalk and Moffitt 
(1994), however, a number of papers using panel data show that tabor income has on average 
become considerably more volat ile across individual workers as weil. Recent evidence based on 
PSID dat a by Dynan et al. (2008) and Jensen and Shore (2008) indicate that this increase 
in tabor income volatility has remained approximately const ant for most individuals but has 
increased greatly for individuals who a lready had volatile earnings in the past. Since t he volatil-
ity of output feil by more t han 50% during the same t ime period, t his mea.ns t hat the relative 
vola.t ility of la.bor income must have increased substant ially on an individual leve! as weil. 
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exogenous shocks that many studies credit as the main driver of the Great Mod-
eration (e.g. Stock and Watson, 2002). Second, the madel is used to explore the 
effects of two structural changes in the labor market : deunionization and increased 
incidence of performance-pa y. 25 
The focus on these two particular structural changes is motivated by a combina-
tian of empirical observations. First, the U.S. labor market experienced a marked 
decline in unionization and a shift towards performance-pay contracts that ap-
proximately coincides with the documented increase in wage volatility. Figure 
1.2 illustrates these developments. The left panel plots the proportion of non-
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Figure 1.2 Evolution of non-union density (left panel) from nonfarm business 
workers and incidence of performance-pay (right panel) in the U.S. 
union workers in the non-farm business sector, computed from data in Hirsch et 
25 The papers by Cali and Van Rens (2010) and Nucci and Riggi (2011) discussed in t he 
int roduction also argue for deunionization and increased performance-pay. respectively, as pos-
sible driving forces behind the changes in labor market dynamics . Their models and calibration 
strategies are quite different from what fo llows. 
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al. (2001 ) and Hirsch and Macpherson (2010) .26 The right panel plots a measure 
of the incidence of performance-pay from Lemieux et al. (2009a), defined as the 
proport ion of male household heads in the PSID whose compensation during an 
employment relationship includes a performance pay component (bonus, commis-
sion, or piece-rate). As the plots show, both deunionization and the shift towards 
performance-pay accelerate in the early 1980s and then continue to rise, although 
at a lower pace, during the 1990s.27 
Second, in Lemieux et al. 's (2009a) sample of male household heads, performance-
pay is more frequent for skilled individuals in salaried posit ions that are employed 
in industries such as wholesale t rade and FIRE. But these are exactly the worker 
groups in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 above for which wage volatility increased most.28 Con-
versely, t he comparison between the estimates in Hirsch and Macpherson (2010) 
and our results in Table 1.5 indicates that the industries for which union coverage 
remains high (e.g. communications) are generally also the industries for which 
26 Union workers are defined as workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
For t he years 1977-2006, union coverage is obtained d irectly from CPS estimates by Hirsch and 
Macpherson (2010; updated regularly at http:/ /www.un ionstats.com). For the years 1964-1976, 
union coverage is constructed by taking Hirsch et al. 's (2001) estimates of union membership for 
the entire U.S. economy from the BLS publication Directory of National Unions and Employee 
Associat ions and the CPS May supplements and assuming that t he rat io of un ion coverage in 
the non-farm business sector to union membership in t he ent ire economy between 1964 and 1976 
is the same as in 1977. T his probably implies too conservat ive of an estimate of union coverage 
before 1977. For 1982, where no union information is available, a linear interpolation with data 
from 1981 and 1983 is performed. 
27 As argued in the calibration section below, Lemieux et al. 's (2009a) PSID measure 
of performance-pay is likely to underestimate the true increase in performance-pay contracts. 
Other studies documenting the increase in performance-pay contracts in t he U.S. are Mitchell 
et al. (1990) , Prendergast (1999) and Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) . 
28 Since most workers at the top end of the income distribution are skilled males in salaried 
positions, this result ties in nicely with the finding in Section 2 that the CPS wage, which is 
based on a more restrictive earnings concept and topcoded high-income salaries, displays a 
smaller increase in volatility in the post-84 period than t he LPC wage. 
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wage volatility fell most.29 
Third, based on the same PSID dataset as in Lemieux et al. (2009a), Lemieux et 
al. (2009b) find that wages of non-union workers with performance-pay contracts 
are most responsive to local labor market shocks and least responsive for union 
workers without performance-pay. Exact ly the opposite is the case for hours 
worked, suggesting t hat wages play an allocative role over the business cycle. 
Taken together, these observations suggest that deunionization and the shift to-
wards performance-pay result in greater wage fl.exibility, making wages more and 
hours (and output) less responsive to business cycle shocks. 
1.4.1 Mo del 
The model contains many elements t hat are st andard in the DSGE literature. As 
in Erceg et al. (2000), workers are assumed to supply differentiated labor services 
and set nominal wages according to a given contract rule. Based on these wages, 
firms then choose the optimal combination of labor services to minimize labor 
costs. The key novelty here is that this wage setting assumption is extended so 
as to distinguish between union and non-union workers who are hired eit her on 
performance-pay or non-performance-pay contracts. This allows us to perform 
a disciplined quantitative exercise on t he effects of deunionization and increased 
incidence of performance-pa y. 
The economy is populated by three types of agents: a continuum of infinitely-lived 
firms ; a continuum of infinitely-lived workers; and a government that determines 
29Interestingly, the only group in Hirsch and MacPherson (2010) for which unionization 
increased (to over 40%) during t he post-84 period are public sector workers . Additional analysis 
with our CPS data shows that wage volatility for these workers fel! more than for any other 
group listed in Table 1.5. 
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monetary and fiscal policy. Firms produce output Yt with labor Nt and capital 
Kt using t echnology 
(1.5) 
where At is an exogenous productivity shock common to all firms. Workers supply 
differentiated labor services and are employed either in the union sector or the 
non-union sector. Labor input Nt that firms use for production is a composite 
made up of union labor N(' and non-union labor Ntnu according to 
(1.6) 
where su and snu = 1 - su are fixed weights t hat pin down the average wage 
shares of the union sector and the non-union sector; and {t > 1 is the elasticity of 
substitution determining the extent to which firms can switch between union and 
non-union labor over the business cycle. Union and non-union labor are themselves 
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of differentiated labor services N('( i) and N'("u( i) that 
workers i in the union and non-union sector , respectively, supply; i.e. 
[ t i-=1 ]h Ni= .Jo N}(i) ~< 1 di for lE {u,nu} . (1. 7) 
The elasticities {lu > 1 and {lnu > 1 determine the extent to which union workers 
and non-union workers, respectively, are substitutable among each other. Given 
nominal wages Wtu(i) and Wtnu(i), firms demand labor N:!(i) and N'("u(i) for union 
and non-union workers i to minimize labor costs subject to (1.6) and (1.7). 
Nominal wages are set by workers depending on whether they receive performance-
pay or not. Let the fraction of workers in the union- and non-union sector 
with performance-pay be pu and pnu, respectively. The defining feature of a 
performance-pay contract is that part or all of compensation is linked to observed 
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output by the worker (see Lemieux et al., 2009b for an illustrative model and a 
review of the literature).30 In the context of our model, this feature is taken to 
mean that in order to remain incentive compatible, the nominal wage vVtl ,p(i) of 
a performance-pay worker adjusts with time t information to equal the worker's 
marginal rate of substitution times the optimal markup the worker commands 
because of the imperfect substitutability of its labor service. 
For the remaining workers without performance-pay, nominal wages are set in 
ad vance of time t information according to a variant of Er ceg et al. ( 2000) . In the 
union sector, the fraction of non-performance-pay workers that get to reoptimize 
their nominal wage for next period is 1-ÇU. In the non-union sector, the equivalent 
fraction is 1- çnu. For all other non-performance pa y workers (a fraction ÇU in the 
union sec tor and a fraction çnu in the non-union sec tor), wages are indexed to the 
steady state growth rate of consumption 'Y and partially to realized gross inflation 
Ilt_ 1; i.e. their nominal wage adjusts according to WZ'np(i) = 'YII~_ 1 wL_nf(i) with w 
denoting the inflation indexing factor. The solution to this optimization problem 
is provided in the appendix. 
Several comments are in order about this formalization of wage setting. First, 
as in existing New Keynesian DSGE literature, the model abstracts from the 
deeper frictions that give rise to staggered wage reoptimization. Likewise, the 
performance-pay contract is not derived from an explicit principal-agent or hold-
up problem as in Lemieux et al. (2009b); and the forces leading to unionization are 
not explicitly modeled. While very interesting, such a richer environment would 
exceed the objective of our model, which is to quantify the general equilibrium 
effects of changes in unionization and the incidence of performance-pay, everything 
30In Lemieux et al. (2009b), performance-pay contracts arise endogenously if t he costs 
of overcoming informational frictions are sufficiently small. Otherwise, firms and workers find 
it opt imal not to measure performance and enter a fixed-wage contract . 
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else constant . Second, firms in the madel have the right-to-manage; i.e. they can 
freely decide on labor input given a set wage. This assumption is consistent with 
most U.S. labor market contracts (see Malcomson, 1999) and the empirical results 
in Lemieux et al. (2009b) suggest that firms indeed ad just hours most for workers 
with the least flexible wages. Third, workers without performance-pay contracts 
in our madel are typically not on their labor supply curve. Given the markup they 
command in the labor market, their wage remains, however, above the marginal 
rate of substitution; i.e. the wage more than compensates for the disutility from 
working. 
The rest of the madel is standard. The exposition is therefore kept to a minimum 
and the reader is referred to the appendix for details. Given labor incarne, worker 
i chooses consumption, investment in physical capital and nominal one-period 
bonds to maximize 
~ t [ Nt(i)H<f> ] Eo ~ {3 Zt-1 log Ct - 1 + cp (1.8) 
subject to the budget constraint 
E 0 denotes the expectations operator; {3 the discount factor; Zt_ 1 an exogenous 
preference shock common to all workers; Ct a composite consumption good; Nt( i) 
hours worked; Kt+1 - (1- 5)Kt investment in physical capital; Bt nominal bond 
holdings; Tt lump-sum taxes; Dt dividends from a perfectly diversified portfolio of 
daims to firms; Ft(i) the net return from astate-contingent insurance mechanism; 
Wt( i) the nominal wage rate; Rf the real net rentai rate of capital; R~~ the gross 
nominal bond return; and Pt the aggregate priee level. Labor incarne Wt(i)Nt(i) is 
worker-specific due to the labor market frictions described above. As in Erceg et 
al. (2000), the net return Ft(i) is such that workers remain identical with respect 
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to their consumption and savings decisions. As a result , Ct, K t and Et are not 
worker-specific. 
Firms' production in (1.5) yields differentiated intermediate goods that are sold to 
a wholesaler who then turns them into a final composite using a CES aggregator. 
The demand for each intermediate good depends on the relative priee that firms 
reoptimize with sorne constant Calvo probability. 
The government, finally, conducts monetary policy according to the following 
interest rate rule 
(1.10) 
and limits fiscal policy to a constant spending rule that is fully financed by lump-
sum taxes. 
1.4.2 Calibration 
The model is calibrated to quarterly U.S. data. The structural parameters are 
partitioned into two groups. The first group contains the parameters not directly 
related to wage setting. These parameters are kept unchanged in t he different 
simulations and are calibrated as shown in the first panel of Table 1.7.The values 
of a, (3 , "( , 5 and <P are standard. The steady-state government spending-output 
ratio T j Y = 0.15 implies an average consumption-output ratio of 0.63 in line with 
the data. The slope parameter "' on marginal cost in the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve (NKPC) that results from the above described Calvo pricing setup lies in 
the range of estimates reported by different empirical studies on the NKPC. The 
monetary policy parameters, finally, are also in line with estimates found in the 
literature. The particular values are chosen so that, conditional on the calibration 
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Standard pa rameters 
a J3 y 0 1/<l> T/Y p a. Sy 
0.33 0.99 0.005 0.025 0.15 0.05 0.8 2 0.3 
Wage setting parameters 
W"N"/WN p" p"" 1/(1~") 1/(1~"") w 11" 11"" 11 
pre-1984 0.30 0.1 7 0.34 12 6 0.5 3.1 6 10 
post-1984 0.13 0.32 0.64 12 6 0.5 3.1 6 10 
Shock processes 
p(a) O(E,) p(llz) O(Eozl o(a) o(llz) 
pre-1984 0.9788 0.0094 0.7956 0.0033 0.0549 0.0054 
post-1984 0.9738 0.0057 0.8951 0.0020 0.0172 0.0046 
Note: Upper panel reports calibration for standard pararreters values in New ·keynesian DSGE rrodels. Middle panel reports parameter values 
for w age setting in rrodel. Bottom panel reports estirrates for the technologie al and preference shock processes. 
Tablè 1. 7 Model calibration 
of all other parameters and shock processes below, the model matches the pre-84 
volatility of H-P filtered output and cornes close to the correlation coefficients of 
labor productivity with output and hours in Table 1.3. 
The second group of model parameters is directly related to wage setting. The 
wage share of union workers wu Nu/ (W N), which pins clown the parameter su in 
(1.6), and the fractions of union and non-union workers receiving performance-pay 
are calibrated separately for the pre-84 and the post-84 period. Changes in these 
values are used to quant ify the effeCts of deunionization and increased incidence 
of performance-pay. The other parameters are calibrated over the entire sample 
and are kept unchanged in the simulations. The second panel of Table 7 reports 
the different values. The wage share of union workers is calibrated to 0.30 for 
the pre-84 period and 0.13 for the post-84 period. These values are obtained by 
decomposing w u N u/ (W N) = w u / W x Hu/ H x Eu/ E and using CPS data from 
Hirsch and Macpherson (2010) and our own estimates to calibrate the different 
components. 31 
~ 1 Specifically, the ratio w u j W is related to the union wage premium w u ; w nu by 
W/ W u = 1 + 1/( Wujw nu) . Using estimates in Hirsch and Macpherson (2010, Table 2a), 
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The fractions of union and non-union workers receiving performance-pay, pu and 
pnu, are more challenging to calibrate as no direct measure of performance-pay is 
available in the CPS. Lemieux et al. 's (2009a) measure plotted in Figure 1.2 can be 
used as a st art ing point . However , their sample only covers 1976 to 1998 and their 
measure explicit ly excludes any performance-pay related to overtime work. Since 
performance-pay was presumably even less common before 1976 and overt ime 
work increased substantially during t he 1980s and 1990s ( e.g. Kuhn and Lozano, 
2008) , Lemieux et al. 's (2009a) measure is likely to substantially underestimate 
the t rue increase in the incidence of performance-pay. Extrapolating based on the 
available information in Lemieux et al. (2009a), we thus calibrate pu and pnu to 
0.17 and 0. 34 for the pre-84 period; and 0.32 and 0.64 for the post-84 period.32 
The remaining parameters in Table 1. 7 are calibrated as follows. The fract ion of 
non-reoptimizing union workers ÇU is set such that the average contract duration 
for union workers is 12 quarters, as reported in Rich and Tracy (2004). According 
to their estimates, this average remained surprisingly constant over their entire 
t he average union premium in the private-sector is estimated to be 1. 23 for the pre-84 period 
and 1. 24 for the post-84 period . The union wage premium is therefore set to w u I W nu = 1.235 
for t he en t ire sample. The ratio H u 1 H denotes average hours per union worker relat ive to 
average hours over ali workers. In the CP S May / ORG data, this ratio averages approximately 
one for bot h the pre-84 and the post-84 period. The ratio is t herefo re set to H u 1 H = 1 for t he 
entire sample. Finally, E u 1 E denotes t he the proport ion of workers covered by a union bargain-
ing agreement . Using the numbers reported in Figure 1.2, union coverage averages 0.25 for t he 
pre-84 period and 0.11 for t he post-84 period . Hence, the fall in t he wage share of union workers 
over t ime is ent irely driven by t he fall in union coverage. Since estimates of union coverage 
estimates only go back to 1964 and was likely to be higher before then, the value of 0.25 for the 
pre-84 period should be considered as conservati vely low. 
32 Specifically, the tables in Lemieux et al. (2009a) indicate that performance-pay con-
t racts are about ha lf as likely for union workers as for non-union workers and t hat t he average 
incidence of performance-pay in the mid 1970s was about 35%. Assuming that the average inci-
dence of performance-pay was 30% for the pre-84 period and 60% for the post-84 period, average 
union density rates and the informat ion t hat performance-pay is half as likely for union workers 
can th en be used to compute the values for pu and pnu. T he assumption th at the proportion 
of performance-pay contracts approximately doubled is consistent with survey information from 
Fortune 1000 companies (see Lemieux et a l. , 2009a). 
36 
sample under consideration (1970-1995). For non-union workers, the correspond-
ing fraction çnu is set such that the average contract duration is 6 quarters, which 
is approxima tel y consistent with recent estimates of nominal wage stickiness based 
on quarterly data by Barattieri et al. (2010). The inflation indexation factor w for 
non-reoptimized wages of 0.5 roughly equals the average proportion of workers re-
ceiving cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) in the sample under consideration (see 
e.g. Hofmann et al., 2010). The elasticities p,u and p,nu translate into steady-state 
markups of 48% and 20% for union and non-union workers, respectively, implying 
an average union wage premium of 23.5% in line with the above numbers from 
Hirsch and Macpherson (2010). Finally, the elasticity p, is set such that, in com-
bination with the other wage setting parameters, union hours worked are about 
50% more volatile than non-union hours worked, consistent with evidence from 
our quarterly CPS ORG sample for 1984-2006. All of the results are robust to 
reasonable changes in w, p,u, p,nu and f.L· 
For the calibration of the two shocks, the logarithms of the technology shock and 
the preference shock are assumed to follow independent AR(1) processes 
at Paat-l + Eat with éat iid (0, a;J 
f:::. zt Pt:o. z f:::. Zt-1 + E: t:o. zt with E:t:o.zt iid (0, a;,:-J, 
where at =log At and Zt =log Zt. The parameters for each process are estimated 
separately for the subsamples 1953:2-1983:4 and 1984:1-2006:4. For the technology 
shock process, a quarterly measure of total factor productivity constructed by 
Basu et al. (2006) that controls for variable factor utilization is used. This measure 
is converted into logarithms, a linear trend consistent with the model is subtracted; 
and Pa and a é:a are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). For the preference 
shock process, f:::.zt is measured as the residual from the Euler equation for nominal 
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bond investment D.zt =Et log(Ct+I/Ct) - [log Rf - Et log(Pt+d Pt)] (see appendix 
for derivation).33 The nominal short-rate in this equation is measured by the 3-
month treasury bill rate. Expectations of future consumption growth and inflation 
are estimated from a bivariate VAR in the two variables, with consumption being 
measured by real chain-weighted per capita expenditures of non-durables and 
services and inflation being measured by the growth rate of the GDP deflator.34 
As for total factor productivity, a linear trend is subtracted from the obtained 
series of D. zt and p t. z and rJ é t> z are estimated by OLS. The point estima tes for 
the pre-1984 and the post-1984 period are provided in the third panel of Table 
1. 7. 35 The innovations to both shock pro cesses become less volatile in the post-
1984 period. This drop in volatility is, however, much less pronounced for the 
innovation to the preference shock. Furthermore, the preference shock becomes 
more persistent. As a result , the volatility of the preference shock drops much 
less and becomes about three times more important relative to the volatility of 
the t echnology shock. 
33 Alternatively, fi z t could be measured as t he residual from the Euler equat ion for invest-
ment in physical capital. There are two reasons to prefer t he bond Euler equation . F irst , t he 
renta! rate of capital in the investment Eu ler equation has to be inferred from macroeconomie 
quantit ies using the fi rm's capital demand condition. Both the real marginal cost and capital 
stocks, which appear in t his condition , are difficult to measure. Second, t he investment Euler 
equation may be affected by investment-spec ific technology shocks. P ri miceri et al. (2006) ar-
gue t hat such investment-specific shocks neutralize a large part of preference shocks, implying 
a substant ia lly smoother series for 6. ;;t· None of t hese issues apply to t he bond Euler equation . 
~ '1 Based on Schwarz' Bayesian Informat ion Cri terion (BIC), a !ag length of fi ve is selected. 
Result s are robust to alternat ive !ag specifications. 
~ 5 For both sub-periods, t he correlat ion between t he innovat ions is negligible (0.11 and 
-0.03, respectively) . Renee, the assumption that the two shock processes are independent is 
val id . 
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1.4.3 Simulations 
The model is first simulated with all parameters set to their pre-84 values. Second, 
the shock process calibration is changed to the post-84 estimates so as to assess 
role played by the 'good luck hypothesis' . Third, ~~~",pu and pnu are changed to 
their post-84 values while keeping the shock processes at their pre-1984 estimates 
to evaluate the effects of deunionization and higher incidence of performance-pay. 
Fourth, both the shock processes and w;~", pu and pnu are set to their post-84 
values to obtain the joint effect of all changes. 
US Data Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 
Pre-84 calibration, Pre-fJ4 calibration, Post-84 calibration, Post-84 calibration, 
Pre-84 Post-84 Relative Pre-84 shock Post-84 shock Relative Pre-84 shock Relative Post-84 shock Relative 
cr(y) 2.57 1.28 0.50 2.55 1.65 0.65 2.12 0.83 1.39 0.55 
cr(n)lo(y) 0.78 1.15 1.47 0.86 0.93 1.08 0.73 0.84 0.83 0.96 
cr(W)/cr(Y) 0.24 0.80 3.33 0.26 0.25 0.97 0.40 1.56 0.43 1.67 
cr(yln)l cr(y) 0.49 0.59 1.20 0.32 0.33 1.02 0.44 1.36 0.43 1.33 
cr(Wnomina/)1 o(y) 0.37 0.80 2.16 0.29 0.28 0.97 0.42 1.45 0.45 1.53 
r(y,w) 0.37 -0. 14 -0.50 0.64 0.65 0.02 0.78 0.14 0.74 0.11 
p(y,yln) 0.65 0.01 -0.84 0.55 0.36 -0.19 0.76 0.20 0.57 0.02 
p(n,yln) 0.21 -0.50 -0.71 0.27 0.03 -0.23 0.44 0.17 0.17 -0.09 
p(nomW,P) 0.82 0.26 -0.57 0.63 0.50 -0.13 0.41 -0.22 0.28 -0.35 
Note : The f irst five rows report respective!y the standard deviation of output and relative standard deviations relative to standard deviation of output for re spectively hours per capita , real 
average hour!y wage , output per hour, and norrinal average hourly wage. The next two rows report the correlation between output and respeclively the real average hourly wage and 
output per hour. The last Iwo rows report the correlation between hours and output per hour, and between the nominal average hourly wage and the priee level. The 'Relative' colurm 
denotes the F\:lsVPre-84 ratios for standard deviations and the Fbst-A"e-84 differences for correlations . Ali series are HP-f iltered and the real wage series ls FC.&deflated. U.S. data : Total 
saftl)le ex tends from 1Q53:2 to 2006:4 w ith split in 1984:1 using Quar terly data for the non-farm business sector. 
Table 1.8 Model simulations 
B aseline calibration. The first three columns of Table 1.8 reproduce the U.S. data 
moments in Table 1.3. Simulation 1 displays the second moments generated by the 
model for t he baseline pre-84 calibration. Despite its relative simplicity, t he model 
does a good job matching the volatilities of the different labor market variables. 
The model also generates a reasonably high correlation between nominal wages 
and priees but overpredicts the correlation of wages with output . 
Smaller shocks. Simulation 2 in Table 1.8 shows the results of changing the cal-
ibration of the two shock processes to their post-1984 estimates while keeping 
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all other parameters at their baseline values. The smaller volatilities for the two 
shock processes lead to a substantial fall in output volatility of about 35% as well 
as a fall in the cyclicality of labor productivity. At the same t ime, the smaller 
shock volatilities in the post-1984 period also generate a substantial fall in the 
volatility of wages with the result that the relative volatility of wages decreases 
slightly. Renee, while the 'good luck hypothesis' on its own can account for a 
substantial part of the Great Moderation, it fails to account for the increase in 
the relative volatility of wages in the data. 
To understand these results, it is useful to think of the labor market in our model 
as consisting of a standard downward-sloping aggregate labor demand and an 
upward-sloping wage setting curve that combines the optimal wage conditions 
of the different workers .36 A temporary technology shock primarily shifts labor 
demand along the wage setting curve. A temporary preference shock, by affecting 
current consumption, primarily shifts t he wage setting curve along labor demand. 
Smaller shocks change the size of these shifts, thus affecting the absolute magnitude 
of adjustments in wages and hours. Rowever, since the slopes of the two curves 
are unchanged, the relative magnitude of adjustments in the real wage and hours 
remains approximately constant. Furthermore, changes in the relative importance 
of the two shocks can have important effects on the cyclicality of wages and labor 
productivity. Technology shocks imply t hat both wages and labor productivity 
co-move with hours whereas preference shocks imply exactly the opposite. Renee, 
when preference shocks become relatively more important, the correlation of wages 
and labor productivity with hours (and thus output ) falls and may even become 
negative. The same intuition suggests that similar conclusions apply for other 
~ 6The appendix contains a det ailed description of the labor market with li nearized wage 
setting condit ions for each worker group. These conditions can be combined to obtain an 
expression for the aggregate wage as a function of the aggregate marginal rate of substitution 
t hat is called here t he wage setting curve. 
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exogenous shocks t hat primarily shift eit her the wage set t ing curve ( e.g. la bor 
supply shocks, government spending shocks) or la bor demand ( e.g. monet ary 
po licy shocks) . This conjecture is confirmed by a variety of robustness exercises in 
t he appendix. Likewise, structural changes outside the labor market (i.e. changes 
that do not directly affect the nature of wage setting or labor demand) are unlikely 
to affect relative wage volatility. For example, a change in the responsiveness of 
monetary policy to inflation, which is often advanced as a contributor to the Great 
Moderation, would have only a modest effect on the relative volatility of wages 
since t his does not affect the shape of eit her wage setting curve or labor demand 
but only by how mu ch t hey shift in response to shocks ( t hrough changes in wage 
and priee markups). 
Deunionization and increased incidence of performance-pay. The calibrat ion of 
t he shock processes is now reset to the pre-1984 estimates and instead, the wage 
share of union workers and t he fractions of performance-pay contracts for union 
and non-union workers is changed to t he post-84 calibration. As Simulation 3 
in Table 1.8 shows, the result is an increase in the relative volatility of wages by 
about 55% and a reduction in the volatility of output by more than 15%. At the 
same t ime, while t he correlation between nominal wages and priees drops, the 
cyclicality of labor productivity and wages increase counterfactually. 
To understand the mechanisms behind these results, return to the intuition from 
above. In a labor market with widespread unionization and lit t le performance-
pay, the wage setting curve is relatively flat . A positive technology shock in 
such a situation leads to a relatively small change in wages but a large change in 
labor and output . As unionization declines and performance-pay becomes more 
widespread, wage set ting increasingly depends on the marginal rate of substitution 
and the wage setting curve steepens. The same posit ive technology shock therefore 
implies a larger equilibrium response of wages relative to t he equilibrium response 
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of hours. Furthermore, the comovement of wages with output increases because 
the wage is now more dependent on the current state of the economy. In turn, 
the change in consumption after a preference shock has a relatively small income 
effect if unionization is widespread and there is little performance-pay. Wages 
therefore adjust relatively little. Instead, when there is little unionization and 
performance-pay is widespread, the income effect of the preference shock is more 
important . This leads to larger shifts in the wage setting curve, making wages 
more countercyclical in response to preference shocks and labor productivity less 
procyclical. 
Deunionization, increased incidence of performance-pay and smaller shocks. Fi-
nally, the effects of simultaneously changing the union wage share, the incidence 
of performance-pay, and the shock processes to their post-84 calibration values 
is assessed. As Simulation 4 in Table 1.8 shows, this decreases the volatility of 
output by about 45% and increases the relative volatility of wages by over 65%. 
The combination of 'good luck hypothesis' and greater wage fiexibility through 
deunionization and increased incidence of performance-pa y therefore accounts for 
almost the entire drop in output volatility during the Great Moderation and simul-
taneously generates a substantial increase in relative wage volatility. The model 
also generates a decrease in the correlations of labor productivity with hours and 
nominal wages with priees relative to the baseline pre-84 calibration (i.e. Simula-
tion 1). The decrease in correlation of labor productivity with hours is, however, 
considerably smaller than in the data and the correlation of labor productivity 
with output barely moves. Moreover, the cyclicality of wages displays a counter-
factual increase. Given the small number of shocks in our model, this failure to 
replicate the different changes in correlations should not come as a surprise. As 
discussed above, any additional shock affecting the marginal rate of substitution 
( e.g. a labor supply shock) that gains in importance relative to the technology 
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shock in the post-84 period would decrease the cyclicality of labor productivity 
and wages, thus improving the model performance. 
In sum, we consider this simulation exercise an instructive and partially success-
ful first step towards a quantitative explanation of the great increase in relative 
volatility of wages. While the increase in relative wage volatility due to deunion-
ization and a shift towards performance-pay remains below what is observed in 
the dat a, the exercise highlights how any structural change in the labor market 
that leads to greater wage flexibility (i .e. wage setting that becomes more sensi-
tive to the marginal rate of substitution) increases the relative volatility of wages 
and simultaneously reduces business cycle fluctuations. 
1.5 Conclusion 
During the Great Moderation period, the relative volatility of hourly wages in-
creased by a factor of 2.5 to 3.5. A large part of this increase in relative wage 
volatility is due to the fact that while output volatility fell by about 60%, t he 
volatility of hourly wages remained approximately constant or even increased. 
CPS microdata reveals that this relative stability in wage volatility applies for 
many different groups of workers. As a result, the increase in the relative volatil-
ity of hourly wages is predominantly due to the increase in relative wage volatility 
for different groups of workers. Composit ional changes of t he workforce, by con-
t rast, account for no more than 13% of the increase in the relative volatility of 
hourly wages. 
T hese findings represent a challenge for macroeconomie modeling in general and 
explanations of the Great Moderation in part icular. Simulations with a DSGE 
model show that reasonable changes in the volatility of exogenous shocks can have 
a substantial impact on the absolute volatility and cyclicality of wages but that 
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these changes on their own have only a small impact on relative wage volatility. 
Hence, the 'good luck hypothesis' that many studies credit as the main driver of 
the Great Moderation cannot explain the observed large increase in relative wage 
volatility. Similarly, structural changes outside of the labor market are unlikely to 
have a large effect on relative wage volatility. This puts the labor market front and 
center. Motivated by empirical observations, the nominal wage setting component 
of the New Keynesian literature is extended to allow for a distinction between 
unions and performance-pay contracts. For calibrations in line with the degree 
of deunionization and increased incidence of performance-pay experienced by the 
U.S. labor market, the thus extended model generates a substantial increase in 
relative wage volatility and simultaneously helps to account for part of the Great 
Moderation. 
Our model simulat ions represent one of the first attempts to provide a quanti-
tative assessment - based on calibrations with actual U.S. labor market data -
of the business cycle effects of structural changes in the U.S. labor market that 
occurred during the Great Moderation. While deunionization and increased in-
cidence of performance-pay in our model imply a substantial increase in relative 
wage volatility, much remains to be explained. Given the stylized formalization of 
unions and performance-pay in our model, this should not come as a surprise. In 
particular, it is likely that union behavior itself and the nature of performance-pay 
contracts has changed over the past decades. Building a model that accounts for 
these changes and can be calibrated from available data remains a challenge for 
future work. 
CHAPTER II 
RECONCILING THE DIVERGENCE IN AGGREGATE U.S. 
WAGE SERIES 
2.1 Introduction 
The evolution of average hourly wages is a key indicator for economie analysis. In 
the U.S., two of the most popular and most" readily available measures of average 
hourly wages for the non-farm business sector are average hourly compensation 
from the Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) program and average hourly earn-
ings from the Current Employment Statistics (CES).1 This paper documents that 
over the past four decades, the two measures diverged substant ially both in terms 
of trend growth and business cycle volatility. In particular: 
1. While the LPC wage grew consistently over t ime and stands today about 
70% higher in real terms than in 1970, the CES wage decreased by almost 
10% between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s and increased by only 20% 
total over the past four decades. 
2. While the volatility of the LPC wage increased by 35% to 45% since the 
early 1980s, the volatility of the CES wage dropped by about 50%. Since 
1 Both data sources come from the Bureau of La bor Statistics (BLS). 
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the volatility of output declined by 40% to 50% since the early 1980s (i.e. the 
Great Moderation) , the relative volatility of average hourly wages increased 
two- to threefold according to the LPC and but remained roughly unchanged 
according to the CES. 
The main objective of the paper is to reconcile this divergence in trend and busi-
ness cycle volatility of the LPC wage and the CES wage. Since each series is 
constructed by dividing an average labor earnings measure with an average hours 
measure, we start by decomposing the total divergence into differences coming 
from the earnings side and the hours side. We find that the divergence between 
the LPC wage and the CES wage - both in terms of trend growth and business 
cycle volatility - is driven by the different evolut ion of average labor earnings. 
Average hours worked, by contrast , evolve very similarly. 
Next, we use data from a third source, the Current Population Survey (CPS) , to 
examine potential reasons for the different evolution of average earnings from the 
LPC and the CES. Following Abraham, Splet zer and Stewart (1998) and Lemieux 
(2006), the CPS earnings series is constructed by combining information from 
the annual May supplements for 1973-1978 with information from the monthly 
outgoing rotation groups (ORG) from 1979 onward. The resulting CPS May / ORG 
extracts - referred to as 'CPS data' from hereon - represent a relatively long, 
consistent earnings series that , on the one hand, is based on a very similar earnings 
concept as t he one used in the CES and, on t he other hand, allows us to cover 
the same worker population as in the LPC.2 The CPS data therefore allows us 
to separately quantify how much of the difference between LPC earnings and 
2 Alternat ively, we could have used earnings data from the Mat·ch CPS supplements . 
As discussed below, t he CPS May/ORG extracts have sorne advantages over t he Mat·ch CP S 
supplements for our purpose; but we plan to incorporate March CPS earnings information in 
subsequent versions of the paper. Other interesting earnings information for t he U.S. economy 
is contained in the ECI/ ECEC database or the PSID dat abase. 
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CES earnings is due to (i) differences in earnings concept; and (ii) differences in 
population coverage. Furthermore, the comparison of CPS earnings with LPC and 
CES earnings is interesting in its own right because the micro-data of the CPS is 
publicly available and its earnings series has been widely used in cross-sectional 
studies on U.S. labor market characteristics.3 
Analysis of the CPS data yields several interesting results. First, we document 
that the evolution of average earnings from the CPS falls in between the evolution 
of LPC earnings and CES earnings, both in terms of trend growth and changes 
in business cycle volatility. Given the shared characteristics of the CPS earnings 
data with both the LPC and the CES data, this result suggests that the divergence 
between LPC and CES earnings has indeed multiple sources. 
Second, using information from the National Income and Product Accounts (NI-
PAs) about the wage and salaries portion of earnings in the LPC as well as labor 
income share data for high-earning individuals computed by Piketty and Saez 
(2003), we show that differences in earnings concept account for almost all of the 
differences between CPS and LPC earnings. In particular, LPC earnings include 
supplements such as employer contributions to pension and health plans as well as 
earnings of high-income individuals (including gains from exercising certain stock 
options) whereas CPS earnings do not. Once these components of earnings are 
controlled for , LPC earnings and CPS earnings evolve very similarly. The CPS 
data therefore provides a reliable measure of wages and salaries that is represen-
tative of a very large part of the U.S. workforce. 
Third, based on information from the publicly available micro-data of the CPS, we 
find that differences in worker population coverage can account for a substantial 
3See Bound and Johnson (1992); Katz and Murphy (1992); or Lemieux (2006) among 
many others. 
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part of the divergence in trend growth and volatility between CPS earnings and 
CES earnings. However, the sources of the remaining differences remain an open 
question. We conjecture that compositional changes in the CES due to a major 
sample expansion occurring between the early 1980s and the late 1990s represent 
one of the most plausible candidates . 
We are not the first to document differences m average hourly wages for the 
U.S. economy. In particular, Abraham, Splet zer and Stewart (1998) analyze in 
detail the differences in trend growth of the three labor earnings series studied 
here. While our paper builds heavily on their analysis, we make three distinct 
contributions. First, we extend the sample analyzed by Abraham, Spletzer and 
Stewart (1998) by almost 20 years to show that the three wage series continued to 
diverge in the 1990s and the 2000s and that sever al of the reasons for the divergence 
discussed in their paper continue to be important . Second, Abraham, Spletzer 
and Stewart (1998) only consider the divergence in trend growth whereas we also 
document the divergence in business cycle volatilities and show that the sources 
for this divergence are, to sorne extent, the same as the ones for the divergence 
in trends. Third, our analysis reveals that the difference in earnings concept can 
account for almost all of the divergence between LPC and CPS earnings, which 
is an important result given the widespread use of the CPS earnings data. 
Our paper also builds on earlier work by Gali and Van Rens (2010) and Cham-
pagne and Kurmann (2013) who document the divergence in business cycle volatil-
ity of the CES wage relative to LPC and CPS wages. Compared to these two 
studies, we provide a detailed analysis for the reasons behind this divergence.4 
4 There is also an extensive survey by Abraham and Halti wanger (1995) on t he correlation 
of hourly wages wit h the business cycle. Their focus is most ly on t he sensit ivity of results .to 
t he measurement of nominal wages, nominal priees, and cyclical condi t ions. Our focus, by 
cont rast, is on t he volatility of real hourly wages . In t he interest of completeness, we also show 
sorne results for t he correlation of our hourly wage series with t he business cycle and how this 
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Finally, while our findings are suggestive of important structural changes in the 
U.S. labor market, it is important to stress that the analysis of these changes, 
however important, is not the focus of the paper. Instead, the primary contribu-
tion of the paper is to provide a detailed account of the divergence in different 
popular aggregate hourly wage series so as to obtain better guidance on which 
wage series to use for the analysis of different aspects of the U.S. labor market. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the different 
data series and documents the divergence in aggregate hourly wages. Section 3 
examines different potential explanations. Section 4 concludes. 
2.2 Divergent average wages: data and facts 
We begin with a description of the different data sources. Additional details 
are available in the appendix. Then we document the divergent evolution of the 
average hourly wage series in terms of trend, business cycle volatility and business 
cycle correlation. For ease of exposition, we directly report for average hourly 
wages, average earnings per worker and average hours per worker from the LPC, 
the CES and from the CPS May/ ORG data. 
2.2.1 Data 
The La bor Productivity and Costs (LPC) data base reports a variety of l_abor mar-
ket variables for the non-farm business sector available quarterly starting in 1948. 
Its weekly earnings measure has two components: 'wages and salaries'; and 'sup-
plements'. The 'wages and salaries' component is based on the Quarterly Census 
of Employment and Wages (QCEW) - also known as the BLS' ES-202 program 
correlation changed over time. Similar results are reported in Gali and Van Rens (2010) and 
Champagne and Kurmann (2013). 
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- a mandatory employer-based program for all employees covered by unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) that spans about 98% of U.S. establishments and jobs. Wage 
and salary disbursements are very comprehensive and include executive compen-
sation, commissions, tips, bonuses and gains from exercising non-qualified stock 
options. The 'supplements' component is based on estimates by the Bureau of 
Economie Analysis and consists of vacation pay, employer contributions to pen-
sion and health plans, and employer contributions for government social insurance. 
Average weekly hours in the LPC are based primarily on hours from the Current 
Employment Statistics (CES) survey (see below), supplemented by hours from 
the Current Population Survey ( CPS) for workers not covered by the CES. The 
hourly wage series computed from these average earnings and hours measures 
('LPC wage' for short) is very comprehensive, both in terms of earnings concept 
and population coverage. 
The second source of earnings and hours cornes from the Current Employment 
Statistics (CES), which is a monthly survey starting in 1964 and is administered 
on a voluntary basis. The sample was significantly expanded during the 1980s and 
1990s and currently covers about 140,000 private-sector firms representing almost 
500,000 establishments. The historical CES earnings only covers production and 
nonsupervisory workers and comprises regular wage and salary disbursements as 
well as overtime, commissions and bonuses but only if paid each pay period. 5 
Tips, irregular bonuses, gains from exercising stock options, and supplements are 
excluded. The hourly wage series computed from the CES measures of earnings 
and hours ('CES wage' for short) is therefore more restrictive than the LPC wage, 
both in terms of earnings concept and population coverage. 
The third source of earnings and hours cornes from the Current Population Sur-
5Start ing in 2006, t he CES started collecting data for a ll workers . We use t his informa-
tion below. 
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vey (CPS) , which is a monthly household survey of about 60 ,000 individuals that 
can be weighted to make them representative of the U.S. Census. Information on 
earnings and hours are available from different extracts of the CPS. As in Abra-
ham, Spletzer and Stewart (1998) , Lemieux (2006) , and Champagne and Kurmann 
(2013), we use information from the annual CPS May supplements from 1973 to 
1978 together with information from the monthly outgoing rotation groups (ORG) 
from 1979 onwards to construct annual series of earnings and hours for private-
sector workers.6 CPS earnings are comprised of wages and salaries, including 
overtime, tips and commissions (OTC) and bonuses if earned and paid in each 
period. 7 Irregular bonuses, gains from exercising stock options and supplemen-
tal benefits are excluded. Furthermore, earnings are topcoded. For hourly-paid 
workers, the CPS topcodes earnings at $99.99 per hour, a threshold rarely crossed. 
For salaried workers, the CPS topcodes weekly earnings at $999 until1989; $1923 
between 1989 and 1997; and $2884 from 1998 onwards. For certain years, this 
puts a substantial share of workers above the topcode. To reduce the risk of 
6 An interviewed individual appears in the CPS for two periods of four consecut ive 
months, separated by eight months during which the individual is left out of t he survey. Before 
1979, earnings quest ions were asked only in March and May of each year (the March and May 
supplements) . Thereafter , an earnings question is asked each mont h for individuals who are at 
the end of a fo ur-mont h rotat ion (the ORG extracts) . This information is collected each year 
by the NBER into a single merged ORG fi le, available on the NBER website. For the years 
between 1973 and 78, t he May supplements yield an average of 30,406 observations per year . 
From 1979 onwards, the merged ORG files yield an average of 139,230 observations per year . 
Prior to 1979, we prefer the May supplements to t he Ylarch supplements because the earnings 
question in t he May supplements is consistent wi th t he one in the ORG fi les; and because the 
March supplements only contain information on total hours worked st arting in 1976. Further-
more, Lemieux (2006) argues that t he earnings data from t he Mm·ch supplements are subject to 
ot her measurement errors not present in t he CPS May/ORG files . See his paper for d iscussion. 
7 CPS respondents are first asked if t hey are salaried or pa id by t he hour. In t he fi rst case 
they report earnings on a weekly basis, in t he latter caes on an hourly basis. Salaried workers 
report ali regular earnings including overt ime, t ips and commissions (OTC) if earned and paid 
in each period. Hourly-paid workers are asked to only report t heir regular hourly wage rate . 
In 1994, a new, separate question about OTC earnings was added for hourly-paid workers . As 
in Abraham, Spletzer and Stewart (1998), we do not use this addit ional OTC information for 
hourly workers for the baseline results. We use this information, however , in Section 3. 
51 
breaks in the earnings ' trend or spurious volatility induced by irregular topcode 
adjustments, we multiply topcoded earnings by a constant factor of 1.3 before av-
eraging across individuals. While this const ant-factor adjustment is standard in 
the labor literature, we also experiment with more sophisticated topcode adjust-
ments ( see the discussion in Section 3 and the appendix for details). Consistent 
with the LPC wage and the CES wage, the 'CPS wage' is computed as average 
weekly earnings divided by average weekly hours. Compared to the two other 
data sources, the CPS wage is similar to the CES wage in terms of its earnings 
concept but provides coverage representative of the non-farm business workforce 
of the US economy, as the LPC wage.8 We exploit this 'in-between ' characteristic 
of the CPS wage relative to the LPC wage and the CES wage for much of our 
analysis. 
All three earnings measures and therefore all three hourly wage series are deflated 
using the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) index from the National 
Income and Products Accounts (NIPAs) Y 
2.2.2 Trends 
Figure 2.1 plots the evolution of the three average real hourly wage series (all in 
naturallogs). Three observations stand out. First, in the early 1970s, the LPC 
wage is already about 35% higher than the CES wage and the CPS wage. Second, 
the LPC wage grows at a substantially higher rate over the sample, ending up 
8 As opposed to CP S earnings, CES earnings do not include t ips . According to Abraham, 
Stewart and Splet zer (1998), however , t ips represented only a very small part of total earnings. 
It is t herefore unlikely t hat t ips play a major role in explaining t he divergence of t he CES wage. 
!J As Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) point out , t here is controversy about the priee 
index that should be used to deflate wages. While the choice of deflator may be important for 
the determination of the real wage levet at any given point in time, our conclusions about t he 
divergence in the t hree series is not affected by the use of alternative deflators. 
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86% and 67% higher than the CES wage and the CPS wage, respectively, in 2009. 
Third, while the CPS wage grows consistently throughout the sample, the CES 
wage experiences a prolonged decline between the mid 1970s and the early 1990s. 
2.2.3 Business cycle volatilit ies 
To compute business cycle statistics, we take logarithms of the different hourly 
wage series and extract the business cycle component using the Hodrick-Prescott 
(H-P) filter. 10 Then, we compute standard deviations of each series for the pre-
10 The H-P fi lter constant is set to 1600 for quarterly data and 6.25 for annual data as 
recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) . Resu lts are robust to alternative filtering methods. 
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1984 period and the post-1984 period. The break in 1984 is motivated by the 
Great Moderation literature that estima tes a significant change in output volatility 
around 1984 ( e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000). 
The first panel of Table 2.1 reports standard deviations for quarterly series of 
the LPC wage and the CES wage for the subsamples 1964:1-1983:4 and 1984:1-
2011:4, with standard errors provided in bracketsY The second panel of Table 2.1 
reports the same standard deviations using annualized data for the samples 1973-
1983 and 1984-2011 together with standard deviations for the CPS wage. Both 
tables also show the corresponding standard deviation of non-farm business chain-
weighted GDP as a benchmark and report the ratio of the standard deviation 
of the different wage series to the standard deviation of GDP ( denoted relative 
standard deviation). 
There is a clear divergence in business cycle volatility for the three hourly wage 
series. While the volatility of the LPC wage increases by 35% to 45% between the 
pre-84 period and the post-84 period, the volatility of the CPS wage increases only 
by about 20% and the volatility of the CES wage drops by about 50%. Since the 
volatility of output drops by 40% to 50% between the two periods (i.e. the Great 
Moderation) , the relative volatility of hourly wages increases two- to threefold 
according to the LPC and the CPS but remains roughly unchanged according to 
the CES. Furthermore, the LPC wage and the CPS wage are equally volatile in 
the pre-84 period, whereas the volatility of the CES wage is substantially higher 
during that period. 
11 Standard errors are computed via t he delta method from GMM-based estimates . See 
the appendix for details. 
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Relative 
Sta ndard Deviation Standard Devia tion 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post!Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post!Pre-84 
Qua rterly data 
Output 2.73 1.62 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.31) (0.23) 
LPC wage 0.68 0.97 1.43 0.25 0.60 2.41 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11) 
CES wage 1.1 3 0.57 0.50 0.41 0.35 0.85 
(0.20) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) 
Annua l data 
Output 2.91 1.46 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.19) (0.25) 
LPC wage 0.64 0.85 1.33 0.22 0.58 2.65 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.04) (0.15) 
CPS wage 0.64 0.76 1.19 0.22 0.52 2.37 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) 
CES wage 1.01 0.50 0.49 0.35 0.34 0.98 
(0.15) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Notes : Total sarrple ex tends from 1964:1 to 2011:11/ for quarterly data; from 1973 to 2011 for annual data. Nonfarm business sec tor. 
FCE-deflated w ages. P-values are reported for a test of equality of variances across the two subsafl'l)les. Standard err ors corrpute 
using GMM and the Delta method appear in parentheses below estimates. 
Table 2.1 Changes in business cycle volatilties 
2.2.4 Correlations 
Table 2.2 reports the correlation coefficients of the three H-P filtered wage series, 
both with respect to non-farm business GDP and total non-farm business hours 
from the LPC. As before , the first panel shows results for quarterly data for the 
samples 1964:1-1983:4 and 1984:1-2011:4; and the second panel shows results for 
annual data for the samples 1973-1983 and 1984--2011. While there are noteworthy 
differences in the pre-84 period ( e.g. the correlation of the CES wage with both 
output and hours is markedly higher than for the other two wage series), all three 
wage series experience a sizable drop in correlation into negative territory for the 
post-84 period. 
Corre lations w/ GDPnfb Correlati ons w/ Hours 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post - Pre 84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post- Pre 84 
Quarterly data 
LPCwage 0.35 -0.22 -0.57 0.21 -0.41 -0.62 
(0.18) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) 
CES wage 0.60 -0.34 -0.94 0.45 -0.35 -0.80 
(0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.15) 
Annual data 
LPC wage 0.39 -0.25 -0.64 0.21 -0.43 -0.65 
(0.30) (0.13) (0.23) (0.14) 
CES wage 0.66 -0.34 -1.01 0.52 -0.37 -0.89 
(0.22) (0.23) (0.19) (0.22) 
CPS wage 0.17 -0.46 -0.63 0.06 -0.44 -0.51 
(0.27) (0.23) (0.33) (0.17) 
Notes: Total sarrple extends from 1964:1 to 2011 :11/ for quarterly data; from 1973 to 2011 for annual data. Nonfarm business sector. 
Cyclical indicator are: (1) real chained-$ nonfarm business GDP (NIPAs} per capita, and (2) hours per capita from LFC. Standard 
errors appear in parentheses below estirrates. 
Table 2.2 Changes in business cycle correlations 
2.3 Potential explanations 
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Since each of the average hourly wage series is constructed by dividing an earnings 
measure with an hours worked measure, we start by decomposing the divergence 
in trend and business cycle volatility into differences coming from the earnings 
side and the hours side. Second, we consider three specifie sources of divergence: 
(i) differences in earnings concepts; (ii) differences in population coverage; and 
(iii) measurement issues. 
There are, of course, other differences between the wage series. However, as our 
analysis reveals, the three candidate sources we consider are likely to account for 
a large part of the divergence. 
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2.3.1 Earnings versus hours 
Each of t he average hourly wage series is constructed by dividing an earnings 
measure by an hours measure; i.e. 
where Wit denotes the average hourly wage from data source i at time t; vVit 
the corresponding average (weekly) earnings measure; and H it the corresponding 
average ( weekly) hours measure. Renee, the divergence in the different average 
hourly wage series must come from different evolutions in either earnings, hours, 
or both. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 plot the evolution of log average weekly earnings and log 
average weekly hours used in the computation of the three hourly wage series. 
Figure 2.2 shows that similarly to average hourly wages, there is already a level 
difference in 1973 between weekly earnings from the LPC and the two other weekly 
earnings measures . Thereafter, weekly earnings from both the LPC and the CPS 
grow consistently although the average growth rate of LPC weekly earnings is 
higher. By contrast, weekly earnings from the CES fall substantially between the 
mid-1970s and the early 1990s before recovering to their early 1970s level by 2010. 
Figure 2.3 shows that while the LPC and the CES measure of weekly hours both 
decrease in similar fashion over t ime, the CPS measure of weekly hours fluctuates 
around an approximately constant level. 
To quantify the importance of these differences for the divergence in the three 
hourly wage series, we use growth accounting techniques. First, we decompose 
the log difference of the average hourly wage from data source i between 1973 
and 2011 into the log differences of the corresponding weekly earnings and the 
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weekly hours measures. Then, we subtract the same decomposition for the log 
difference of the average hourly wage from data source j to obtain the percent 
contributions of differences in weekly earnings growth and weekly hours growth 
for the difference in average hourly wage growth; i.e. 
where !:::. log w i denotes the log difference in the average hourly wage from data 
source i between 1973 and 2011 and so forth. FiguJe 2.4 reports the results. Figure 
2.4 shows that the divergence in average hourly wage growth between the LPC 
and CES is entirely due to the difference in earnings growth. By contrast, only 
about two thirds of the considerably smaller divergence in average hourly wage 
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growth between the LPC and the CPS is due to smaller weekly earnings growth 
in the CPS. The remaining third of the divergence in average hourly wage growth 
is due to the fact that LPC weekly hours decreased consistently over time whereas 
CPS weekly hours remained appro:ximately constant . 
The results in Figure 2.4 confirm the previous findings by Abraham, Spletzer and 
Stewart (1998) for a substantially longer sample. The close association between 
LPC and CES hours should not come as a surprise since LPC hours are primarily 
constructed from CES hours. The divergence between CES (respectively LPC) 
hours and CPS hours is also relatively well-known and has been investigated in a 
recent paper by Frazis and Stewart (2010). We return to discussing their findings 
below. 
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Note: The figure decomposes total ho<1rly wage groo;th {blue) belw<en 1973 and 20t l into total e.unings growth (led) and total hours grm\1h (gr«n), i.e: 
âlog(w) - âlog(W) - àlog(H) 
where w denotes the avm ge hourJy wage, W denotes weekly •• 1mings, and H denotes weekly hours W<1fKOO for the LPC. CES, and CPS d.m sets. TIJe 
accomp>lll}ing table RpOrts the difftlffires in gro\\11h rates between the diffèrent c.ompooents .. 
Figure 2.4 Accounting for the divergence in average hourly wage growth 
The decomposition of average hourly wages into weekly earnings and weekly hours 
can also be used to analyze the divergence in business cycle volatility. Specifically, 
the variance of average hourly wage growth from data source i can be expressed 
as 
where a;;= Var( .6. logwit ); a~; = Var( .6.log Hit); and 
Pw H = Corr(.6. log Wit, .6. log Hit )· By subtract ing this decomposition for some 
" ' 
subsample a from the decomposit ion of some other subsample b (i.e. between the 
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pre-84 period and the post-84 period), we obtain 
[O"?vJb)- O"~i(a) ] + [O"~i(b)- O"~i(a)] 
-2 [Pwi,I-db )O"wi (b )O" HJb) - Pwi,Hi (a )O"w; (a )O" H; (a)] . 
By manipulating this expression further to decompose t he multiplicative parts, 
we end up with 
) 
Hence, the change in variance of average hourly wage growth is accounted for by 
changes in either the volatility of earnings growth; the volatility of hours growth; 
or the correlation between earnings and hours growth. This allows us to quantify 
the sources of the divergence in business cycle volatility between the different 
average hourly wage series. 
As a preliminary to this volatility accounting exercise, Table 2.3 shows the post-84 
to pre-84 changes in volatilities and correlations of the three weekly earnings and 
weekly hours measures, together with the corresponding changes in the hourly 
wage volatilities reported in Table 2.1. Three observations stand out. First, the 
volatility of weekly earnings from both the LPC and the CPS experience a small 
decline although, interestingly, the volatility of weekly earnings from the CPS 
declines by a slightly smaller amount. 12 In comparison, the volatility of CES 
12 The small decline in volatility of weekly earnings from the LPC and the CPS is con-
sistent with recent findings from micro-data that for most individuals, the volatility of labor 
incarne has remained approximately constant (e .g. Dynan et al. , 2008; Jensen and Shore, 2008). 
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LPC 1973-1984 1984-2011 post 84 - pre 84 
Std(hou rly wage) 0.64 0.85 0.21 
Std('t..eek/y earnings) 0.90 0.80 -0.10 
Std(ooek/y hours) 0.41 0.45 0.04 
corr(ooek /y earnings, ooekly hours) 0.78 O. 17 -0.61 
CES 1973-1984 1984-2011 post 84 - pre 84 
Std(hourly wage) 1.01 0.50 -0.51 
Std(ooek /y earnings) 1.29 0.49 -0.79 
Std(ooek ly hours) 0.38 0.36 -0.02 
corr(ooekly earnings, ooek/y hours) 0.79 0.35 -0.44 
CPS 1973-1984 1984-2011 post 84- pre 84 
Std(hourly wage) 0.64 0.76 0.12 
Std(ooek/y earnings) 0.76 0.69 -0.07 
Std(ooekly hours) 0.41 0.28 -0.13 
corr(ooekly earnings, ooek ly hours) 0.56 -0.04 -0.59 
•Note: A nnual data, H-P f inered. Standard deviations are rrultiplied by 100. 
Table 2.3 Changes in standard deviations and correlations of weekly earnings 
and weekly hours 
weekly earnings drops about 8 times as much. Second, t he volatility of weekly 
hours remains approximately constant in the LPC and the CES but decreases 
slightly in the CPS. Third, the correlation of weekly earnings with weekly hours 
drops in all three data sets but the drop is lm·ger for the LPC and the CPS. 13 These 
observations imply, maybe somewhat surprisingly, that the incr-ease in volatility 
of the average hourly wage in the LPC and the CPS is entirely due to the drop in 
correlation between weekly earnings and weekly hours (since a drop in correlation 
affects hourly wage volatility posit ively). In turn, the large drop in volatility of 
the CES wage is driven by the large drop in volatility of weekly earnings. 
F igure 2.5 displays the results of the volatility accounting exercise based on the 
t:lSince LPC hours and CES hours are very highly correlated in bath subsamples (0.99 
and 0.98, respectively) , the larger drop in correlat ion between earnings and hours in the LPC is 
entirely due to the different cyclical properties of earnings . 
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numbers m Table 2.3.14 The figure provides quantitat ive confirmat ion for the 
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Figure 2.5 Accounting for the divergence in business cycle volatility of average 
hourly wages 
above observat ion that the large drop in correlation between earnings and hours is 
behind the increase in hourly wage volatility in the LPC and the CPS . The increase 
in the volatility of the LPC wage is larger than the increase in the volatility of the 
CPS wage because in the LPC, the drop in correlation between earnings and hours 
is attributed a larger weight in the above variance decomposit ion (due to larger 
average earnings and hours volatilities in the LPC). In t urn, the large drop in the 
1 1The volatility account ing formula is deri ved for first-differenced data whereas the results 
in Table 3 pertain to H-P fi ltered data. This introduces an approximation error t hat is, however, 
only of minor quantitative importance . 
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volatility of the CES wage is primarily due to the large fall in earnings volatility 
and the somewhat smaller drop in correlation between earnings and hours. 
We take away two main lessons from the trend and volatility decomposition ex-
erclses: 
1. The divergence in both trend and volatility between the LPC wage and 
the CES wage is entirely driven by the divergence in trend and volatility 
of weekly earnings. Weekly hours from the LPC and CES behave, by con-
struction, very similarly. 
2. The divergence in trend growth of the LPC wage relative to the CPS wage 
is due to the smaller growth of weekly earnings in the CPS and, to a lesser 
extent, the difference in the evolution of weekly hours. The lar·ger increase 
in volatility of the LPC wage relative to the CPS wage is mainly due to a 
smaller contribution of the drop in correlation between earnings and hours 
in the CPS. 
Based on these results, differences in earnings behavior become the main focus of 
our attempt to reconcile the divergence in average hourly wages. 
2.3.2 Differences in earnings concepts 
As described in Section 2, LPC earnings are based on a very broad concept that 
includes executive compensation, tips, bonuses and gains from executing non-
qualified stock options; as well as supplements such as vacation pay and employer 
contributions to pension and health plans. By contrast, CPS and CES earnings 
only include compensation that is earned and paid each period; and completely 
exclude supplements. 
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Given the similarity in earnings concepts between the CPS and the CES, we focus 
on the comparison between LPC earnings and CPS earnings. First, we try to 
compare the wages and salaries component of the LPC to the one from the CPS. 
Second, we use information in the CPS on overtime, tips and commissions (OTC) 
to assess the importance of a particular type 'regular' bonus payments for hourly-
paid workers. Third, we use wage share information on top incarne earners from 
Piketty and Saez (2003, updated to 2010) to quantify the role played by earnings 
of high-income individuals in the LPC. 
Wages and salaries 
To compare the wages and salaries component of LPC earnings to the one from 
the CPS, we need to strip out supplements components from LPC earnings. Un-
fortunately, this cannat be clone directly in the LPC dataset because it does not 
contain separate information on these two components of compensation. Separate 
information on the two components is, however, provided by the incarne tables in 
the ational In come and Product Accounts (I IPAs), from which the LPC pro-
gram computes its earnings series. At the same time, the publicly available NIPA 
data do not contain all information to reconstruct the non-farm business coverage 
employed by the LPC. 15 We therefore consider a 'private non-agriculture' coverage 
of earnings that is straightforward to compute from the NIPAs. 
Figure 2.6 plots the resulting NIPA series of average weekly earnings bath for total 
compensation including supplements (labeled ' I IPA total compensation ') and the 
wages and salaries component (labeled ' IPA wages&salaries') . The figure also 
15 As explained in more detail in t he appendix, the LPC non-farm business data excludes 
farms, households and non-profits and general government ; but includes agricultura l services, 
forestry and fishing, government services and imputee! data for self-employee!. Severa! of these 
added and subtracted components are unavailable publicly over t he ent ire sample period. 
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contains, for comparison, the LPC (non-farm business) series of weekly earnings 
from above; and two weekly private non-agricultural earnings series computed 
from the CPS. The series labeled 'CPS private non-agricultural' is the equivalent 
of the CPS wage from above. The series labeled 'CPS non-agricultural with OTC' 
includes OTC payments and is discussed further below.As shown by the top two 
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Figure 2.6 Comparison of aggregate weekly earnings measures 
lines, t here is sorne difference in total compensation (i.e. earnings including sup-
plements) between non-farm business sector covered by the LPC and the private 
non-agricultural sector as computed from the NIPAs. However, this difference 
is small compared to the substantial and widening gap between NIPA private 
non-agricultural earnings based on total compensation and earnings based on the 
wages and salaries component. This gap, which started to appear in the 1960s 
illustrates that the inclusion of supplements are an important reason for the level 
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difference and the divergence in trends between LPC earnings and CPS earnings 
(and therefore CES earnings). 
Table 2.4 displays the business cycle volatility of the same earnings series for the 
pre-84 and post-84 subsamples . The decline in volatility of total compensation 
Changes in Volatility : Average Weekly Earnings 
Relative 
Sta ndard Deviation Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 
HP-Fi lter 
Output (nib) 2.91 1.42 0.49 1.00 1.00 
(0.19) (0.22) 
LPC total compensation (nib) 0.90 0.81 0.90 0.31 0.57 
(0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.14) 
NIPA total compensation (private non-agri) 0.89 0.71 0.80 0.31 0.50 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.05) (0.12) 
NIPA wages&salaries (private non-agri ) 0.76 0.84 1.11 0.26 0.59 
(0. 11) (0.10) (0.04) (0. 11 ) 
CPS (private non-agri) 0.76 0.69 0.90 0.26 0.48 
(0. 13) (0.12) (0.04) (0.13) 
CPS with OTC (private non-agri) 0.84 0.79 0.94 0.29 0.56 
(0.14) (0.12) (0.04) (0.15) 
Notes : Total sarrple ex tends from 1973 to 2010. Annual data; FC&deflated w ages (2005 dollars). Standard errors corrputed us1ng Gtvf\.1 and the 
E:elta method appear in parentheses below es timates. 
Table 2.4 Comparison of aggregate weekly earnings measures 
1.00 
1.85 
1.64 
2.28 
1.84 
1.94 
m the post-84 period is slightly larger. for the NIPAs priva t e non-agricultural 
aggregate than for the LPC non-farm business aggregate. This difference is due 
to small differences in the evolution of volatility for segments of the population 
that are included in the LPC (such as self-employed) but excluded from the NIPAs 
aggregate and vice versa. 
More interesting is the increase in volatility of the 'wages and salaries' component 
computed from the NIPAs. This result obtains because supplements, which are 
excluded in this 'wages and salaries' series but included in total compensation, fell 
in volatility in line with the business cycle. In other words, once supplements are 
stripped out from NIPA earnings (or, equivalently, LPC) earnings, there is thus 
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also a divergence in earnings volatility between NIPA earnings and CPS earnings 
(which does not contain supplements). 
Overtime, tips and commissions 
As described in Section 2, salaricd workers in the CPS report all earnings in-
cluding OTC if earned and paid each period. Hourly-paid workers, by contrast , 
were historically asked to only report their regular hourly wage rate, thus ex-
cluding OTC. Since hourly-paid workers represent almost 60% of the workforce 
(and around 50% of the total wage bill), the CPS earnings measure is likely to 
understate the true level of regular earnings. Furthermore, since overtime work 
increased substantially during the 1980s and 1990s (see Kuhn and Lozano, 2008) 
and is likely to be more volatile than regular pay, the CPS earnings measure is 
also likely to understate the true trend and volatility of earnings over time. 
To obtain a measure of earnings including OTC for hourly workers in the CPS, 
we proceed as follows. Prior to 1994, we use the greater of weekly _ earnings and 
wage _rate* hours to obtain a measure of earnings that includes at least sorne 
of the OTC received by hourly-paid workers (see the appendix for details and a 
discussion on why this measure is incomplete). Starting in 1994, the CPS intro-
duced a separate question about OTC earnings for hourly-paid workers, which we 
add to the usual wage _rate * hours series. 
The last line in Figure 2.6 and Table 2.4 report the results, labeled 'CPS with OTC 
(private non-agricultural)'. Adding OTC for hourly-paid workers indeed leads to 
a systematic level increase with a discrete jump in 1994 when the OTC question 
was introduced. Including OTC thus covers at least part of the gap between CPS 
earnings and NIPA / LPC earnings. As Table 2.4 indicates, adding OTC also leads 
to a smaller drop in the volatility of CPS earnings for the post-1984 subsample. 
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Further analysis reveals, however, that this is mostly the result of a discontinuity 
resulting from the introduction of additional OTC earnings question in 1994. Once 
we control for this discontinuity, the smaller drop in volatility disappears. 
Labor earnings of high-income individuals 
While the CPS contains all information to construct a representative average 
weekly earnings series of private non-agricultural workforce, respectively the en-
tire U.S . workforce, publicly available earnings data is topcoded for high-income 
individuals (see the description in Section 2), t hus downweighing their contri-
bution to average weekly earnings. But even if earnings for these high-income 
individuals was not topcoded , the CPS data would still miss a substantial portion 
of high-income individuals ' compensation due to the restrictive earnings concept 
in the CPS. In contrast, the earnings concept in the LPC (and NIPAs) is much 
more comprehensive because the QCEW, its basis for earnings, includes irregular 
cash bonuses and gains from exercising non-qualified stock options. This may 
affect the evolution of earnings in non-trivial ways .16 
This difference between CPS and LPC / NIPAs earnings are particularly interest-
ing to investigate because recent evidence shows that the share of total labor in-
come by high-earning individuals has increased importantly over the past decades. 
Most prominently, based on tabulations from the Internai Revenue Service (IRS), 
Piketty and Saez (2003, updated to 2010) document that the top 1% individuals 
of the income distribution saw their share of total economy-wide income increase 
from a stable 8% between the 1950s to the mid-1990s to 23.5% in 2007. This 
remarkable growth is due mostly to the growing inequality in labor income and 
16Irregular bonuses, but not gains from exercises stock options, are included in the CPS 
:vlarch supplements. We plan to quant ify the importance of these bonuses in a subsequent 
version of the paper. 
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implies earnings of high-income individuals play an increasingly important role 
for the trend of average weekly earnings as recorded in the LPC / NIPAs. Like-
wise, if earnings of high-income individuals have become more volatile, then this 
could explain why the volatility of the LPC hourly wage increased so much in the 
post-84 period. 17 
To assess the role played by earnings of high-income individuals, we use infor-
mation on top wage income shares from Piketty and Saez to calculate a separate 
series of average weekly earnings for the top 5% earners and the remaining 95% 
in each year. We th en compare the two series to average weekly earnings for 
the corresponding top 5% earners in the CPS (of which a fraction have topcoded 
earnings) and the remaining 95%.18 Since the earnings concept of the IRS data 
used by Piketty and Saez is very similar to the one employed in the QCEW, 
the comparison allows us to consider the role played by high-income individuals 
and their irregular earnings that are not taken into account in the CPS. At the 
same time, since IRS data does not allow a distinction into different sectors, the 
Piketty-Saez data is only available for 'all economy'. We therefore recompute the 
CPS earnings series for an 'all economy' equivalent. Figure 2.7 shows the results. 
Unsurprisingly, there is a large and widening difference in average weekly earnings 
between the top 5% earners and the remaining 95%. What is striking, however, is 
that average weekly earnings for the 95% computed from Piketty and Saez (2003, 
2011), labeled 'P-S 0-95' , evolves almost identically to the one computed from 
17This is particularly relevant for stock options because they are likely to be exercised in 
upturns when t heir value is higher than their fair-market value at t he t ime t hey were granted (i.e. 
the t ime when they should have been recorded as compensation). See Mehran and Tracy (2001) 
who argue t hat the growth of stock opt ions in the 1990s and their inclusion in compensation 
at the time of exercise has biased the evolution of compensation upwards. T he authors also 
conjecture that increased use of stock options may render compensation more variable. 
18 We use a 5%-95% split simply because in the CPS data, t he fract ion of individuals wit h 
topcoded earnings never exceeds 5%. 
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Figure 2. 7 Log average real earnings for different income groups 
the CPS, labeled 'CPS 0-95' . In contrast, for the top 5% earners, weekly earn-
ings computed from Piketty-Saez grow at a substantially higher pace than weekly 
earnings for the 5% top earners in the CPS. 
To further quantify the importance of this difference in weekly earnings for high-
income individuals, we take Piketty and Saez' (2003, 2011) weekly earnings in-
formation for the top-income groups (i.e. top 0.01%, 0.1%-0.01%, 0.5%-0.1%, ... to 
1%-5%) and extrapolate new values for topcoded CPS earnings for each year from 
1973 to 2009 (the last year for which the P iketty-Saez data is currently available) . 
Based on this extrapolation, we then compute a new 'topcode corrected' weekly 
earnings measure for the CPS and analyze to what extent this measure tracks 
the evolution of weekly earnings from the NIPA wages and salaries portion. The 
specifies of the procedure are described in the appendix. Figure 2.8 shows the 
results. We notice that weekly earnings from the topcode corrected measure of 
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Figure 2.8 Log average real income corrected for high-income individuals 
the CPS closes most of the gap with the NIPA wages and salaries series. If, in ad-
dition, we adjust for the small difference in weekly earnings for the remaining 95% 
earners between the CPS and the Piketty-Saez measure, labeled 'CPS topcode & 
0-95 corrected', we basically close the gap. 
Table 2.5 reports on the business cycle volatility of weekly earnings of the different 
series in Figures 2.7 and 2.8. For comparison, the table also shows the NIPA wages 
and salaries series for 'all economy' . The first panel confirms that weekly earnings 
for the top 5% earners are substantially more volatile than for the remaining 95% 
and have, according to the Piketty-Saez data, greatly increased in volatility for the 
post-84 period. The second panel shows that correcting the CPS earnings series 
with the Piketty-Saez data reduces the drop in volatility and, in one instance, 
Changes in Volatility : Average Weekly Earnings 
Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post!Pre-84 
Percentiles 
P-S P0-95 0.87 0.59 0.68 
CPS P0-95 0.83 0.59 0.72 
P-S P95-100 1.03 2.66 2.58 
CPS P95-1 00 1.17 1.44 1.23 
Aggregates 
NIPA wages&salaries ail economy 0.85 0.68 0.80 
CPS ail economy 0.74 0.64 0.86 
CPS with P-S topcode adjustment 0.73 0.76 1.04 
CPS with P-S topcode adjustment and 0-95 lift 0.77 0.69 0.90 
Notes : CPS May-MORG data and Aketty-Saez "Top incorre shares" database. Real Average Weekly Earnings 
(2005 dollars). Annual data. Ali economy. Sarfllle: 1973 to 2009. Ali data are H-Pfiltered. 
Table 2.5 Effect of high-income individuals on average earnings volatilities 
slightly increases it. 19 
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We conclude from this investigation that differences in earnings concept between 
the QCEW and the CPS explain the vast majority of the divergence in weekly 
earnings between the two data sets and therefore also account for at least part of 
the divergence in trend and volatility between the LPC wage and the CES wage. 
2.3.3 Differences in population coverage 
As described in Section 2, the LPC and the CES cover different segments of the 
U.S. workforce. Specifically weekly earnings in the LPC is based on the QCEW 
and includes labor income of the near totality of workers in the non-farm business 
sector. By contrast , the CES historical sample covers only earnings of production 
19 Also note from t his panel t hat t he volati li ty of the 'ail economy' aggregate of NIPA 
wages and salaries falls substantially while it increased for the 'pri vate non-agricultural' aggre-
gate. By contrast, for t he CPS , t here is no corresponding fall in earnings volat ility of the 'ail 
economy' aggregate relative to the 'private non-agricu ltural' aggrega.te. We plan to a.na.lyze t his 
issue furt her in subsequent versions of the pa.per . 
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and non-supervisory workers. In 2006, the CES started collecting earnings and 
hours information for all workers in the sampled establishments. Comparing earn-
ings for this 'all worker' sample to earnings from the sample of production and 
non-supervisory workers should therefore provide information on the role played 
by the difference in population coverage. Figure 2.9 shows the result of this com-
parison, together with average earnings from the non-farm business population in 
the CPS ( which, as discussed ab ove, is based on a very similar earnings concept as 
the CES). The figure reveals that average weekly earnings for the 'all worker' sam-
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Figure 2. 9 Log real average earnings for different population coverage in the CES 
ple of the CES are about 20% higher than for the production and non-supervisory 
sample and almost match the level of average earnings in the CPS. The difference 
in population coverage therefore explains most of the gap between CES earnings 
and CPS earnings at the end of the sample (respectively LPC earnings once the 
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difference in earnings concept is taken into account). vVhat needs to be explored 
is whether the difference in population coverage also explains the divergence in 
trends and volatility over time between CES earnings and CPS earnings. 
To assess this possibility, we employ the strategy used in Abraham, Spletzer and 
Stewart (1998) and create a weekly earnings measure from the CPS data intcnded 
to replicate the population coverage in the CES. In a first instance, we use the 
official definition of production and non-supervisory workers from the BLS. As can 
be seen from Figure 2.10, the resulting series, labeled 'CES replication 1', fails to 
generate the trend and business cycle dynamics of weekly earnings in the CES.20 
As opposed to CES earnings, from CES replication 1 are already substantially 
below CPS earnings in the early 1970s and grow at approximately the same pace 
as CPS earnings thereafter. This result confirms, for a substantially longer sample, 
the findings reported by Abraham, Spletzer and Stewart (1998). 
Plewes (1982) and Abraham, Spletzer and Stewart (1998) argue, however, that es-
tablishments in the CES often mistakenly interpret production and non-supervisory 
workers as employees paid by the hour and other employees that are non-exempt 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Renee, by restricting the CPS sample to 
the definition of production and non-sup rvisory workers in the BLS, we may not 
necessarily capture what establishments in the CES sample report. In a second in-
stance, we use an alternative definition of production and non-supervisory workers 
constructed by Abraham, Spletzer and Stewart (1998) based on their assessment 
of what CES establishments report .21 As Figure 2.10 shows, the resulting series, 
20 The sample for this exercise stops in 2002 because occupations definitions in the CPS 
changed in 2003, making the construction of consistent occupation-specifie series difficult. 
21 We thank Jay Stewart for kindly providing us with the Stata codes u ed in Abraham 
et al. (1998). Our second CES replication therefore uses exactly the sa me definitions they use 
in their paper. 
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Figure 2.10 Replicating log average real earnings from the CES with CPS data 
labeled 'CES replication 2' , implies an even larger gap in earnings relative to the 
CES in the early 1970s. Thereafter, however, earnings from CES replication track 
earnings from the CES more closely, including a significant decline in earnings be-
tween the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Again, this result broadly confirms the 
findings reported in Abraham, Spletzer and Stewart (1998) for a longer sample. 
It is also interesting to assess the extent to which the two CES replications are 
capable of generating the large fall in earnings volatility in the CES from the pre-
84 to the post-84 subsample. Table 2.6 reports the results for both 1st-differenced 
and H-P filtered data. Earnings volatility from CES replication 1 drops somewhat 
more than earnings volatility from the CPS but not nearly enough to replicate the 
change in earnings volatility from the CES.22 In contrast, CES replication 2 cornes 
22 Notice that t he CPS earn ings volatility numbers for the post-1984 period are slightly 
different t han in Table 3 because the sample here stops in 2002 instead of 2011. 
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Changes in average earnings volatility 
Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Relative 
1 st-differe nee 
CPS 1.16 1.33 1.15 
CES replication 1 1.32 1.32 1.00 
CES replication 2 1.78 1.22 0.68 
CES 1.95 1.27 0.65 
HP-filter 
CPS 0.76 0.65 0.85 
CES replication 1 0.96 0.62 0.65 
CES replication 2 1.21 0.63 0.52 
CES 1.29 0.51 0.39 
Notes: CPS May-MORG data. Real Average Weekly Earnings (2005 dollars). Annual data. 
Sarrple: 1973 to 2002. 
Table 2.6 Replicating average real earnings volatility from the CES with CPS 
data 
close to matching the higher volatility of actual CES weekly earnings in the pre-84 
period and, depending on the :filtering method used, accounts for 79% to 91% of 
t he decline in volatility of the CES weekly earnings in the post-84 period.23 This 
further suggests that differences in population coverage can explain at least part 
of the divergence in trend and business cycle volatility of earnings in the CES. 
Naturally, the same issues of representativeness may explain the different evolution 
of weekly hours from the CES and the CPS. In a recent paper, Frazis and Stewart 
(2010) investigate t his possibility. They :find that both CES replication 1 and 2 
with the CPS sample decreases average hours by 1.3 to 1.7 hours, which basically 
closes the initial gap between CES and CPS hours. However, neither of t he 
replications can account for the downward trend in CES hours. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to assess the extent to which applying the two replication to both 
2;1Because first-differencing cuts out a part of t he fluctuations that are typically associated 
wit h the business cycle, we think that 79% is a more accurate and conservative estimate of how 
t he CES replication 2 accounts for the decline in CES weekly earnings after 1984. 
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weekly earnings and weekly hours allows us to explain the divergence in trend 
and business cycle between the CES hourly wage and the CPS hourly wage (and 
therefore, the LPC hourly wage). Figure 2.11 and Table 2.7 display the results. 
In terms of trends, CES replication 2 cornes surprisingly close to the CES hourly 
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Figure 2.11 Replicating log average real hourly wages from the CES with CPS 
data 
wage although there remains a large level difference between the two. In terms of 
business cycle volatility, results are broadly similar to the replication exercise for 
average earnings in Table 2.6. CES replication 1 generates hourly wage volatilities 
that remain close to the CPS hourly wage volatility. For first-differenced data, 
CES replication 2 accounts for the main share of the fall in volatility of CES 
hourly wages. For H-P filtered data, CES replication 2 accounts for about 55% of 
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Changes in average hourly wage volatility 
Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Relative 
1st-differe nee 
CPS 1.21 1.38 1.14 
CES replication 1 1.18 1.34 1.14 
CES replication 2 1.70 1.27 0.75 
CES 1.49 1.17 0.79 
HP-fi lter 
CPS 0.64 0.64 1.00 
CES replication 1 0.69 0.59 0.87 
CES replication 2 0.99 0.63 0.64 
CES 1.01 0.35 0.34 
Notes : CPS May-MORG data. Real average hourly earnings (2005 dollars) . Annual data. 
Sarrple: 1973 to 2002. 
Table 2.7 Replicating average real hourly wage volatility from the CES with CPS 
data 
the fall in volatility of CES hourly wages relative to the fall in volatility of CPS 
hourly wages, which is somewhat less than was the case for weekly earnings but 
still substantial. Also, for H-P filtered data, CES replication 2 cornes very close 
to generating the higher pre-84 hourly wage volatility in the CES. 
Overall , the CES replication exercises with CPS data suggest that the segment of 
workers for which establishments in the CES sample have traditionally reported 
earnings is not representative of the non-farm business sector workforce and that 
this lack of representativeness plays a major role in the divergence of the CES wage 
from the other wage series. In addition, the difference between CES replication 
1 and CES replication 2 suggest that the historical earnings and hours series 
from the CES do not even cover the subset of the workforce they are supposed 
to represent. This makes the use of historical CES earnings and hours series 
pro blematic. 
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2.3.4 Nieasurernent issues 
This last section describes a particular set of issues that affect t he CES earnings 
and hours measures but not the LPC and CPS measures, and how these issues 
may explain t he remaining part of the divergence in the CES earnings and hours 
measures .24 
First , the CES sample underwent a substantial expansion from about 160,000 to 
400,000 establishments between 1980 and 2006. This expansion is likely to have 
led to spurious changes in the CES average earnings measure. Specifically, based 
on ur microfiles, Plewes (1982) documents the following characteristics of the CES 
sample for the early 1980s: 
• Whereas 72% of all private-sector employment came from services-providing 
industries, this proportion in t he CES sample was only 30.4%. 
• The service establishments that the CES captured were on average much 
larger and older than the orres in t he ur records.25 Since the proport ion of 
small and young establishments in service-providing industries was higher 
than in goods-producing industries, this implied that the CES sample con-
tained few small and young establishments . 
The sample expansion of the CES that started in the early 1980s led to a better 
2 1This is not to say that the CPS does not suffer from measurement i sues . For example, 
as claimed by some researchers, hours in the CPS may be overreported (although Fraz is and 
Stewart (2010) argue that once ali t he necessary adjustments for sample representation and 
reporting period are made, overreporting in the CPS is not sign ificant). The point here is, 
however, tha.t we are not awa.re of systemat ic changes in measurements issues for the CPS that 
could lead to a bias in the evolut ion of the CPS wage similar to, we argue, is the case for t he 
CES earnings and hours. 
25 An important reason for t his underrepresentation is, according to Plewes (1982), the 
ina.bility / unwillingness of small establishments to provide information for the CES survey (BLS 
790 questionnaire), which is voluntary. 
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representation of the service-providing industries and, more generally, of small 
and young establishments. Because small and young establishments in service 
industries hire on average less skilled workers for whom hourly wages are lower and 
have become less volatile (see Champagne and Kurmann, 2013), the observations 
by Plewes (1982) imply that the resulting shift in sample composition may have 
led to spurious changes in the CES average earnings measures - both in terms 
of trend and business cycle volatility.26 It would be interesting to assess this 
conjecture using QCEW and CES earnings data that distinguishes establishments 
by industry and age. Such an exercise hinges on the availability of a micro-data 
that extends suffi.ciently far back in timeY 
2.4 Conclusion 
The evolution of average hourly wages is a key indicator for economie analysis. 
In the U.S., the Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) program and the Current 
Employment Statistics (CES) provide the two most popular and most readily 
available measures of average hourly wages for the non-farm business sector. In 
u; Note that employment numbers in the CES are benchmarked once a year to UI records 
(t he source of t he QCEW). Earnings and hours are, however, not benchmarked and therefore 
do not undergo a regular bias correction. 
27Furthermore, since average earnings in t he CES are a weighted sum of earnings across 
industries, the sample expansion is likely have decreased t he measurement error in sorne of 
the industries , thus reducing the volati lity of averag~earn i ngs . To see t his, think of measured 
earnings across establishments in sorne industry i, W;, t , as the sum of "true" earnings, W;.t, 
plus an uncorrelated error term E:i,t 
The variance of measured earnings is therefore 
Var (W;,t) = V ar(Wi.t) + Vm· (E:;, t )· 
Under t he hypothesis t hat t he errors are i.i.d. across establishments of industry i, an increase 
in the number of establishments per industry leads to a decrease in t he variance of errors and 
therefore a decrease in the variance of measured CES earnings. 
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this paper, we document that over the past four decades, the two measures di-
verged substantially bath in terms of trend growth and business cycle volatility. 
Particularly, while the LPC wage is today about 70% higher in real terms than 
in 1970, the CES wage decreased by almost 10% between the mid-1970s and the 
mid-1990s and increased by only 20% total over the past four decades. Further-
more, while the volatility of the LPC wage increased by 35% to 45% since the 
early 1980s, the volatility of the CES wage dropped by about 50%. 
We try to reconcile this divergence in trend and business cycle volatility of the 
LPC and the CES average hourly wages by first decomposing the total divergence 
into differences coming from the earnings side and the hours side. We find that 
the divergence between the LPC wage and the CES wage - ba th in terms of 
trend growth and business cycle volatility - is driven by the different evolution of 
average labor earnings. Average hours worked, by contrast , evolve very similarly. 
As a result , we turn the focus on earnings to explain the divergence between the 
two hourly wage series. 
vVe use data from a third source, the Current Population Survey (CPS), to exam-
ine potential reasons for the different evolution of average earnings from the LPC 
and the CES. Earnings data in the CPS is based on a very similar earnings con-
cept as the one used in the CES and at the same time allows us to caver the same 
worker population as in the LPC. We show that the evolution of average earnings 
from the CP S falls in between the evolution of LPC earnings and CES earnings, 
bath in terms of trend growth and changes in business cycle volatility. Moreover, 
using additional information about the wage and salaries portion of earnings in 
the LPC as well as labor incarne share data for high-earning individuals computed 
by Piketty and Saez (2003) , we show that differences in earnings concept account 
for almost all of the differences between CPS and LP C earnings. The CPS data 
therefore provides a representative measure of wages and salaries for large part 
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of the U.S. workforce. Finally, we use occupational and industry information in 
the CPS to show that differences in worker population coverage can account for 
a substantial part of t he divergence in trend growth and volatility between CPS 
earnings and CES earnings. However, the sources of the remaining differences 
remain an open question. We conjecture that compositional changes in the CES 
due to a major sample expansion occurring between the early 1980s and the late 
1990s represent one of the most plausible candidates . 
Even though our findings are suggestive of important structural changes in the 
U.S. labor market, it is not the focus of the paper. Instead, the primary contri-
bution of the paper is to provide a detailed account of the divergence in different 
popular aggregate hourly wage series so as to obtain better guidance on which 
wage series to use when analysing different aspects of the U.S. labor market. 
CHAPTERIII 
THE CARROT AND THE STICK: THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
IMPLICATIONS OF INCENTIVE PAY IN THE LABOR 
SEARCH 1\I ODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
It has largely been documented that the nature of business cycle fluctuations 
evolves over t ime. Many studies present evidence for changes in the dynamics 
of U.S. macroeconomie times series, such as McConnell and Pérez-Quir6s (2000), 
Stock and Watson (2002), Galî and Gambetti (2009), Galf and van Rens (2010). A 
classic example of changing dynamics is the 25 years prior to the Great Recession, 
a period referred to as the Great Moderation where the business cycle volatility 
of output and other macro aggregates fell by more than 50%. However, this 
historically low macroeconomie volatility did not apply to one prominent labor 
market variable: real average wages. For instance, Champagne and Kurmann 
(2013a) document that, from 1953-1983 to 1984-2006, the business cycle volatility 
of average hourly wages relative to the volatility of aggregate output became 2.5 
to 3.5 t imes larger over the two sample periods. As in Gali and van Rens (2010), 
they point towards changes in labor market dynamics as a common explanation 
for the decline in macro volatility and increase in real wage volatility. 
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Among the documented changes in labor market dynamics, the increase incidence 
of performance-pay compensation schemes has been advocated as an explanation 
for the increase in wage volatility. For example, Lemieux et al. (2009a) show, 
using PSID data, that the incidence of performance-pay schemes has increased 
significantly during the last 30 years in the U.S. Moreover, Lemieux et al. (2009b) 
find that wages of non-union workers with performance-pay contracts are most 
responsive to local labor market shocks and least responsive for union workers 
without performance-pay contracts, implying that performance-pay increase flex-
ibility in wage setting. Finally, Champagne and Kurmann (2013a) suggest that 
structural changes in the labor market, in the form of more flexible wage setting, 
are promising candidates to account for the increase in relative wage volatility. 
Motivated by these observations, this paper first introduces two types of incentive 
pay schemes in a business cycle model with matching frictions and wage bargain-
ing. Second, it compares the business cycle implications of each compensation 
scheme, along with the basic labor search model where the intensive margin is 
constant ( e.g. Shimer (2005)) . Finally, it evalua tes how a structural change 
in the way firms compensate their workers, from a state of the economy where 
efficiency-wages are pervasive to astate where performance-pay schemes are more 
present, in the light of Lemieux et al. 's (2009a) evidence, can account for the 
observed increase in the relative volatility of average real wages and the dynamics 
other labor market variables. 
Specifically, I use a real business cycle DSGE model with labor search frictions 
( e.g. Andolfatto, 1996; Trigari, 2009) and variable effort that is costly for the 
worker to supply and unobservable to the firms. Then I use Lazaear's (1986) 
insights on 'input-based' and 'output-based' compensation schemes to formulate 
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two different wage determination mechanisms.1 Under each scenario, firms and 
workers negotiate over a joint surplus, but the wage outcome differs because the 
essence of incentive pay is different. Under the 'input-based ' scenario, workers and 
firms negotiate pay in advance subject to an incentive compatibility constraint 
that guarantees a minimum effort level (i.e. an efficiency-wage / shirking type 
of model). On the other hand, under the 'ouput-based ' wage contract (labelled 
'performance-pay' wage throughout the paper) the object of the negotiation is a 
wage schedule t hat links pay to effort (i. e. performance), which the worker supplies 
such as to maximize his utility given the ex-ante negotiated wage schedule.2 The 
first wage contract can be caricatured as 'the stick', while the second as 'the 
carrot' . 
Simulations of the model yield interesting results. F irst, the performance-pay 
scheme implies greater wage volatility than under the efficiency-wage scenario 
(and vs. the benchmark labor search model), a finding robust even if we use clif-
ferent calibration strategies ( e.g. Shimer, 2005; Hagedorn and Manovskii , 2008). 
This suggests t hat changes in the way firms compensated workers over the last 
decades, i. e. from an efficiency-wage type of compensation to pay schemes linked 
to output , are at least partially responsible for the observed increase in relative 
wage volatility. Second, whilc the model is not able to replicate fluctuations in un-
employment and vacancies as observed in the data under the preferred calibration 
1 Lazear (1986) offers two simple examples to illu trate the difference between ' input-
based ' and 'output-based' wage contracts: "Two extreme examples are illustrative. Unskilled 
.farm labor often is paid in the classic piece-rate fashion: an amount of payment per pound or 
piece harvested is spec~fied in advance. Near the other extreme are middle managers of major 
corporations whose anmtal salaries a1·e specified in advance, and who are then paid exact/y that 
amotmt, independent of otdpttt. The qual~fier is that, ~f effort falls below some spec~fied level 
(e.g., he does not come to work regtdarly), the manager may be terminated." 
2 As put forward by the micro literature (e.g. Prendergast, 1999), th is wage determina-
tion mechanism provides a natural alternative incentive deviee for subtle effort supplies that are 
very hard to monitor. 
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strategy,3 it does fairly better under a more extreme calibration as in Hagedorn 
and Manovskii (2008). When the economy is calibrated to match the average 
incidence of performance-pay wage contracts in the U.S. economy before and then 
after 1984, simulations shows that an increase in the incidence of performance-
pay leads to an increase in relative wage volatility of about 10%. But it also leads 
to counterfactual results like an increase in output volatility and an increase in 
the correlation between wages and output. The reason behind this is that effort 
is procyclical, amplifying the response of wages to technology shocks, but at the 
same time raising output volatility and the correlation between wages and output. 
This paper tries to frame in a business cycle Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) model ideas from the microeconomie literature on incentive pay. 
A large body of studies have reached into many forms of compensation schemes 
and have pointed to different ways they can be used to incite effort from workers 
( e.g. Lazear, 1986; Prendergast, 1999). On the macroeconomie side, sorne papers 
introduced variable effort in different contexts and studied its impact on different 
key macroeconomie variables over the business cycle ( e.g. Burnside, Eichembaum, 
and Rebelo (BER), 1993; in efficiency-wage frameworks: Alexopoulos, 2004; and 
Danthine and Kurmann, 2004; and in efficiency-wage and labor sem·ch frame-
works: Costain and Jansen, 2010; Riggi, 2013). However, no studies have either 
tried to model the idea of performance pay into a DSGE framework, or looked 
at the consequences of having different incentive pay schemes into a single DSGE 
framework. And while Costain and Jansen (2010) and Riggi (2013) study the 
implications of efficiency-wages into a labor search framework, there is exoge-
nous productivity in Costain and Jansen (2010), and no wage bargaining in Riggi 
(2013), two key elements to understand the effects of incentive pay on wages and 
:
1This is consistent with Shimer (2005) as my preferred calibration strategy follow closely 
Shimer 's. 
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the business cycle in general.4 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes recent empirical 
evidence on the increased incidence of performance-pa y contracts and the increase 
in relative wage volatility in the U.S., which point towards more flexible wage 
setting happening over the last three decades. Section 3 presents the model with 
sem·ch frictions, variable effort and two different forms of incentive pay. Section 
4 presents the calibration of the model, along with simulation results. Section 5 
concludes. 
3.2 Empirical evidence 
This section summan zes the empirical evidence on the increased incidence of 
performance-pay wage contracts and relative wage volatility that serves as a mo-
tivation for t he model and theoretical exercise developed in the next section. 
The first piece of evidence cornes from Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2009a) who, 
using PSID data, document that the incidence of 'output-based' compensation 
schemes (i.e. 'performance-pay' contracts) has increased significantly during the 
1980s and continued to rise (at a slower pace) in the 1990s, suggesting that it 
acted as an important driver behind the increase in wage inequality. At the same 
time, the U.S. experienced a sharp decline in unionization, which has been largely 
documented (e.g. Farber and Western, 2001; Hirsch and Macpherson (2010); 
Champagne and Kurmann, 2013a). Both phenomenons lead to more flexibility 
'
1 Lastly, note t hat the concept of incentive pay in this paper is very different from the 
'performance-pay' wage in Champagne and Kurmann (2013) . Apart from the fact t hat t he 
wage schedule here is determined ahead of t ime-t information, the performance-pay wage in 
this paper differs from Champagne and Kurmann (2013) as in their mode! the performance-pay 
wage is equal to t he marginal rate of substit ut ion between consumpt ion and leisure hours t imes 
an opt imal markup t he worker commands because of t he imperfect substitutability of its labor 
service. This paper thus presents a more microfounded form of performance-pay. 
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in wage contracts between firms and workers. Figure 3.1 below plots Lemieux 
et al.'s (2009) measure of incidence of performance-pay between 1976 and 1998 
(measured as the percentage of workers receiving part of their compensation as 
performance-pay) for the non-farm business sector. 
Incidence ri Perfct111a1Ce-pay 
0.47 
0.46 
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0.44 
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Figure 3.1 Evolution of incidence of performance-pay in the U.S. for the private 
nonfarm economy 
Second, Champagne and Kurmann (2013a) document that, from 1953-1983 to 
1984-2006, the business cycle volatility of average hourly wages increased by 15% 
to 60%, depending on the dataset and filtering method used. As a result, the 
business cycle volatility of average hourly wages relative to the volatility of aggre-
gate output became 2.5 to 3.5 t imes larger over the two sample periods. Cham-
pagne and Kurmann (2013a) further document that this increase in relative wage 
volatility is pervasive across the labor market, albeit the magnitude of the increase 
varies for different groups of workers. 5 Table 3.1 presents a brief overview of these 
5 0n the individual leve!, it has been documented that earnings has also become more 
------- ---- -----
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findings, updated to 2012, by showing volatilities and relative volatilities for real 
chained GDP, real average hourly compensation, and real average weekly com-
pensation for the nonfarm business sector.6 '7 It shows that while the volatility 
of output decreased remarkably after 1984, the volatility of both average hourly 
and weekly earnings have increased, so that the relative volatility (to output) of 
hourly and weekly earnings increased by a factor of 2.36 and 1.69, respectively, 
between the 1953:2 to 1984:1 and 1984:2 to 2012:4 periods. 
Relative 
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 
Output 2.57 1.58 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.24) (0 .20) 
A\9. hourly comp. 0.65 1.02 1.56 0.26 0.65 2.50 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) 
A\9. weekly camp. 0.87 0 .96 1.10 0.34 0.61 1.80 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) 
Notes : Standard and relatrve standard dev1at10ns for output. average hourty COrllJensaoon and average weekly corl'l>ensabon C0111Juted 
using quarterly , 1-P-filtered data. Total sarrpte ex tends from 1953:1 to 2012:N . f\bnfarm business sec tor. FC&deflated wages. Standard 
errors cofll)uted using Gtv'Mand the Delta method appear in parentheses below estimates. 
Table 3 .1 Changes in business cycle volatilities 
While the timing of the increases in performance-pay contracts and in relative 
wage volatility might not be causal but coincidental, Lemieux et al. (2009a) 
volatile in the last t hree decades. Starting with Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994), a number of pa-
pers using panel data show that labor income bas on average become considerably more volatile 
across individual workers. Recent evidence basee! on PSID data by Dynan et al. (2008) and 
Jensen and Shore (2008) indicate t hat this increase in labor income volat ility has remained ap-
proximately constant for most individuals but bas increased greatly for individuals who already 
had volatile earnings in the past . Taken together , these panel studies imply that wages have 
become more volatile on average, and much more volati le relat ive to output. 
6 The reason I show volatilities for average weekly compensation is that it is the appro-
priate measure of wages in t he mode! presentee! below (i.e. t here are no 'hours' in the mode!). 
7 See the appendix for a detailed description of the data. 
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document that performance--pay is more frequent for skilled individuals that are 
employed in industries such as wholesale trade and FIRE, and also more con-
centrated into the upper end of the wage distribution, which is precisely where 
wage volatility is highest and increased the most in the last three decades.8 Fi-
nally, based on the same PSID dataset as in Lemieux et al. (2009a), Lemieux et 
al. (2009b) find that wages of non-union workers with performance-pay contracts 
are most responsive to local labor market shocks and least responsive for union 
workers without performance-pay contracts. Together, these observations suggest 
that the increased incidence of performance-pay contracts result in greater wage 
flexibility, making wages more responsive to business cycle shocks. 
3.3 A DSGE model with incentive pay and matching frictions 
The model I present in this section is a real business cycle DSGE model with 
a representative household, a cont inuum of firms offering an homogenous good 
in a competitive market, and labor search frictions. The model has two notable 
features. First, effort is a production input that firms cannot observe and therefore 
cannot directly contract upon. Second, in the spirit of Lazear (1986), firms incite 
effort from their workers according to one of two compensation schemes. The first 
scheme is one where a firm and a worker negotiate ahead of time-t information over 
a wage and a minimum required amount of effort (e).9 With a given probability 
0 < d < 1, the firm can monitor if the worker actually supplies this required 
amount of effort . If the worker is found to supply less then this effort level, he is 
fired. I call t his an 'effi.ciency-wage' type of compensation because it follows closely 
8See Champagne and Kurmann (2013a) for a detailed account of the behavior of the 
relative volatility of wages across different segments of the workforce. :vloreover, Champagne and 
Kurmann (2013b) document that the increase in relat ive wage volat ili ty was most pronounced 
for workers in the upper end of the wage distribut ion . 
9 Consequent ly. t he wage is predetermined in period-t . 
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the intuition of the shirking model by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).1° The second 
compensation scheme is one where the negotiation occurs again ahead of time-t 
information, but where the object of the negotiation is a wage schedule that links 
the worker's wage to his output. The key feature here is that the worker can then 
adjust his effort level in any period given the state of the economy. Consequently, 
even though the wage schedule is predetermined, the resulting wage is not. I call 
this compensation scheme 'performance-pa y' . 
I assume a segmented labor market where a fraction 1-p of firms operate in in one 
segment and negotiate with workers over an efficiency-wage type of compensation, 
while the remaining firms (fraction p) operate in the other segment of the labor 
market and negotiate over a 'performance-pay' wage. Firms cannot switch from 
one segment to the other , i.e. they al ways use the same compensation scheme. 
Timing. After random matching occurs, the firm negotiates with the worker over 
wages and effort, depending on its type. Then, shocks are observed, and firms take 
their optimal decisions over vacancies (for next period's hiring), while households 
choose t heir optimal consumption level and workers decide how much effort to 
supply.11 
Below I lay out the details of the model, starting with a description of the labor 
market, the households and firms' optimization problems, and finally the bargain-
ing process. At t his last stage I will describe the efficiency-wage and performance-
pay wage determination mechanisms separately, since this is where the differences 
10 Think of this efficiency-wage con tract as one where the worker is off'erecl a precleterminecl 
wage and , in return, has to show up to work and supply a fixecl amount of effort . The firm can 
observe with probability d if he shows up to work, and fi re him if he does not. 
11 In the efficiency-wage case, workers sim ply choose to either supply t he (fixed) required 
amount of effort or shirk, while in the performance pay segment workers choose an optimal 
amount of effort to supply given t he bargained wage schedule. 
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come from. 
3.3.1 Labor market 
The labor market is divided in two separate segments characterized by how the 
wage is negotiated. Within each segment, the labor market is standard and char-
acterized by mat ching frictions ( e.g. Shimer, 2005) , and search is not directed: 
unemployed workers automatically search at no cost and firms pay to post va-
cancies.12 In segment i, matching between unemployed individuals and vacancies 
occurs randomly according to an aggregate matching function 
(3.1) 
where u i,t is the measure of workers searching for a job and vi,t is the aggregate 
number of vacancies in segment i during period t . The parameter CJ denote the 
elasticity of job matches with respect to the vacancy input. Finally, I define 
the labor market tightness in segment i, ei,t , as the vacancy-unemployment ratio, 
i.e. ~::: ; the probability that an unemployed individual is matched to an open 
vacancy in segment i at date t is denoted At = m(v~::tu;,t); and, the probability 
that any open vacancy is matched with a searching worker in segment i at date t 
is qi,t = m(v~::tu; , t). Households and firms take these probabilities as given. 
Employment in segment i evolves according to the following dynamic equation: 
(3.2) 
At the beginning of period t + 1, employment in segment i is equal to the number 
12 A worker who !oses his job automatically seaches for a job within the same segment of 
the labor market. 
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of surviving matches from period t , plus the new ones (m(vi,t, ui,t) 
Matches are separated each period with exogenous probability s (0 < s < 1). 
The number of unemployed individuals in the beginning of any period t (when 
production occurs) is 1 - ni,ty However, this is different from the number of 
individuals searching for a job during period t , which is given by 
ui,t = 1- (1 - s)ni,t (3.3) 
The measures of unemployment (1 - ni,t ) and job seekers (ui,t) differ , as sorne 
workers who produced in period t can then be exogenously separated and search 
for next period employment.14 
3.3.2 Households 
The households are thought of as very large 11 families 11 or 11 units 11 comprised of 
a continuum of members along the unit interval. A fraction 1 - p of household 
members are employed in the efficiency-wage segment of the la bor market (labelled 
'ew' below), and a fraction p in the performance-pay segment (labelled 'pp' below). 
As described above, workers cannot switch from one segment to the other , even 
t:l Because t he labor force is nor malized to one in each segment , 1 - n;,t also corresponds 
to t he unemployment rate . 
1 1 I based t his sequencing of events following the insights of Ra ven na and Walsh (2012) 
to allow sorne workers to work and search in t he same period. As stated in t heir paper: "In 
search models based on a monthly period of obse1·vation, it is more common to assume workers 
hired in period t do not produce tmtil period t + 1. In this case, the number of job seekers in 
period t plus the number of employed workers adds to the total work for·ce . Becattse we base our 
madel on a quarterly frequency, we allow for some workers seeking jobs to find jobs and produce 
within the same period." 
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if they are separated. The household has period utility 
'U (r. e) = r. - [(1- p)n (eew ,t)1+'1 + pn (epp,t)1+1J l 
""' t "" ew,t 1 +Tl pp,t 1 +Tl 
where Ct denotes consumption, et denotes average aggregate consumption, eew,t 
denotes the effort level supplied by household members employed in efficiency-
wage fi.rms; eew,t E [0, e] , depending whether the employed member supplies the 
required amount of effort or if he shirks.15 epp,t denotes the effort level supplied 
by household members employed in performance-pay fi.rms, and ry is a parameter 
governing the effort supply elasticity. The household's period utility thus includes 
the gain in utility of consuming Ct, minus the disutility of supplying effort sending 
nt = (1 - p)new,t + pnpp,t members in the labor market.16 
Households in each period face the following budget constraint: 
(1- p)new,tWew,t + pnpp,tWpp,t (3.4) 
+(1- (1- p)new,t- pnpp,t )b + IIt- Tt 
where b represents unemployment benefi.ts (fi.nanced by lump-sum taxes on house-
holds, Tt); Wew,t, wpp,t denote the efficiency-wage and the performance-pay wage, 
respectively; and IIt = piipp,t + (1 - p) IIew,t denotes the household's profits share 
from the firms. Note t hat Wew,t , Wpp,t, eew,t and epp,t will be determined during 
the bargaining process. 
15 See bargaining section below for more details. 
16 As it is standard in the unemployment literature, I assume t hat households provide 
perfect consumption insurance to its members. As a result, the consumption and investment 
decision rules are the same for every household member. See Andolfatto (1996) for a detailed 
struct ure that implements this full-insurance assumption in a search and matching framework, 
or Alexopoulos (2004) for a detailed structure in a n efficiency-wage context. 
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The household 's value function can therefore be written as 
subject to the budget constraint (3.4) and employment evolution (3.2). Dt = 
(nt; zt) represents the state vector of the economy, while D i ,t = ( ni,ti Zt) represents 
the state of the economy in segment i of the labor market. 
As in many papers from the labor search literature (e.g. Shimer, 2005; Hagedorn 
and Manovskii, 2008), I assume linear utility of consumption and thus the mar-
ginal utility of consumption of the household is constant . However, I provide an 
explicit form for the disutility of supplying effort instead of assuming that the 
outside option of the worker is constant and equal to bY 
3.3.3 Firms 
There is a continuum of identical firms on the unit interval. As stated above, 
a fraction 1 - p of firms bargain with workers over an 'efficiency-wage' type of 
compensation, while the remaining firms (fraction p) bargain with workers over 
a performance-pay wage schedule that links the worker's wage to output . Firms 
cannot switch type, i.e. they always offer the same type of compensation. Firms 
are owned by the households, and thus they discount expected future values ac-
cording to 
which is constant and equal to /3 because of linear utility. When a firm is matched 
with a sui table worker in segment i, it bargains over the wage ( according to the 
17I assume b represents unemployment benefits, t he "constant" port ion of the worker 's 
outside option. See the bargaining section for more detai ls on the workers' outside option. 
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incentive-pay scheme prevailing within the segment of the labor market) and then 
observes time-t information. Thereafter, it chooses t he number of vacancies to 
post for next period's hiring at fixed cost per vacancy K,, and finally produces 
according to the following linear production function: 
(3.5) 
where Zt is an aggregate t echnology shock. As a result, in each period, the firm 
in segment i chooses the number of vacancies vi,t to post such as to maximize 
the present discounted value of their future profits stream. Since this d cision 
problem is similar in each segment of the labor market, t he firm's value function 
can be written as: 
(3 .6) 
s. to n i,t+l = (1 - s) n i,t + Qi,tVi,t 
The first-order condition is: 
(3.7) 
where Bn ;, t +1 = q· . The value of an addit ional worker for the firm, i.e. av(n;,,) 
8vi ,t 1-,t a ni,t ' 
lS: 
_8V--'-(n--'i,...:..t) _ u (" · ) _ 8F(n i,tei ,ti zt ) _ . f3E { 8V(S1,·,t+l) 8ni,t+1} 
- v n -1 G2 t - w, t + t 
on · t ' on ·t ' 8n t+1 8n t t , t, t , 'l.. , 
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Updating Vn(Sli,t) by one period, using equations (3.5) and substituting back into 
(3.7) yields the vacancy-creation condition: 
K { [Yi,t+l k ] } 
- = f3 Et --- wi,t+l + (1- s)--
qi,t ni,t+l qi ,t+l 
(3.8) 
The vacancy-creation condition states that in equilibrium the cxpected cost of 
hiring a worker is equal to the expected value of a match in each segment i. 
Equation (3.8) shows that an increase in expected future profits will decrease qi,t, 
implying that the number of posted vacancies must rise. This increase in vacancies 
will then increase employment next period. 
3.3.4 Bargaining 
As mentioned above, I assume that bargaining occurs before time-t shocks are 
realized. Since the bargaining problems for each compensation scheme differ sub-
stantially, I describe them separately below. 
Efficiency-wage bargaining 
Under this scenario, firms ask workers to supply a minimum amount of effort in 
return for a predetermined wage. They incite effort using a punishment scheme: 
with a given detection probability d, they can catch shirkers (if caught shirking, 
workers are fired). The important thing to note here is that this required effort 
level is not an equilibrium outcome as in Alexopoulos (2004), but an implicit 
assumption that firms can only monitor basic effort such as showing up to work. 
The reason bchind this is that I assume the constant detection probability dis an 
outcome of a contract enforcement deviee that can monitor only sorne basic type 
of effort, as showing up to work. However, it cannot help in enforcing more subtle 
98 
effort supplies that are likely to be variable.18 
The wage paid to workers is determined via bargaining over a surplus (a "surplus-
sharing11 rule), before time-t information is revealed. It can be formulated as 
Wew,t = arg maxEt-1 { rw:s (Oew,t) - w~ (Oew,t)]ç Vn (Oew,t)l - Ç} (3 .9) 
W ew, t 
where w;s (Oew ,t) and W~ (Oew,t) are the values of being employed supplying 
effort level e and being employed shirking, respectively; Vn (O ew, t) is the firm's 
value of hiring an additional worker, and Ç is the worker's bargaining power. As 
said earlier, expectations are in t - 1 sin ce bargaining occurs before time-t shocks 
are realized. Even though the problem is standard, the household's surplus in the 
match is not. vVhy such a formulation of the household's surplus? Because under 
this efficiency-wage scenario, the "threat point" of t he worker is not t he value of 
being unemployed, but the value of shirking at worlc If the worker does not get 
the minimum wage at which the no-shirking condition binds, he will shirk instead 
of going into the unemployment pool because he is strictly better off shirking than 
being unemployed. 
Before solving the wage bargaining problem, it is convenient to define the relevant 
surplus from employment for the firm and the worker. As laid out above, t he firm's 
surplus from employment is 
1 .r (" ) Yew, t K, ( ) V n ~lew t = -- - Wew t + -- 1 - S 
, new,t , qew,t 
(3 .10) 
1gRiggi (2013) assumes t hat t he effort leve! is not fixed and t hus can vary with t he state 
of t he economy. For instance, after a negative shock to t he leve! of capital, firms fire workers 
and those who keep t heir jobs increase t heir effort leve! due to the "unemployment threat ", 
t hereby increasing productivity and having prolonged (negative) effects on employment and job 
creation. Here, I assume that the firm 's monitoring technology does not permit to verify more 
subtle effort supplies. 
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For the household, the value of having an additional member employed is different 
whether the employed member supplies effort or not. Since every worker will be 
considered shirking if he supplies eew,t < e, the household maximizes utility by 
either choosing eew,t = e if the household wants its members to exert any effort , 
or eew,t = 0 otherwise.19 
Consequently, write the values (in terms of current consumption) of being em-
ployed supplying effort level e , W~s (Oew,t), and of being employed shirking, 
W~(Oew,t ), as :20 
[ 
Wew ,t - b- (~~~) ] (3_11) 
+/3 [(1 - s) (1- f ew,t)] Et {Wn( fl ew,t+l)} 
[ 
(1 - d)wew,t - b l 
+/3 [(1 - s) (1- f ew,t ) (1 - d)] Et {Wn(Oew,t+l)} j 
The first expression in (3.11) is standard: it states that the surplus from employ-
ment (in terms of current consumption) for a worker exerting the desired effort 
level e, w:s(Oew,t), is equal to his wage minus the forgone unemployment benefits 
and the cost of supplying effort, plus the discounted expected future value of being 
employed in the next period, i. e. Wn (Oew,t+l)· The second expression, W~(Oew,t), 
states that the value of being employed shirking, in tenns of current consump-
tion, is the wage ( discounted by the probability d of being caught shirking), less 
the forgone unemployment benefits, plus the discounted expected future value of 
being employed in the next period. 
With the surpluses from the match defined, it is straightforward to solve the wage 
19 Since al! workers are similar, there will be only one equilibrium wage in each segment 
of the labor market. 
20 The detailed derivations of t he surplus from employment are provided in the appendix . 
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bargaining problem. The first-order condition yields the optimality condition:21 
(3 .12) 
Expanding (3.12) using (3.10) and (3.11) and simplifying, we get the wage equa-
tion: 
Wew,t [ { y } { "' }] ei+
17 
1 Ç Et- 1 ewt + (1 - s)Et-l - + (1- Ç) ( ) d(3.13) 
n ew,t qew,t 1 + 'Tl 
- (1- üB(1- s)(1- Et-1 U ew,t} )Et-l {[Wn(Dew,t+1)]} (3.14) 
where 
The resulting efficiency-wage is thus a predetermined variable; it is an expected 
sum (weighted by the worker's bargaining power) of the marginal product of 
a worker plus the expected cost of a vacancy and the discounted disutility of 
supplying effort , minus the ( discounted) value of being employed next period.22 
Performance-pa y bargaining 
Here, firms and workers negotiate prior to observing t ime-t shocks; after t ime-t 
information is revealed, workers can adjust their effort to any level. The outcome 
of this negotiation is a predetermined wage schedule that link the worker's wage 
21 The expression {w:s- W~} is actua lly equal to the incentive compatibility constraint. 
See the appendix for the derivation of the exact expression. 
22If the value of being employed next period is expected to be high, then the Nash-
bargained efficiency-wage will be lower today since t he worker has an incentive to stay on the 
job for the next period. 
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to output. As a result, the wage schedule Wpp,t will satisfy optimality condition: 
(3.15) 
where, as above, Vn PP = Ypp,t - wpp t + (1- s) .!5:.. is the firm's value of an additional 
' npp,t ' Qt 
worker, and Wn (Slpp ,t ) denotes the worker' surplus from employment (in terms of 
current consumption), i. e. 
1+7) 
epp,t 
Wn (Sl pp,t) = Wpp,t - b- (1 + TJ) + (3 (1- s) (1- Jpp ,t)Et {Wn (Slpp,t+l)} (3.16) 
The first-order condition yields the optimality condition: 
(3.17) 
Using the expression for W2 (Slpp,t) and V2 (Sl pp,t), one gets the wage schedule: 
(3.18) 
where Et-l { ~: } = Ztepp,t and epp,t is the optimal level of effort determined af-
ter observing time-t shocks (see optimal condition below). This wage schedule is 
similar as in the basic labor search model with wage bargaining, as it depends on 
both the· marginal product of the worker and his marginal rate of substitut ion. 
However, it also depends on t - 1 expectations of labor market outcomes (i.e. 
Et_ 1 {Bpp,t }; Et_ 1 { ~} ). The key feature in the above wage equation is that while 
the wage schedule is predetermined, Wpp,t is not, as epp,t is determined after ob-
serving time-t shock. This performance-pa y scheme resembles a right-to-manage 
assumption, where workers have the right-to-manage their effort as a function of 
the bargained wage. This right-to-manage analogy describes nicely the idea that 
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performance-pay creates an incentive mechanism inciting workers to supply more 
effort . 
Effort determination. After the wage schedule (3.18) is determined, workers ob-
serve shocks in t and choose the amount of effort to supply as to maximize t he 
value of being employed: 
The optimal effort condition is thus 
(3.19) 
the choice of effort equalizes the marginal product of effort and the marginal rate 
of substitution and is privately efficient. 23 
3.3.5 Aggregation and model dynamics 
To close the model, I need to derive the aggregate identities for the variables that 
differ across the two firm types. First, the aggregate matching function is defined 
as 
nNote t hat private efficiency occurs only because of linear utili ty. 
103 
where vacancies ( Vt) and job searchers (Ut) can be expressed as 
(1 - p)vew,t + pvpp,t 
Ut Uew,t + U pp,t 
Uppt U ew t p = --' ; and : 1 - p = --' 
Ut Ut 
where 
The aggregate market t ension, average aggregate probabilit ies of finding a job and 
filling a vacancy are simply defined as 
with m( Ut, Vt ), and aggregates Ut, and Vt defined ab ove. Aggregate employment 
and output are defined as 
n t (1 - P )new ,t + pnpp,t 
Yt (1 - P )Yew,t + PYpp ,t 
and the aggregate unemployment rate is simply 
For variables where we use the "per worker value", such as the average the wage 
per worker or effort per worker, we aggregate these variables as 
Wt 
(1 ) new,t _ + npp,t -p --e p--e t 
nt nt pp, 
( 
new,t npp,t 1- p)--Wew t + p-- Wppt 
nt , nt , 
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Moreover, I get the aggregate resources constraint from the household's budget 
constraint (3.4), substituting in the definition of profits and using Euler's theorem. 
This yields 
Yt = Ct; + K,Vt (3.20) 
The model dynamics are obtained by taking a loglinear approximation around the 
steady state of the model. The appendix provides a complete set of the equations 
of the model. 
3.4 Calibration and steady states 
The model is calibrated to quarterly data for the U.S. economy. I lay out the 
calibration strategy in four steps. First, sorne parameters of the model are stan-
dard and thus are calibrated accorcling to related literature. For example, the 
quarterly discount factor f3 is set to 0.99, the elasticity of effort supply (1/rJ) to 
1, the elasticity of matches to vacancies, cr , to 0.6 , which is about the mid point 
of what is typically used in the literature,24 Ç is set to 0.4 such that the Hosios 
condition is satisfied, and s, the separation rate, is set to 0.10 as in den Haan, 
Ramey, and Watson (2000; DWR thereafter) and Shimer (2005). These standard 
parameters appear in the upper portion of Table 3.2. 
The second step consists of fin ding steady state values for n, f, u, and the un-
2 1See for example Andolfatto (1996), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), or Trigari (2009). 
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Calibrate d parame te r values 
Parameter Definition Value 
~ Discount factor 0.99 
1111 Elasticity of effort supply 1 
ç Worker's bargaining power 0.4 
s Separation rate 0.1 
(J Elasticity parameter, matching fct 0.6 
n Employed 1 (Employed + unemployed) 0.89 
1-n unemp loyment rate 0. 11 
f Average job-finding rate 0.45 
outsideOpt Value of nonmarket ac tivity 70% 
b/w Unemployment benefits as a fraction of the wage 0.15 
KY/y Yacancy-posting costs as a fraction of output 8% 
d Detection probability, Efficiency-wage 78% 
Table 3.2 Calibrated parameter and steady state values 
employment rate (1 - n) using the steady state equivalents of quations (3.2) and 
(3 .3), i.e. 
sn f tt 
u 1 -(1 -s)n 
To do this, I follow DRW's (2000) strategy as I abstract from labor force partici-
pation decisions and interpret unmatched workers as including 11 both unemployed 
individuals and those not in the labor force but stating that they want a job 11 • Ac-
cording to DRW (2000), the steady state ratio of unmatched to matched workers 
(i.e. (1- n)/n), using the above definit ion of unmatched workers, is around 12%, 
which yields a value of n = 0.89. Consequently, the steady state unemployment 
rate 1 - n is equal to 0.11, and the job-finding rate f is equal to 0.45. 25 
25 I fo llow DRW (2000) to find target values for n , u ,and f. It is hard to fig ure out what 
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The third step of the calibration strategy is less trivial because the wage equations 
differ substantially in each labor market segment while key labor market parame-
ters, such as the unemployment benefits to wage ratio (bj w) or the vacancy-
creation cost ~, need to be the same in each segment. I thus start with the 
remaining steady state equations defining the performance-pay s gment of the 
model, find what are the implied values for bj w and ~Jq, and then solve the rest 
of t he steady state system. 
The remaining equations defining the steady state of the performance-pay segment 
of the model are the steady state equivalents of the production function (3.5); 
the vacancy-creation condition (3.8); the performance-pay wage equation (3.18); 
the effort condition (3.19); and the aggregate resources constraint (3.20). Since 
there is one more variable (and free parame ter) than there are equations left, I 
need one other assumption to solve the system. I thus assume that the worker's 
outside option is equal to 70% of the wage, a value consistent with Hall (2006) 
and in between Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). 26 With these 
assumptions in hand, solving the performance-pay segment is straightforward. 
rote that the steady state vacancy-creation condition in the performance-pay 
segment can be written as 
~Vpp _ ~ j Upp _ S [ Wppnpp ] 
YPP - qpp PP Ypp - (1/ /3 - 1 + s ) 1 - ----:;;;;;;- (3.21) 
t hese values are in t he steady state for each segment of the labor market . Consequent ly, I set 
new = npp = n, and thus t l ew = Upp = u , t hus a suming only one steady state. T he simulations 
below will therefore study t he dynamics around this steady state. 
26 Cali brat ing t he outside option as 70% of the steady state wage leve! implies that: 
( 
el +1J ) 
( 1 : "7) + b = 0. 70w 
107 
while the performance-pay condition can be rewritten as 
wppnpp = Ç [1 + (1-s)~ f npp ] 
Ypp [1 - (1 - Ç)OutOp] qPP PP YPP (3 .22) 
where OutOp is the worker 's outside option, here equal to 70% of the wage. Sub-
stituting (3 .22) into the vacancy-creation condition (3.21) defines the aggregate 
vacancy-posting costs as a fraction of output: 
KVpp = ~!PP upp = s [1 - (1 - Ç)OutOp - Ç] 
YPP qPP YPP [ ( ~ -1 + s) (1 - (1 - ÇOutOp) + f~(l- s)ç] (3.23) 
at a value of about 8%. Using the national accounting equation, the effort con-
dition, and the production function, I can find values for cpp , epp , and the steady 
Y pp 
state output level Ypp · I finally find the wage wPP from (3.22). With these steady 
state values I can find (b/w) such that t he outside option is equal to 70% of t he 
steady state wage, and !5: such that !5: f ...:!!:._ = 0.08. These values are reported in 
q q Ypp 
the bottom half of Table 2. 
The fourth and final step is to close the steady state system by calibrating the 
remaining values in the efficiency-wage segment . The only additional parameter 
specifie to this segment is d, the detection probability. For simplicity, I will assume 
that the labor share implied in the performance-pay segment 's calibration is the 
same in the efficiency-wage segment, and let d be determined by the steady state 
system of the model. This implies a detection probability of d = O. 78, similar to 
the preferred value of Riggi (2013). 
One could argue that t he steady state values found above, especially from the 
third step onwards, are debatable. For example, aggregate vacancy-posting costs, 
at 8% of output are arguably high; however, as seen in equation (3.23), vacancy-
posting costs depend entirely on the value of the worker's outside option and sorne 
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parameter values .27 In the next section, I will show that a very high value for the 
worker 's outside option à la Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) yields a higher labor 
share and most important ly, lower vacancy-posting costs as a share of output. 
I will also show how simulation results differ under an alternative calibration 
strategy à la Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) . 
Finally, for the technology shock, I assume that its logarithm follows an indepen-
dent AR( 1) pro cess 
Zt = Pa Zt- 1 + Ezt with Eat iid (0 , O';J 
where Zt = log Zt · For the simulations below, I set Pa = 0.978 and O';z = 0.80, 
values found in Champagne and Kurmann (2013a) for the 1953-2006 period. 
3.5 Simulations 
In this section, I first simulate the model assuming that either all firms offer 
efficiency-wage compensation schemes (i.e. setting p = 0) or performance-pay 
schemes (i.e. setting p = 1), to get sorne intuition on how the model behaves 
within each segment of the labor market, and then compare the results to U.S. 
data and to a benchmark labor search model without effort. If wages turn out 
to be more volatile in the performance-pay segment of the model, then a shift 
towards performance-pay schemes in the last 30 years, as documented in Section 
2, could be a potential explanation for the observed increase in relative wage 
volatility during the same period. Second, I discuss the results along with the 
problems the search and matching model has in amplifying fluctuations in the 
labor market, and I propose an alternative calibration in the spirit of Hagedorn 
27 Andolfatto (1996) sets vacancy-posting costs as a share of output at 1%, while Ravenna-
Walsh (2013) set them at 5%. 
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and Manovskii (2008) and show how it affects the simulation results without 
changing the qualitative differences between the efficiency-wage and performance-
pay segments. Finally, I perform a quantitative exercise where I vary exogenously 
the proportion of efficiency-wage and performance-pay firms in the economy (i.e. 
vary p), similar as in Champagne and Kurmann (2013a), to show how a reasonable 
shift towards performance-pay schemes can account for the increase in relative 
wage volatility. 
3.5.1 Impulse response functions 
To build intuition and to better understand the second moments below, it is useful 
to start by looking at impulse response functions following a 1% technology shock, 
first when all firms offer efficiency-wage contracts, and then when all firms offer 
performance-pay contracts, separately. Under the efficiency-wage scenario, firm 
and worker negotiate prior to time-t information, and agree on a wage to be paid 
for a fixed amount of effort . Therefore, the wage is predetermined and the worker 
cannot adjust his effort as it is constant . This is shown in Figure 3.2: when the 
technology shock hits the economy, the efficiency-wage (dashed blue line) does not 
react on impact. In the next period, it jumps to adjust to the positive shock, and 
then decrease back at sluggish pace to towards its steacly state level. On the other 
hand, the performance-pay wage is not precletermined, although the wage scheclule 
is. The reason is that workers adjust their effort supplies according to the state of 
the economy in period t. This is apparent from the red and green lines in Figure 
3.2, which represent the impulse response functions of the wage and effort following 
the same technology shock. The performance-pay wage reacts contemporaneously 
following a technology shock because of contemporaneous adjustments along the 
effort margin by workers. Since the performance-pay wage reacts each time a 
technology shock hits the moclel economy whereas the efficiency-wage does not, 
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Figure 3.2 Impulse response functions (IRFs) following a technology shock 
we can safely assume that it is also more volatile than the efficiency-wage. I show 
in the next subsection that it is indeed the case. 
3.5.2 Second moments 
Table 3.3 reports st atistics summarizing the cyclical properties of the U.S. and 
model economies. The first t hree columns display second moments for the U.S. 
economy in three different sub-periods; the next t hree columns display moments 
from three model economies, i.e. a 11 benchmark model 11 , the efficiency-wage seg-
ment, and the performance-pay segment of the model, respectively. The hench-
mark modelisa standard labor search model without efl"ort,2 and wage bargaining 
28Since there is no effort in the benchmark mode!, there is no disutility of providing effort 
in the worker's outside option (which equals b). Consequently, b in t he benchmark mode! is 
calibrated to equal the same outside option value than in the efficiencywage/ performance-pay 
mode!. 
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occurs as in the standard search and matching liter at ure ( e.g. Pissarides, 2000; 
Shimer , 2005). 
US Data Benchmark Efficiency-wage Performance-pay 
Ali Pre-84 Posl-84 no effort e:;(O.constsnt} ( o(o)l o(y)=O. 45} 
o(y} 2.14 2.57 1.58 1.30 1.39 2.32 
o(n)lo{y} 0.75 0.66 0.95 0.27 0.45 0.15 
o(w)la(y) 0.42 0.34 0.61 0.75 0.66 0.86 
a(yln)l a( y) 0. 75 0.66 0.95 0.80 0.75 0.90 
o(ureto)l a(y) 6.17 5.59 7.04 2.29 3.73 1.28 
o(v)lo(y) 6.68 6.28 7.50 2.27 2.52 1.27 
p(y,l>j 0.51 0.75 0.18 0.98 0.83 0.99 
p{y,yln) 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.98 0.91 0.99 
p(v.yln) 0.87 0.91 0.82 0.92 0.99 0.92 
p(v.ureto) -0.92 -0.94 -0.90 .{).29 .{).23 -0.29 
Note : The first live rows report resp&etively the standard deviation of output and relative standard deviations reta~ve to standard deviation of oulput for respectively hours per capita, real 
average hourly wage, output per hour. and norrinal average hourly wage. The next two rows report the correlation between output and respectively the real average hourly wage and 
output per hour. Thelast two rows report the correlation between hours and output per hour. and berween lhe norrinal average hourly wage and the priee level. The 'Relative' colurm 
denotes the A:lst/A"e-84 ratios for standard deviations and the A>st-A-e-64 differences for ~orrelations. An soriu oro f-P.Iiltered <and lhe real wage series is R:6-deflated. U.S. data· Total 
sarrple extends from 1953:1 to 20012:4 with split in 1984:1 using quarterly data for lhe non-farmbusiness sec tor. 
Table 3.3 Model simulations 
Data 
The data sample for the U.S. nonfarm business economy spans from 1953 to 2012, 
in quarterly terms; all series are logged and HP-filtered .20 The first column dis-
plays second moments for the whole sample, whereas the second and third show 
second moments for two subsamples, before and after 1984:1. The sample split is 
motivated by the Great Moderation literature that estimates a break in output 
volatility in 1984 (e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000),30 whereas many other 
papers document the changing business cycle behavior of other prominent macro-
economie variables (e.g. Barnichon, 2010; Champagne and Km·mann, 2013a; Gali 
29 See appendix for a detailed description of the data. 
30Even though the Great Recession period (2007-2009) has been a turbulent period of 
economie activity, \ire see from Table 3 that output volati li ty has decreased by 40% after 1984, 
a period, up to the financial crisis, known as the Great .\!Ioderation . 
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and Van Rens, 2010; Nucci and Riggi, 2013). As documented in Champagne and 
Kurmann (2013b) and shown in Table 3.3, the relative volatility of real earnings 
per worker (measured as real average weekly earnings) to output has increased 
signifi.cÇtntly after 1984, from a ratio of 0.34 between 1953:1 and 1984:1 to a ratio of 
0.61 between 1984:2 and 2012:4. Employment and labor productivity (measured 
as real-chained GDP divided by employment) also experienced increases in rela-
tive volatility after 1984, but to a lesser degree than earnings per worker. In terms 
of correlations, we see that real average weekly earnings were strongly procyclical 
before 1984, and mildly procyclical since 1984.31 Labor productivity, as measured 
by output per worker , remained strongly procyclical throughout the sample, which 
stands in st ark contrast to the vanishing procyclicality of output per hour docu-
mented in Gali and Van Rens (2010) and Champagne and Kurmann (2013a).32 
Finally, as documented in many papers (e.g. Shimer, 2005; Hagedorn-Manovskii, 
2008) , there is a strong positive (negative) correlation between vacancies and labor 
productivity (unemployment).33 
Model economies 
The last three columns of Table 3.3 presents the results for a benchmark model 
with no effort à la Shimer (2005), along with the model simulated with all fi rms 
31 E ven t hough the drop in correlat ion of weekly earnings with output after 1984 is con-
sistent with t he drop in t he correlat ion wit h output of real average hourly earnings after 1984 
(as documented in Champagne and Km·mann (2013a,b)), t he magn itude of t he correlations are 
different . Champagne and Kurmann (2013a,b) report t hat hourly wages went from being midly 
procycl ical before 1984 to mildly countercyclical after 1984. 
nchampagne and Kurmann (2013a), Table 3, shows that t he correlatio n between tabor 
productivity (as measured by outout put hour) and real nonfarm GDP went from 0.65 (1964-
1984) to 0.01 (1984-2006). 
:JJ Again , t his is in stark cont rast with the correlation between vacancies and output per 
hour ; Barnichon (2010) reports (Table 1) t hat this correlat ion is 0.34 for the 1948-1984 period , 
and -0.31 for the 1984-2008 period. 
113 
bargaining over efficiency-wage contracts (p = 0) and over performance-pay con-
tracts (p = 1). The first striking observation is that neither mo dels come close 
to match the relative (to output) volatility of unemployment and vacancies, es-
pecially the performance-pay model. This result is a well-established one and 
known as the "Shimer puzzle" (Shimer, 2005). J\!Ioreover, when output is en-
dogenous, and technology shocks are the only exogenous shocks in the model, 
it turns out that the labor search model is not only unable to generate a lot of 
amplification in unemployment and vacancies, but in output also. This second 
result is consistent with DRW (2000) , who show that without endogenous sep-
arations (i.e. fluctuations in the job-destruction rate) , the la bor search mo del 
does not propagate well technology shocks. The second striking, and more inter-
esting observation concerns the relative volatility of earnings per worker; in the 
performance-pay segment of the labor market, earnings are more volatile than in 
the efficiency-wage segment (by about 27%), and also vs . the benchmark madel 
(rv 15%). F\1rthermore, as anticipated the efficiency-wage is less volatile than 
the standard wage bargained wage, implying that the shirking model along with 
the t - 1 bargaining assumption induce wage stickiness. Finally, it is interesting 
to note that while the performance-pay madel worsens the Shimer (2005) puzzle 
(vs. the benchmark case), the efficiency-wage generates more amplification in un-
employment and vacancies; because the wage predetermined and does not react 
contemporaneously to productivity shocks, firms have a greater incentive to post 
vacan ci es following a positive technology shock. 04 Also note that all three mo dels 
are able to generate a negative Beveridge curve, even though the curve is not as 
steep as in the data. 
Lastly and unsurprisingly, the performance-pay madel generates a larger cor-
3
'
1This is t he argument put forward by Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005), i.e. st icky wages 
are a potential solution to the unemployment and vacancies volat ility puzzle. 
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relation between the wage and output than the efficiency-wage (and also than 
the benchmark model). It is not surprising in the sense that by definition a 
"performance-pay " wage should follow more closely production than a more sticky 
wage. At the same time, if performance-pa y as become more pervasive in the 
economy, it is inconsistent with the observed decline of this correlation in the 
U.S. data. 
3.5.3 The Shimer puzzle and an alternative calibration strategy 
As discussed in the calibration section above, one could argue that sorne values 
implied by the steady state system of equations are more or less realistic, such 
as vacancy-posting costs at 8% of output. High vacancy-creation costs reduce 
the incentive to post vacancies, and thus worsen the unemployment / vacancies 
volatility puzzle. Essentially, Shimer (2005) states that the standard labor search 
model cannot reproduce the volatility observed in the unemployment rate and 
vacancy-posting because following a positive productivity shock, the increase in 
the job-finding rate pulls clown unernployment and thus the ~ ratio increases, 
raising the workers' threat point and consequently raising wages, which then take 
the bulk of the productivity increase and eliminate the incentive to post vacancies. 
Here I propose a new calibration strategy in the spirit of Hagedorn and Manovskii 
(2008), where I set t he worker's outside option at a very high value (at 95% of the 
steady state wage value) . As a result, ~ and b will be different than in the above 
strategy. 
Table 3.4 presents the parameters and steady state values for this second cali-
bration strategy.We can see that this new calibration strategy using an outside 
option value in the spirit of Hagedorn and Manovksii (2008) yields a very low 
value for vacancy-posting costs (as a share of output). This can be easily seen 
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Calibrate d parame te r values 
Parameter Definition Value 
~ Discount factor 0.99 
1/ r] Elasticity of effort supply 1 
ç Worker's bargaining power 0.4 
s Separation rate 0.1 
cr Elasticity parameter, matching tèt 0.6 
n Employed 1 (Employed + unemployed) 0.89 
1-n unemployrnent rate 0. 11 
f A verage job-finding rate 0.45 
outsideOpt Value of nonmarket activity 95% 
b/w Unemployment benefits as a fraction of the wage 0.44 
KV/y Vacancy-posting costs as a fraction of output 1% 
d lmplied detection probability, Efficiency-wage 54% 
Table 3.4 Alt ernative calibration strategy 
using equation (3.22); for a given labor share, the higher the outside option of the 
worker (as a fraction of the wage), the lower the vacancy-post ing costs (as a share 
of output) . 
Table 3.5 presents the results for this alternative calibration strategy. As in Table 
3.4, the first three columns present the same key data moments for three differ-
ent sample periods, and the last three columns present moments for the model 
economies (i .e. the benchmark, efficiency-wage, and performance-pay models) . 
First note that this calibration strategy yield much more fluctuations in output 
than the previous strategy in all three models. Second, as put forward by Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2008), calibrating the outside opt ion of workers at a very high 
proportion of the wage helps solving the Shimer (2005) puzzle. As we see in Table 
3.5, the benchmark model cornes close replicating the relative volatility of unem-
ployment and vacancies to output. To understand this result, we simply need to 
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US Data Benchmark Efficiency·wage Performance-pay 
Al/ Pre..f.J4 Post-84 no effort e={O.constant} ( a{e)lo{y}=O. 16} 
o{y} 2.14 2.57 1.58 2.76 3.88 3.21 
o{n}!o(y) 0.75 0.66 0.95 0.72 0.87 0.62 
o{w)lo(y} 0.42 0.34 0.61 0.32 0.22 0.42 
o(yln}/ a{y} 0.75 0.66 0.95 0.38 0.27 0.49 
a{u}/o(y) 6.17 5.59 7.04 5.98 7.28 5.15 
o(v)/o{Y} 6.68 6.28 7.50 5.94 4.93 5.12 
p{y,w} 0.51 0.75 0.18 0.83 0.75 0.95 
p{y,y!n) 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.83 0.58 0.88 
p{v,y!n) 0.87 0.91 0.82 0.92 0.99 0.92 
p{v,u) -0.92 -0.94 -0.90 -0.29 -0.23 -0.29 
Note : The first five rows report respectively the standard deviation of output and relative standard deviations relative 10 standard deviation of output for respeclively hours per cap1ta, real 
average hourly wage, output per hour. and norrinal average hourly wage. The next two rows report the correlation between output and respectNely the real average hourly wage and 
output per hour. The last two rows report the correlation between hours and output per hour, and between the nomi'lal average hourly wage and the priCe levet The 'Relative' colurm 
denotes the FbslfPre-84 ratios for standard deviations and the Fbst-Re -84 differences for cOfreLations. AM series are HP.mtered and the real wage series is PCE-deflated. U.S. data: Total 
sa~le extends from 1953:1 to 20012:4 w ith spi! in 1984:1 usi'lg quarterly data for the non-farm business sec tor. 
Table 3.5 Model simulations 
look at the volatility of average wages: in all three models, the relative volatilities 
of wages are much lower than in the previous calibration. This implies more stick-
iness in the wage, increasing the firms' incentive to post vacancies. However, and 
most importantly, even if wages are less volatile in all three models und er this cal-
ibration strategy, results are qualitatively consistent with the previous calibration 
on three aspects: (1) the performance-pay model generates higher relative volatil-
ities of earnings per workers (about 117% higher than the e:fficiency-wage, and 
56% higher t han the benchmark model); (2) the performance-pay model worsen 
the Shimer (2005) puzzle, in the sense that it yields lû\-ver relative volatilities of 
vacancies and unemployment than the benchmark model; and (3) it increases the 
correlation between output (and productivity) with wages. 
3.5.4 Quantitative exercise 
To further assess how the increase incidence of performance-pay contracts can be 
behind the increase in average wage volatility, I use the first calibration of the 
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previous section, set the proportion of performance-pay firms in the economy (i. e. 
p) as in Champagne and Kurmann (2013) such asto match the pre-1984 average 
incidence of performance-pay contracts in the U.S. economy, and simulate the 
madel. Then I set p to match the post-1984 average incidence of performance-pay 
contracts and again simulate the madel to see how the change in the pervasiveness 
of pay-for-performance can account for the increase in relative wage volatility 
in the madel. Table 3.6 below presents the results of the quantitative exercise. 
Consistent with the results found in the previous subsection, more performance-
US Data Mode l Model 
Pre-84 Post-84 p=0.30 p=0.60 
cr( Y) 2.57 1.58 1.68 1.97 
cr(n)lcr(Y) 0.66 0.95 0.37 0.31 
cr(w}/ cr( Y) 0.34 0.61 0.71 0.78 
c;(yln)l cr( Y) 0.66 0.95 0.81 0.84 
cr(urate)l cr(y) 5.59 7.04 3.08 2.62 
cr( v)/ cr(Y) 6.28 7.50 2.10 1.77 
p(y, wj 0.75 0.18 0.93 0.96 
p(y,yln) 0.80 0.79 0.94 0.96 
p(v,yl n) 0.91 0.82 0.99 0.99 
p(v,urate) -0.94 -0 .90 -0.23 -0 .23 
Note: See tables 3.3 and 3.3 for data description. p is set at 0.30 to match pre-1984 average of performance-pay incidence. and at 
0.6 to match post-1984 average of ppay incidence. 
Table 3.6 Madel simulations - Quantitative exercise 
pay contracts in the economy increase average wage volatility, but only by about 
10%. Labor productivity also becomes more volatile, but the increase is again 
very small. Counterfactually, the increase in performance-pay schemes increases 
the volatility of output, along with the correlation between average wages and 
output (and productivity). As mentioned earlier, this is due to the fact that effort 
is strongly procyclical under the performance-pay scenario, linking more closely 
the wage to output. 
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This quantitative exercise shows the challenges faced by advocates ( e.g. Lemieux 
et al., 2009a; Champagne and Kurmann, 2013a) of the performance-pay story 
(i.e. changes in the structure of pay over the past three decades as a driver of the 
increase in relative wage volatility and by the same token of increased macroeco-
nomie stability): wh en one takes a microfounded approach to mo del performance-
pa y into a general equilibrium framework with explicit effort determination, it is 
difficult to generate business cycle statistics as observed before and during the 
Great Moderation. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Sorne researchers have argued that changes in the dynamics of labor markets can 
be a potential explanation for the changing nature of business cycle fluctuations. 
For instance, during the Great Moderation period, a period of unprecedented 
macroeconomie stability, average real wages have become more volatile in the 
U.S. economy, putting the labor market on the front stage. 
Among the documented changes in labor market dynamics, the increase incidence 
of performance-pay compensation schemes has been advocated as an explanation 
for the increase in wage volatility. For example, Lemieux et al. (2009a) show that 
the incidence of performance-pay schemes has increased significantly during the 
last 30 years in the U.S. Moreover, Lemieux et al. (2009b) find that wages of 
non-union workers with performance-pay contracts are most responsive to local 
labor market shocks and least responsive for union workers without performance-
pay contracts, implying that performance-pay increase flexibility in wage setting. 
Finally, Champagne and Kurmann (2013a) suggest that structural changes in the 
labor market, in the form of more flexible wage setting, are promising candidates 
to account for the increase in relative wage volatility. 
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Motivated by these observations, this paper first introduces two types of incentive 
pay schemes in a business cycle model with matching frictions and wage bargain-
ing. Second, it compares the business cycle implications of each compensation 
scheme, along with basic the labor search model where the intensive margin is 
constant (e.g. Shimer (2005)). Finally, it evaluates how a structural change to-
wards more performance-pay contracts, in the light of Lemieux et al. 's (2009a) 
evidence, affects the relative volatility of average real wages and other labor mar-
ket variables. 
Specifically, I use a real business cycle DSGE model with labor sear·ch frictions, two 
types of incentive pay with explicit effort determination. To model incentive pay, 
I use Lazaear 's (1986) insights on 'input-based' and 'output-based' compensation 
schemes to formulate two different wage determination mechanisms: one where 
bargaining occurs over an efficiency-wage (i. e. no-shirking) type of compensation 
scheme, while the other occurs over a wage schedule that links pay to effort (i.e. 
performance) that is costly for the workers to supply. The first wage contract can 
be caricatured as 'the stick', while the second as 'the carro t'. 
Simulations of the model yield interesting and counterfactual results. First, the 
performance-pay scheme implies greater wage volatility than under the efficiency-
wage scenario (and vs. the benchmark labor search model), a finding robust 
across different calibration strategies ( e.g. Shimer, 2005; Hagedorn and IVIanovskii, 
2008). Second, while the model is not able to replicate fluctuations in unemploy-
ment and vacancies as observed in the data (consistent Shimer, 2005) under the 
preferred calibration strategy, it does fairly better under a more extreme calibra-
tion as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Third, when the economy is calibrated 
to match the average incidence of performance-pay wage contracts in the U.S. 
economy before and then after 1984, simulations shows that an increase in the in-
cidence of performance-pay leads to an increase in relative wage volatility of about 
120 
10%. But it also leads to counterfactual results like an increase in output volatility 
and an increase in the correlation between wages and output. The reason behind 
this is that effort is procyclical, amplifying the response of wages to technology 
shocks, but at the same time raising output volatility and the correlation between 
wages and output . 
These results pose a challenge to the story that an increase in performance-pa y 
wage contracts yields more flexibility in wage setting, increasing average wage 
volatility and lowering fluctuations in output. When one t ries to model the idea 
of performance-pay seriously (i.e. more microfounded with an explicit effort de-
termination), it is difficult to generate the observed business cycle fluctuations 
observed over the last three decades. 
Nonetheless, the idea of changes in the pay structure as an explanation behind 
changes in labor market dynamics and business cycle fluctuations is intriguing. 
Having a good theory of incentive pay in a DSGE framework can give good insights 
not only on the business cycle, but also to assess the role of incentive pay on wage 
inequality, economie growth, etc. With a good DSGE framework with incentive 
pay, other research avenues could be explored: for example, heterogenous workers 
with different skill sets could sort themselves towards (or not) performance-pay 
jobs; endogenous separation rates, where matches between low skill workers and 
performance-pay jobs are terminated at a high frequency; or endogenizing the 
firm's decision to offer sorne type of incentive cont ract . 
CONCLUSION 
During the Great Moderation, a period of unprecedented macroeconomie stability 
in the U.S. and in many industrialized countries, the business cycle volatility of 
real hourly wages in the U.S. has increased significantly such that the relative 
volatility of real hourly wages to output became 2.5 to 3.5 times larger than be-
fore the Great Moderation period. The three chapters have all tried to tackle this 
observation in one way or another, seeking what we can understand on the labor 
market from wage dynamics and vice versa. The first chapter aims directly at 
t his observation and documents that over the past 25 years, real average hourly 
wages in the United States have become substantially more volatile relative to 
output . Microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) is used to show 
that this increase in relative volatility is predominantly due to increases in the 
relative volatility of hourly wages across different groups of workers. Composi-
tional changes of the workforce, by contrast, account for only a small fraction of 
the increase in relative wage volatility. Simulations with a Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) madel illustrate that the observed increase in rela-
tive wage volatility is unlikely to come from changes outside of the labor market 
( e.g. smaller exogenous shocks or more aggressive monetary po licy) . By con-
trast, greater fiexibility in wage setting due to deunionization and a shift towards 
performance-pay contracts as experienced by the U.S. labor market is capable 
of accounting for a substantial fraction of the observed increase in relative wage 
volatility. Greater wage fiexibility also decreases the magnitude of business cycle 
fluctuations, suggesting an interesting new explanation for the Great Moderation. 
The second chapter builds on the first chapter as it documents the graduai di-
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vergence in trend growth and business cycle volatility of two popular aggregate 
hourly wage series for the U.S. economy: average hourly compensation from the 
Labor Productivity and Cost (LPC) program and average hourly earnings from 
the Current Employment Statistics (CES). While the LPC wage increased by 
about 70% over the past four decades and became markedly more volatile start-
ing in the 1980s, the CES wage grew by only about 20% over the same period and 
experienced a large drop in volatility post-1980. We establish that the divergence 
between the two aggregate hourly wage series is due to the different evolution of 
average labor earnings. A ver age hours worked, by contrast, evolve very similarly. 
We th en use la bor earnings data from the Current Population Survey ( CPS), the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs), and Piketty and Saez (2003) 
in an attempt to reconcile the divergence between LPC and CES labor earnings. 
Our analysis indicates that differences in earnings concept and population cov-
erage can account for a large part of the divergence. Our analysis also shows 
that earnings differences between the CPS and the LPC can be attributed almost 
entirely to earnings of high-income indivicluals and supplements such as employer 
contributions to pension and health plans, which are inclucled in the LPC but 
not in the CPS. This result is interesting in its own right given the widespread 
use of micro earnings data from the CPS in cross-sectional studies. Finally, the 
third chapter aims at first defining a more "serious" theory of performance-pay 
in general equilibrium and then takes this theory to the data. It considers a 
real business cycle model with labor search frictions where two types of incentive 
pay are explicitly introduced following the insights from the micro literature on 
performance-pay (e.g. Lazear, 1986). While in both schemes workers and firms 
negotiate ahead of time-t information, the object of the negotiation is different. 
The first scheme is called an 'efficiency-wage' as it follows closely the intuition of 
the shirking model by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), while the second is called a 
'performance-pay' wage as the negotiation occurs over a wage schedule that links 
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the worker's wage to his output. The key feature here is that the worker can then 
adjust his effort (i.e. performance) level in any period. I simulate a shift towards 
performance-pay contracts as experienced by the U.S. labor market to asses if it 
can account simultaneously for two documented business cycle phenomena: the 
increase in relative wage volatility and the Great Moderation. While the model 
yields higher wage volatility when performance-pay is more pervasive in the econ-
omy, it pro duces higher volatility of output and higher procyclicality of wages, two 
results counterfactual to what the U.S. economy has experienced during the Great 
Moderation. These results pose a challenge to the idea that higher wage flexibility 
through an increase in performance-pa y schemes can account for business cycle 
statistics observed over the last thirty years. 
APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR "THE GREAT INCREASE 
IN RELATIVE WAGE VOLATILITY IN THE UNITED STATES" 
A.l Data Description 
This section describes in details the different variables used throughout the first 
chapter, along with data sources and series' IDs. 
A.l.l Macro Variables 
The different macro variables used throughout the paper and in the appendix are: 
• Output : Gross Domestic Product, Non-farm business, Chained-$2000. From 
the NIPA tables of the Bureau of Economie Analysis (BEA) . Series ID: 
A358RX1. We divide this series by the U.S. population (see below) to get 
an hours per capita measure. 
• Priee deflator: The main series we use is the Persona! Consumption 
Expenditure (PCE) deflator, from the NIPA tables of the BEA; index, 
2000=100. Series ID: A002RD3. The alternative deflator we use is the 
GDP deflator, again from the NIPA tables; index, 2000=100. Series ID: 
A191RD3. 
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• Population: Non-civilian population, 16 years old and over; from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) pro-
gram. Series ID: LNUOOOOOOOOQ. 
A.l.2 Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) 
The Major Productivity and Costs program of the BLS produces labor produc-
tivity and costs (LPC) measures for the private-sector of the U.S. economy. Here 
are the three main variables used in the paper from the LPC dataset . All of them 
are available quarterly and seasonally adjusted . 
• Average hourly wages: Total houTly compensation for the non-farm busi-
ness sector, ID: PRS85006103. Index (1992= 100). This series is computed 
(in the LPC) as total compensation divided by total hours. 
• Total compensation: Total compensation from the LPC dataset is com-
prised of a 'wages and salaries' component, and a 'supplements' component . 
The 'wages and salaries' component is based on earnings data from the Quar-
terly Census of Employment and Wages ( QCEW) , previously known as the 
BLS ES-202 program. The QCEW is " ... a cooperative program involving the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the U. S. Department of Labor and the 
State Employment Security Agencies (SESAs) ... [and] produces a complete 
tabulation of employment and wage information for workers covered by State 
unemployment insurance (UI) laws and Federal workers covered by the Un-
employment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) program". This 
represents about 98 percent of all U.S. jobs. The definition of labor earnings 
in the QCEW are very comprehensive. Specifically: "Wage and salary dis-
bursem ents consist of the monetary remuneration of employees (including 
the salaries of corporate officers, commissions, tips, bonuses, and severance 
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pay); employee gains from exercising nonqualified stock options; distributions 
from nonqualifi ed deferred compensation plans; and an imputation for pay-
in-kind (such as the meals furnished to the employees of restaurants) . " See 
http: / jwww. bea.gov / regionalj pdf/ spi2005 / Complete_ Methodology. pdf for 
more information. 
The 'supplements' components consists of employer contributions for em-
ployee pension and insurance funds and employer contributions for gov-
ernment social insurance.l To derive total compensation for the non-farm 
business sector, the LPC substracts compensation of employees working in 
public administration offices, in the farm sector, and in non-profit insti-
tutions and private households.2 Moreover, the LPC imputes earnings of 
self-employed individuals using comparable data from workers in the CPS. 
• Total hours: Total hours in the LPC database mainly cornes from the Cm-
rent Establishment Survey (CES) for production and nonsupervisory work-
ers (see CES description below), supplemented by other sources to estimate 
hours of workers not covered by t he CES. For example, LPC computes an 
estimate of average weekly hours for nonproduction and supervisory workers 
by applying a CPS-based ratio of [nonproduction & supervisory workers] / 
[production & non-supervisory workers] to CES production & nonsupervi-
sory worker average weekly hours. When reporting statistics for total hours, 
we use the non-farm business portion of total hours, ID: PRS84006033 (index 
1992 = 100) , and divide it by the U.S. population (i.e. hours per capita). 
1The estimates for the 'supplements' portion of total compensation come from var ious 
sources, such as the IRS, the Medical Expencliture Panel Survey, or t he American Counsil on 
Life Insurance. The est imates are compilecl by the Bureau of Economie Analysis (BEA) . 
2 Note t hat workers employecl in 'general government ' are not incluclecl in the non-farm 
business measure, white workers in 'governement enterprises ' are . 
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A.1.3 The Current Population Survey ( CPS) 
Overview 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 60,000 house-
holds. It collects a variety of information on households ' demographies and em-
ployment.3 To construct an average hourly wage series, we need data on earnings 
and hours from the CPS. However, earnings and hours questions are not asked to 
all CPS respondents each month. Specifically, an interviewed individual appears 
in the CPS for two periods of four consecutive months, separated by eight months 
during which the individual is left out of the survey. Between 1973 and 1978, the 
CPS asked all the respondents in the sample about weekly earnings and weekly 
hours once a year only. This data was collected in May in what is called the 'May 
supplements '. Starting in 1979, weekly earnings and hours questions are asked 
each month to the individuals who are at the end of a four-month rotation - the 
'Outgoing Rotation Group' (ORG) . Renee, from 1979 onward, one fourth of the 
CPS sample is asked about earnings and hours each month.4 
Following Abraham et al. (1998) and Lemieux (2006), we use the earnings and 
hours information from the CPS May supplements and the ORG extracts to create 
an annual series of weighted average weekly earnings and weighted average weekly 
hours from 1973 onwards. The weights used in this calculation are provided by the 
CPS to make the resulting sample representative of the U.S. workforce. Finally, 
;1For more documentation on the CPS and in particular t he Ylay 1 ORG ext racts, see 
Schmitt (2003) ; and Roth and Feenberg (2007) . 
4In March of each year , t he CPS also asks all inviduals in the sample abo ut their annual 
labor earnings. Whi te these 'March supplements' start in 1963, they do not provide information 
on ammal hours worked prior to 1976, making it impossible to compute an hourly wage series. 
Furthermore, Lemieux (2006) argues that the earnings data from t he March supplements is 
subject to measurement problems not present in t he CP S May 1 ORGs. See his paper for 
details. 
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average hourly wages are computed by dividing average weekly earnings with 
average weekly hours. 
To obtain a non-farm business equivalent comparable to the LPC data, all unem-
ployed; self-employed; individuals under 16 years of age; government agricultural 
and private household workers; as well as armed force personnel are removed from 
CPS sample. For 1973-1978, the May supplements yield an average of 30,406 
individual observations per year. For 1979-2006, the combination of 12 monthly 
ORG files yields an average of 139,230 individual observations per year. 
Lastly, note that the actual CPS ORG extracts (1979-2006) used are from the 
Center for Economie Policy Research (CEPR).5 These extracts are based on the 
'Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups' fi les ('MORGs', i.e. the ORGs, merged in 
annual files) compiled by the National Bureau of Economie Research (NBER). 
We use the CEPR data because the CEPR modifies the NBER MORGs to make 
them more 11 user-friendly 11 •6 But the greatest advantage with the CEPR data 
is that they provide detailed documentation on the modifications they make to 
the NBER's MORG files. We carefully use this documentation to replicate the 
CEPR's adjustments for the NBER MORG extracts for the CPS May Supplement 
files so as to have a consistent sample from 1973 to 2006. 
Creating a consistent average hourly wage series 
Workers in the CPS May / ORG extracts report earnings in two different ways, 
depending on whether they are salaried or paid by the hour. Salaried workers re-
5See Center for Economie and Policy (CEPR) Research. 2006. CPS ORG Uniform 
Extracts, Version 1.2.2. Washington , DC ( http://www.ceprdata.org/). 
6 For instance, the coding of sorne variables in the CPS survey changes through t ime, 
e.g. the variable 'education '. The CEPR :VIORGs are formatted such that there is consi tency 
in each variab le through time. 
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port usual weekly earnings, defined as compensation normally received, including 
bon uses, overtime, tips and commissions ( OTC) if paid and earned each period 
but excluding payments in kind, stock options and any other form of irregular 
bonuses. Hourly-paid workers report their usual hourly rate, which is not sup-
posed to take into account OTC or any form of irregular pa y. Renee, CPS earnings 
contain sorne fraction of bonuses and OTC if paid and earned each period but no 
irregular form of compensation. 
To create a consistent average hourly wage series from this data, two issues need 
to be addressed. The first issue concerns topcoding of high earnings; the second 
issue concerns the CPS redesign in 1994. 
Topcoding concerns the fact that the CPS limits (i.e. topcodes) publicly available 
data of high earning individuals to a maximum value that varies over time and 
depends on whether a worker reports weekly earnings or the hourly wage rate. 
For the latter, the CPS topcodes the hourly rate at $99.99, which is a threshold 
rarely crossed. For the former (i.e. salaried workers), the CPS topcodes weekly 
earnings at $999 until 1989; $1923 between 1989 and 1997; and $2884 from 1998 
onwards. For certain years, this puts a substantial share of workers above the top-
code, which may lead to discontinuities around topcode changes, thus inducing 
spurious volatility in the post-1984 sample. To reduce this risk, we multiply top-
coded weekly earnings by a factor of 1.3 before averaging across individuals. While 
this constant-factor adjustment is standard in the labor literature (e.g. Abraham 
et al. , 1998; Lemieux, 2006), it does not completely eliminate the possibility of 
discontinuities from topcode changes. Alternatively, one can use more sophisti-
cated adjustment methods that estimate mean earnings of individuals above the 
topcode from the cross-sectional distribution of earnings below the topcode. The 
most popular among these methods is based on the Pareto distribution, which 
has been shown to provide the best approximation of the actual earnings mean 
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in confidential CPS samples.7 We use a battery of different topcode adjustment 
methods, including the Pareto distribut ion, and find that our volatility results 
do not differ across methods. For simplicity and because it is relatively standard 
in the labor literature, the constant-factor adjustment of 1.3 is the only topcode 
adjustment used throughout the paper. 
The second issue with creating a consistent average hourly wage series from CPS 
data concerns the redesign of the CPS sm·vey in 1994. Specifically, as part of 
the redesign, the CPS introduced an addit ional question on weekly earnings from 
OTC that is asked to hourly-paid workers but not to salaried workers. Because 
OTC earnings are growing in importance (see Kuhn and Lozano, 2008) and are 
potentially more volatile than regular earnings, we include this additional infor-
mation in the calculation of weekly earnings for hourly-paid workers.8 At the same 
time, we need to avoid creating a discontinuity in the average wage of hourly-paid 
workers between 1993 and 1994 due to the int roduction of t he OTC question. We 
therefore adjust the average hourly wage for hourly-paid workers before 1994 with 
a linear trend. Specifically, we t ake the average hourly wage between 1994 and 
2006 of skilled and unskilled hourly-paid workers and estimate a linear trend for 
each of the two series. For both skilled and unskilled hourly-paid workers, we then 
take the difference between the actual average wage in 1993 and the 1993 wage 
implied by the linear t rend; apply this difference to the rest of t he observations 
before 1993; and average the thus adjusted series for skilled and unskilled hourly-
7 See Feenberg and Poterba (1992). Polivka (2000) and Schmitt (2003). 
8Specifically, before 1994, weekly earnings of hourly-paid workers are computed 
as max(wage_rate * weekly_hoztrs, weekly_earnings); from 1994 onward, weekly earn-
ings of hourly-paid workers are computed as max(wage _ rate * weekly_hours + OT C , 
weekly _ earnings) . This calculat ion takes into account t hat espec ially before t he redesign in 
1994, hourly-paid workers reported both their hourly wage rate and usual weekly earnings. The 
reasons for this double report ing are not entirely clear . One possibili ty is that sorne hourly-paid 
workers reported weekly earnings if they had compensat ion from OTC payments that they were 
not allowed to report as part of their hourly wage. Our calc ulation acco unts for t his possibility. 
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paid workers back into an average hourly wage series for all hourly-paid workers. 
While this adjustment procedure removes any potential discontinuity from the 
redesign, it also removes any change in hourly-paid workers' wages between 1993 
and 1994 that is due to other, business cycle related reasons. The adjustment 
procedure may therefore lead to an overly conservative estimate of the post-1984 
wage volatility. 9 
A.1.4 Current Employment Statistics 
The CES is a monthly survey including about 140,000 U.S. firms representing 
about 400,000 establishments.10 While it reports data for all employees as far 
back as 1939, it only reports earnings and hours from 1964 onwards and only for 
production workers in the goods-producing sector and nonsupervisory workers in 
the service-providing sector.l1 As a result , no public administrat ion workers nor 
farm workers are included. 
• Average Hourly Earnings (AHE): the AHE measure discussed in the pa-
per was downloaded directly from the BLS website, series ID: CES0500000008. 
It is computed (in the CES) as total earnings divided by total hours. 
• Total earnings: Chapter 2 of the BLS Handbook of Methods states that : 
11 Aggregate payrolls include pay before deductions for Social S ecurity, un-
employment insurance, group insurance, withholding tax, salary reduction 
9 We also implement t he adj ustment procedure with a polynomial trend and obtain sim-
ilar results . 
10 As discussed in the text, the CES grew from about 166,000 to abo ut 330,000 establish-
ments between 19 0 and 1993; and then to over 400,000 establishments in 2006. 
11 Note t hat since Ylarch 2006, the CES also publishes series of weekly earnings and hours 
that caver a ll employees in the non-farm business sector. 
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plans, bonds, and union dues. The payroll figures also include overtime pay, 
shift premiums, and payments for holidays, vacations, sick leave, and other 
leave made directly by the employer to employees for the pay period reported. 
Payrolls exclude bonuses, commissions, and other lump-sum payments (un-
less earned and paid regularly each pay period or month), OT' other pay not 
earned in the pa y period (such as retroactive pa y). Tips and the value of fT'ee 
rent, fu el, meals, OT' other payments in ki nd are not included. 11 
• Total Hours: Chapter 2 of the BLS Handbook of Methods states that : 
" Total hours during the pay peT'iod include all hour·s worked (including over-
time hours), hours paid for standby or reporting ti m e, and equivalent hours 
for which employees received pay diT'ectly from the employeT' foT' sick leave, 
holidays, vacations, and otheT' leave. Overtime and otheT' premium pay hours 
are not converted to straight-time equivalent hours. " 
A.2 Computation of Standard Errors 
Standard errors and relative standard errors in the text are obtained using the 
delta method from GMM-based estimates. In the first stage, define 
XNt - f-L N 
xltxlt - f-Ln 
where Xit are the time series of interest for t = 1; ... , T; f-L i = E( Xit) for i = 1, ... , N; 
and {Lij = E ( XitX jt) for i, j = 1, ... , N. The G MM estima tor sets 'ji su ch th at 
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~ 'L}=' 1 J (xit, Jl) =O. The asymptotic distribution of the GMM estimator is given 
by 
where 
is the Jacobian matrix (N x N since our GMM procedure is just-identified), and 
where 
00 
S = L E [f( xt, fl)f( xt, Ji)'] . 
j=-oo 
Next, compute the covariance matrix for the standard errors 
{D' s-1 D} - 1 
COV(Jl) = T 
To construct a sample analog of S, we use the Newey-West estimate of S: 
S~ ~ { (k - !JI) 1 ~!( ~) !( ~)'} T = j k - k-" - T~ Xt, fl Xt-j, [l . 
Now, the moments of interest are standard deviations and relative standard de-
viations (non-linear functions of the moments found above), so we use the delta 
Method to estimate the standard errors of these standard deviations and relative 
standard deviations. For example, consider the standard deviation of a random 
variable Xit: 
Here we interpreta x as a function of the population moments E(xt) and E(xz). 
Moreover, define 
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and thus 
( ) _ ( _ 2)112 _X( ) (Jx P - ~lxx Px - Px> ~lxx · 
The delta method states that 
VT(X- x ) -t N (o, ox {D'S- 1D} - 1 oX'). 
o~l op 
Since D = ~~ = - I, where I denotes the identity matrix of appropriate dimension, 
{D' s-1 D} - 1 reduces to S. Furthermore, we can compute the derivative of X with 
respect to ~l 
~ 
vVith these in hand, along with the estima te of S, Sr, we can comput the standard 
error of CJ x . Note that we use the same procedure to find the standard err ors for 
relative standard deviations ( e.g. the ratio of the standard deviations of wages 
and output), where the derivative of X with respect top is: 
Ôux 
-l-'x 
ÔtJ.x <YxŒy 
ox o {CJ x/CJy } ÔUy fLy X ÔtJ.y 172 
op op ~ 1 
ÔtJ. x x 217xl7y 
Ôl7y 1 x 
ÔtJ.yy -2172 
A.3 Aggregate Moments - Robustness checks 
A.3.1 Alternative priee deflator 
Tables A.1 and A.2 present the same statistics as in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 of the 
paper, but use an alternative deflator, the GDP deflator, in the computation of 
real average hourly wages. 
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Relative 
Standard De viation Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 p-value Pre-84 Post-84 PosVPre-84 
First..Oifference 
Output 1.52 0.68 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.10) (0.07) 
Wage 0.45 0.63 1.42 0.01 0.29 0.93 3.17 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10) 
HP-Fi t ter 
Output 2.57 1.28 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.24) (0. 14) 
Wage 0.51 1.05 2.07 0.00 0.20 0.82 4.16 
(0.04) (0.11 ) (0.02) (0.12) 
BP -Fi tter 
Output 2.50 1.16 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.26) (0. 11 ) 
Wage 0.43 0.95 2.21 0.00 0.17 0.82 4.79 
(0.04) (0.11 ) (0.02) (0.13) 
Note : Total sarrple extends from 1953:2 ta 2006:4 w lh split 111964:1. HP-filtered, quarterly data. GCP-deflated wages. f\bn-farmbusiness sector. 
P.values are rep:~rted for a test of equality of variances across the two subsaiT'fJies . Standard errors COfllluted using GM..tand the Dela method 
appear in parentheses bebw estirrates . 
Table A .l Changes in volatility 
The tables indicate that the results reported in the paper are robust to using the 
GDP defiator instead of the P CE defiator. In fact, with the GDP defiator, t he 
volatility of hourly wages increases even more after 1984. This is also true for t he 
CES wage; however, the CES wage still do es not increase in volatility relative to 
output . 
A.3.2 Alternat ive hourly wage series 
Here we present further evidence of the increase in aggregate wage volatility 
with other wage series constructcd from dataset that are less commonly used in 
the macro literature: Dale Jorgenson's Private Economy labor Quality (PELQ) 
dataset; and the NBER Productivity database. 
PELQ: The PELQ dataset was used by Jorgenson and coauthors to construct 
labor input indices for various productivity analyses. For example, see Jorgenson, 
Ho and Stiroh (2008). The primary source of compensation and hours' data 
Relative 
Standa rd Deviati on Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 
Annu al 
Ouput 2.90 1.1 5 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.19) (0.13) 
LPC wage 0.44 0.97 2.20 0.15 0.84 5.53 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.12) 
CPS wage 0.33 0.70 2. 11 0.12 0.61 5.29 
(0.03) (0.12) (0.01) (0.14) 
Quarterly 
Output 2.73 1.28 0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.31) (0.14) 
LPC wage 0.54 1.05 1.94 0.20 0.82 4.14 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.03) (0.12) 
CES wage (AHE) 0.92 0.44 0.48 0.34 0.34 1.02 
(0.17) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Note: Total sarrple ex tends from 1964 to 2006 for quarterly data; 1973 to 2000 for an nuai data. HP~fiHered data. GDPdeflated wages. 
Nonfarmbusiness sector. Standard errors corrputed using GMv1and the OeHa rnethod appear in parentheses bebw estimates . 
Table A .2 Changes in volatility 
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across industries are the NIPA tables. Moreover, the CPS and the Censuses of 
Population are used to obtain detailed cross-classifications by characteristics of 
individual workers. After aggregating compensation and hours worked across all 
groups of workers in each year, we compute the average hourly wage by dividing 
total compensation with total hours worked. 
NBER P roductiv ity database: This database is a collaboration between the 
rational Bureau of Economie Research (NBER) and U.S. Census Bureau 's Center 
for Economie Studies, containing annual industry-level data on output, employ-
ment, payroll and other input costs, investment, capital stocks, TFP, and various 
industry-specific priee indexes. It contains information on 450 ( 4-digit) manu-
facturing industries from 1958 to 2003.12 After aggregating earnings and hours 
across industries, we compute an average hourly wage measure from this database 
12 We use a new version of the NBER manufacturing database kindly sent tous by Wayne 
Gray. This version of t he database covers t he years 1958 to 2003. 
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by dividing total earnings by total hours . 
Table A.3 presents the evidence for hourly wages constructed from the PELQ and 
the NBER Productivity data. For comparison, the table also includes results for 
real private nonfarm GDP, the LPC wage and the CPS wage. The table indicates 
Re la tive 
Standard Devi a tion Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/ Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pos// Pre-84 
Fi rst-Diffe re n ce 
Output 3.89 1.76 0.45 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.30) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) 
LPC wage 0.99 1.49 1.51 0.25 0.85 3.40 
(0.15) (0.23) (0.03) (0.18) 
PELQ wage 0.86 1.33 1.55 0.23 0.75 3.26 
(0.05) (0.16) (0.03) (0.20) 
NBER manufacturing wage 1.57 2.20 1.40 0.41 1.15 2.80 
(0.09) (0.34) (0.05) (0.25) 
CPS wage 1.11 1.29 1.17 0.28 0.73 2.58 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.05) (0.19) 
HP-Fi lter 
Output 2.90 1.15 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.19) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) 
LPC wage 0.60 0.93 1.55 0.21 0.80 3.81 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.13) 
PE LQ wage 0.59 0.80 1.36 0.21 0.78 3.71 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.16) 
NBER manufacturing wage 1.15 1.22 1.06 0.40 1.09 2.73 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.05) (0.27) 
CPS wage 0.63 0.72 1.14 0.22 0.62 2.86 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.03) (0.15) 
Note : Total sample ex tends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984, except for PB.O w age sample (1976-2000), and the NB ERs manufacturing 
database safll)le (1973to 2002). Annual data. PCE-deflated wages. Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimates. 
Table A.3 Replicating average real hourly wage volatility from the CES with 
CPS data 
that for both the PELQ and the NBER productivity data, the volatility of hourly 
wages increases post-1984; and the relative wage volatility increases by a factor 
of 2. 7 to 3.8, depending on the filtering used. 
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A.3 .3 Total Compensation vs. Wage and Salaries 
Total compensation from LPC includes supplements such as vacation pay and 
employer contributions to pension and health plans. To assess the role of these 
supplements for the increase in wage volatility in the LPC, we strip out supple-
ments and compute the wage volatility for the wages and salaries part only. 
Unfortunately, this exercise cannot be done directly with the LPC dataset since 
it does not contain separate information on the wage and salary and supplements 
portions of LPC's total compensation. This information is, however, available 
in the NIPAs. We therefore switch to the NIPAs and compare non-farm busi-
ness sector measures of hourly wages based on the wages and salary part (from 
the QCEW); and the 'total compensation' part (i.e. 'wages and salaries' plus 
'supplements') .1 3 
The left panel of Figure A.l plots the resulting hourly wage series. The widening 
gap between the two series indicates that supplements have become an increasingly 
important part of total compensation over the past 40 years. However, as can be 
seen in the right panel of Figure A.l, the H-P filtered components of the two 
series behave very similarly throughout the sample. Table A.4 takes a doser look 
at the volatilities of the two NIPA wage series for different business cycle filtering 
methods, along with t he LPC hourly compensation series. 14 Comparing the results 
for the hourly wage series based on total compensation with the results for the 
LPC wage used in the paper, notice that the increase in volatility in the post-84 
period is similar (differences in wage volatility increases across filtering methods 
1:1To compute NIPA hourly wages, we divide the relevant earnings series by NIPA hours; 
the NIPA hours series is constructed from the product of LPC average weekly hours ( wit hout 
self-employed) and employment from QCEW. 
1 1 Data in Table A.4 is in annual ter ms , sin ce NIPA hours are only available on an annual 
basis. 
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Figure A .l Real average hourly compensation and wages and salaries, in logs 
levels (left) and respective HP-filtered components (right) 
- 1.e. LPC's hourly compensation volatility increase is higher than NIPA's hourly 
compensation - are very small) . The likely reason for these small differences is the 
inclusion of self-employed individuals in the LPC series (whereas IPA earnings 
and hours do not include self-employed individuals). 
Next, notice that t he hourly wage series based on the wages and salaries part expe-
riences a somewhat lm·ger increase in volatility than the hourly wage series based 
on total compensation; this is because supplements evolve relatively smoothly 
over the business cycle. Consequently, Figure A.2 and Table A.4 show that the 
increase in average hourly wage volatility presented in Table 1.1 of the paper is 
not an artifact of the inclusion of supplements in total compensation. 
Relative 
Standard Deviation Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 
1st-Difference 
Output 3.43 1.76 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.25) (0.27) 
Total compensation (LPC) 1.06 1.49 1.40 0.31 0.84 2.73 
(0.12) (0.23) (0.03) (0.19) 
Total compensation (NIPA) 1.10 1.37 1.24 0.32 0.78 2.42 
(0.12) (0.20) (0.03) (0.16) 
Wages & Salanes (NIPA) 1.09 1.37 1.26 0.32 0.78 2.44 
(0.11 ) (0.22) (0.03) (0.03) 
Hodrick-Prescott fi lter 
Output 2.29 1.15 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.25) (0.13) 
Total compensation (LPC) 0.54 0.93 1.71 0.24 0.80 3.40 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.13) 
Total compensation (NIPA) 0.53 0.83 1.59 0.23 0.72 3.16 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) 
Wages & Salanes (NIPA) 0.49 0.85 1.76 0.21 0.74 3.50 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.02) (0.11) 
Bandpassfi lter 
Output 2.33 1.11 0.48 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.31 ) (0. 12) 
Total compensation (LPC) 0.61 0.90 1.48 0.25 0.81 3.24 
(0.07) (0 .12) (0.02) (0 . 14) 
Total compensation (NIPA) 0.60 0.84 1.41 0.26 0.76 2.96 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.02) (0. 11 ) 
Wages & Salanes (NIPA) 0.52 0.83 1.60 0.22 0.75 3.36 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.11 ) 
Note . Total sarrple ex tend s from 1953 to 2006. Annual data. PC&deflated wages. N:m-farmbus1ness sec tor. NIPA tc and w &s hourly w ages 
corrputed by dividing the relevant rreasure of corrpensation w ith total hours f romNIPA . LPC ser ies corresponds to Table 1 in the paper, but in 
annuel teriT6. Standard errors corrputed us ing Gwtvl and the Delta rrethod appear in parentheses below estirretes . 
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Table A.4 Changes in volatility Total Compensation vs. Wages and Salaries 
A.3.4 Hours: LPC vs. CES 
In the paper, we discuss that the divergence in wage volatility between the LPC 
wage and the AHE come from divergent earnings ' volatility and not from divergent 
hours' volatility. Here, we back up this daim. 
Since the publicly available data from the CES does not contain separate informa-
tion on total hours, we construct an index of CES hours index from the available 
information on employment and average weekly hours as 
CES hours= avg weekly hours* employment (A.1) 
In the LPC database, total hours is also and index, normalized to 100 in 1992. We 
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thus normalize the above CES hours index to the same base. Figure A.2 compares 
both series in indexes (logs) and HP-filt ered. As Figure A.2 shows, the business 
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Figure A .2 LPC and CES total nonfarm business hours in logs (left) and HP-
fil te red ( right) 
cycle components of both hours series move very closely together. 
A.4 Wage volat ility across decomposit ions 
A .4.1 Detailed results 
T his section presents more details about the disaggregated CPS data from Tables 
1.4 and 1.5. Specifically, changes in average wage shares and changes in the 
volatility of hours' shares for each of t he decompositions are shown. Tables A.5 to 
A.8 below provide the detailed results. For the industry / education decomposition 
in Table A.8 (Table 1.5 in t he paper), the 10 'major industry groups' are defined 
by the following 3-digit 1980 SIC codes (in brackets):15 
15 As stated in the paper , agriculture, forestry and fishing industries . armed forces occu-
pations, and public administration workers are removed from the sample to cover only t he non 
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1. Mining, Oil, and Gas Extraction (40-50) 
2. Construction (60) 
3. Manufacturing - Durables (230-391) 
4. Manufacturing - Non-Durables (100-222) 
5. Transportation & Utilities ( 400-432, 450-4 72) 
6. Communications ( 440-442) 
7. Wholesale Trade (500-571) 
8. Retail Trade (580-691) 
9. Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (700-712) 
10. Other Services (761-893) 
Average Re la live 
Wage Share Standard Deviation Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pos t/Pre-84 
Male unski ll ed 0.55 0.41 
Wage 0.71 0.83 1.16 0.25 0.72 2.92 
Hours share 0.70 0.35 0.50 0.24 0.30 1.26 
Male skilled 0.18 0.24 
Wage 0.41 1.11 2. 71 0.14 0.96 6.80 
Hours share 2. 62 0.77 0.29 0.90 0.67 0.74 
Female unski ll ed 0.24 0.24 
Wage 0.78 0.73 0.94 0.27 0.63 2.35 
Hours share 0.52 0.39 0.76 0.18 0.34 1.90 
Female skilled 0.04 0.11 
Wage 1.47 0.84 0.57 0.51 0.73 1.43 
Hours share 2.48 0.78 0.32 0.85 0.68 0.79 
Note : Total sall"ple ex tends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984. HP..filtered, annual data. f\bn.farm business sec tor. 
Table A.5 Evolution of EducationjGender Wage Components 
farm business sector. 
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Average Relative 
Wage Share Standard Deviation Standard Deviation 
Pr<>-84 Post-84 Pr<>-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 Pr<>-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 
16-29 Unskilled 0.26 0.17 
Wage 0.98 1.00 1.02 0.34 0.87 2.56 
Hours share 1.68 0.90 0.53 0.58 0.78 1.34 
16-29 Ski lied 0.06 0.06 
Wage 1.13 1.45 1.28 0.39 1.26 3.23 
Hours share 2.83 1.41 0.50 0.98 1.22 1.25 
30-59 Unskilled 0.48 0.46 
Wage 0.80 0.76 0.95 0.28 0.66 2.37 
Hours share 0.53 0.42 0.79 0.18 0.36 1.98 
30-59 Ski lied 0.15 0.27 
Wage 0.75 0.94 1.25 0.26 0.82 3.15 
Hours share 2.03 0.68 0.33 0.70 0.59 0.84 
60-70 Unskilled 0.04 0.03 
Wage 1.35 0.97 0.72 0.47 0.85 1.81 
Hours share 3.37 1.73 0.52 1.16 1.50 1.29 
60-70 Ski lied 0.01 0.014 
Wage 2.65 1.63 0.62 0.92 1.42 1.55 
Hours share 8.72 3.13 0.36 3.01 2.72 0.90 
Note : Total sarrple ex tends from 1973 to 2006 wijh split 1n 1984. HP-f1Kered, annual data. f\bn·farmbusness sector. 
Table A.6 Evolution of Education/ Age Wage Components 
A.4.2 Occupation / Gender decomposition 
Another interesting decomposition of the labor force (not shown in the paper) is 
on the occupation and gender level (instead of education and gender). Following 
Eckstein and Nagypal (2004), we create three occupation groups (Blue-collar and 
white-collar workers, and Professional and Managerial occupations). Note that 
the sample stops in 2002 because reclassification of occupations in 2003 makes it 
hard to compute consistent occupation groups before and after 2002Yi 
Table A.9 provides the same insights as Table 1.4 in the paper, except that here 
the skill groups are based on occupations instead of education. We can notice an 
interesting shift in the composition of the work force: women moved into white-
collar and professional occupations. This is certainly in line with the move towards 
16 Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) make the same statement and eut their sample in 2002. 
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Average Relative 
Wage Share Sta ndard Deviation Sta ndard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post -84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 
Hourly, unski lled 0.48 0.42 
Wage 0.96 0.89 0.92 0.33 0.77 2.32 
Hours share 1.38 0.42 0.31 0.48 0.37 0.77 
Hourly, ski lled 0.03 0.06 
Wage 1.48 1.48 1.00 0.51 1.28 2.51 
Hours share 3.95 2.03 0.51 1.36 1.76 1.29 
Sa laried, unskilled 0.31 0.24 
Wage 1.21 0.85 0.70 0.42 0.74 1.76 
Hours share 1.70 0.84 0.50 0.59 0.73 1.24 
Salaried, ski li ed 0. 19 0.28 
Wage 0.44 0.91 2.09 0.15 0.79 5.24 
Hours share 2.47 0.68 0.27 0.85 0.59 0.69 
Note : Total sarrple extends from 1973 to 2006 w ith split •n 1964. HP-f•ltered, annual data. Non-farmbus•ness sector. 
Table A. 7 Evolution of Education/ Compensation Status Wage Components 
more skilled jobs, and also with the increased participation of women in the labor 
force. We also observe that relative wage volatilities increase across the board for 
all occupations, except female professionals. The major increase cornes from male 
professionals, which represent the second largest share in the total wage bill, and 
had the second biggest increase in relative wage volatility (3.10) . These results 
are in line with our argument in the paper that performance-pay is a contributor 
behind the increase in wage volatility. According to Lemieux et al. (2009a), male 
professionals are a group of individuals where the incidence of performance-pay 
is high compare to other occupations. All in all, these results reaffirm the orres 
found in Table 1.4 of the paper. 
A.5 Volatility accounting: Details 
This section lays out the details of the variance decomposition of Section 3 in the 
paper. Let us start with equation (2) in the paper: 
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Average Re lative 
Wage Shlllre Standard Deviation Stand•rd Deviation 
Pro-84 Post-84 Pro-84 Pos/·84 Pr&'Pos/·84 Pre-84 Pos/-84 PrWPost-84 
MlnOIIGas unskllled 0.015 0.008 
w.., 2.40 1.71 0.71 0.83 1.53 1.85 
~sl'lare 9.11 4.17 0.46 3.14 3.73 1.H) 
Construct unsk:Uied 0.071 0.060 
w.., 1.33 0.96 0.72 0.46 0.86 1.87 
Hours share 3.99 1.97 0.49 1.38 1.76 1.28 
Manuf.O unskUied 0.181 0.118 
Woge 0.81 1.04 1.27 0.28 0 .93 3.30 
Hours share 3.16 1.05 0.33 1.09 0.94 0.86 
Manuf-NO unskllled 0.105 0.071 
w.., 0.78 1.23 1.57 0.27 1.10 4.07 
Hours share 1.75 1.06 0.61 0.60 0 .95 1.57 
T&U unskllled 0.064 0.053 
Woge 1.13 0 .87 0 .77 0.39 0.78 2.00 
Hours share 2.27 1.22 0.54 0.78 1.09 1.39 
Comm unskll ted 0.021 0.017 
Woge 2.22 1.29 0.58 0.77 1.15 1.5 1 
Hours share 5.73 3.24 0.57 1.98 2.90 1.46 
Whole T unskllled 0.045 0.037 
Woge 1.18 0.89 0.75 0.41 0.79 1.95 
Hour.. share 3.25 2.08 0.64 1.12 1.86 1.66 
Retaii T unskllled 0.116 0.1 08 
Woge 1.11 1.01 0.91 0.38 0.90 2.35 
Hours share 1.62 0.69 0.42 0.56 0.61 1.10 
FI RE unskllled 0.049 0.050 
Wage 1.26 1.01 0 .80 0.43 0.90 2.08 
Hours share 3.22 1.84 0 .57 1.11 1.65 1.48 
Servlcesunskllled 0 .116 0 .146 
w,.. 0.56 0.66 1.21 0.19 0.61 3. 15 
Hournshare 1.80 0.73 0.40 0.62 0.65 1.04 
MlnOIIGas ski lled 0.004 0.004 
w.., 5.31 3.86 0.73 1.83 3.45 1.88 
Hours share 11 .28 8.35 0.74 3.89 7.47 1.92 
Construct skllled 0.006 0 .008 
Woge 2.38 1.88 0 .79 0.82 1.66 2.05 
Hours share 4.11 3.45 0 .84 1.42 3.08 2. 17 
Manuf-0 skllled 0.041 0.050 
Woge 1.26 1.24 0.98 0.44 1.11 2.53 
Hours share 2.92 2.21 0.75 1.01 1.97 1.96 
Manuf-NDskllled 0.024 0.029 
Woge 1.53 1.18 0.77 0.53 1.05 1.99 
Hours share 5.98 2.44 0.41 2 .06 2.18 1.06 
T&U skllled 0.010 0 .015 
Woge 2.74 2.26 0.83 0 .94 2.02 2.14 
Hours share 5.70 2.41 0 .42 1.97 2.15 1.10 
Comm skllled 0.005 0.010 
w,.. 4.76 2.17 0.46 1.64 1.94 1.18 
Hours share 8.43 3.53 0.42 2.91 3. 16 1.08 
Whole T skllled 0.015 0.018 
Woge 1.02 1.47 1.44 0.35 1.31 3.73 
""""''""" 
7.72 2.88 0.35 2.66 2.40 0.90 
Retail Tskltled 0.016 0 .024 
w.., 3.04 1.90 0.83 1.05 1.70 1.62 
Hours share 4.26 1.84 0.43 1.47 1.65 1.12 
FIRE skllled 0 .026 0.044 
Woge 0.89 1.25 1.40 0 .31 1.11 3.83 
Hours shan~~ 4.16 1.81 0.44 1.44 1.62 1.13 
Services skllled 0.068 0.131 
Table A .8 Evolution of Educat ion/ Industry( l ü) Wage Components 
By adding and subtracting elements, expand this equation m two different ways 
(}~ (b) Œ~(a) L L [si(b)sj(b) Œxx (a) (A.3) ~ si(a)sj(a)] ';( ) (}~ ( b) Œ~ (a) ~ j ŒY a 
+ LLsi(b)sj(b) [Œx;;xi(b) _ Œx;;xi(a) ] 
i j ~(0 ~(~ 
L L [si(b)sj(b) Œxx (b) ~ s~(a)sj(a)] ;~(b) ~ j 
+ LL -·( t·() [Œx;,xi(b) _ Œx;,xj (a)] 
st a s 1 a 2 ( b) 2 ( ) 
i j ŒY Œya 
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Average Rel ative 
Wage Share Standa rd Deviation Standard Deviation 
Pre-84 Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 
Male blue-collar 0.35 0.27 
Wage 1.02 0.96 0.94 0.35 0.86 2.44 
Hours share 1. 13 0.47 0.42 0.39 0.42 1.09 
Male white-colt ar 0.12 0.12 
Wage 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.33 0.81 2.46 
Hours share 1.49 1.06 0.71 0.51 0.95 1.85 
Ma le professiona l 0.22 0. 23 
Wage 0.82 0.98 1.20 0.28 0.88 3. 10 
Hours share 1.88 0.74 0.40 0.65 0.67 1.02 
Fe male blue-colla r 0.09 0.07 
Wage 0.98 1.25 1.28 0.34 1.12 3.31 
Hours share 1.83 0.72 0.39 0.63 0.64 1.01 
Fe male white-collar 0. 17 0.20 
Wage 0.82 0.68 0.82 0.28 0.61 2.13 
Hours share 1.35 0.84 0.62 0.47 0.75 1.60 
Fe male professional 0.04 0.10 
Wage 2.09 0.64 0.32 0.70 0.57 0.82 
Hours share 1.63 0.96 0.59 0.56 0.86 1.53 
Note : Total sarrple extends from 1973 to 2002 w ith split 1n 1984. HP-f atered, annuel data. Non-farmbus1ness sec tor. 
Table A .9 Evolution of Occupationj Gender Wage Components 
The first expansion decomposes the change in the relative variance of average 
hourly wage growth into changes in wage shares weighted by the covariances of 
the wage components fo r the first subsample and changes in covariances of the wage 
components weighted by the wage shares for the second subsample. The second 
expansion decomposes the relative variance of the average hourly wage growth into 
changes in wage shares weighted by the covariances of the wage components for the 
second subsample and changes in covariances of the wage components weighted by 
the wage shares for the first subsample. Since there is no economie justification to 
prefer one 'base period' over the other, we take the average over the two expansion 
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and obtain17 
CT~(b) CT ~(a) 
-- - --CT~ ( b) CT~ (a) 
The first line on the right-hand side of (A.4) captures the effect of changes in 
workforce composition on the relative variance of average hourly wages. The 
second line captures the effect of changes in the relative variances and correlations 
of the different Xi,t terms. Using the fact that 6log Xi ,t = 6log W i, t + lllog h i,t 
and applying the same averaging of 'base periods ', we can expand this second part 
further into a weighted sum of changes in the relat ive variances of hourly wage 
growth of the different groups, changes in the relative variances of hours share 
growth of the different groups and changes in the various correlation terms. 
For example, take the case where i = j, thus CT xi ,xi = CT;i . It is possible to 
decompose the change in t he relative variance of each wage component (between 
subsamples b and a) as 
CT;;(b) _ CT;i(a) 
CT~(b) CT~(a) 
By adding and subtracting elements as we did above, we can expand the second 
line as: 
17This problem of choosing a 'base period ' is concept ually similar to t he problem faced 
in national acco unting when comput ing real macro aggregates (e.g. real GDP). Our approach 
to use an average as the 'base period ' for the weights resembles the chain-type method used in 
the NIPAs. 
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or alternatively, 
Take the average over the two methods and write (A.5) as: 
CJ;i ( b) CJ;i (a) 
- -- - -(J~(b) CJ~(a) 
where 
2 
are averages over subsamples a and b of correlations between wages and hours, 
and product of variances of wages and hours, respectively. Moreover, we can also 
<7;;(b) _ <7;;(a) 
<7~(b) <7~(a) 
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The last equation shows that changes in the relative variance of each wage com-
ponent can be expressed as changes in the relative volatility of hourly wages and 
hours' shares, and as changes in the correlations between the two. Finally, de-
compose the change in the relative covariance between two wage components (i. e. 
when i =/=- j ) as the same fashion as above. Putting everything together and 
rearranging, we get, 
where s ·(a b) = [s; (b)sj (b)+S; (a) sj (a)J and using the same logic as above as above t] , 2 , c , , 
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avg abPw;wi is defined as p(w; (b) ,wj(b))~p(w; (a) ,wJ(a)) , and so forth. Expression (i) is 
unchanged from the first t erm on the right-end side of equation (A.4) and measures 
the portion of the change in the relative variance of aggregate wages accounted 
for by compositional changes in the workforce as measured by the difference in 
wage shares. Expression (ii) is the portion of the change in the relative variance 
of aggregate wages accounted for by changes in relative wage volatility of different 
worker groups ; expression (iii) is the portion accounted for by changes in the 
relative volatility of hours shares; and expression (iv) is the portion accounted for 
by changes in correlations coefficients across hourly wages and hours shares. 
A.6 DSGE Model: Det ails 
A.6.1 Mo del 
The economy is populated by three types of agents: a continuum of infinitely-lived 
workers; a continuum of infinitely-lived firms; and a government that determines 
monetary and fiscal policy. Workers discount t imc at rate (3 and have preferences 
over consumption and leisure. Total expected lifetime utility of worker i is 
(A.6) 
and the per period budget constraint is 
E 0 denotes the expectations operator; Zt- l an exogenous preference shock corn-
mon to all workers; Ct a composite consumption good; Nt(i) hours worked; 
Kt+l - (1 - 8)Kt investment in physical capital; Bt nominal bond holdings; Tt 
lump-sum taxes; Dt dividends from a perfectly diversified portfolio of daims to 
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firms; Ft(h) the net return from astate-contingent insurance mechanism; Wt(i) 
the nominal wage rate; Rf the real net rental rate of capital; Rf the gross nom-
inal bond return; and Pt the aggregate priee level. Labor income Wt(i)Nt(i) is 
worker-specific due to the labor market frictions described below. As in Erceg et 
al. (2000), the net return Ft ( i) is su ch that workers remain identical with respect 
to their consumption and savings decisions. 
Workers' first-order conditions with respect to consumption, nominal bond hold-
ings and capital are 
Zt-1 
Ct 
"{ Àt 
R f Pt 
"{ Àt 
f Et [Àt+l ( p~J] , 
fEt [>..t+l(R{ + 1- b)J, 
where ry is deterministic growth (variables are normalized). 
(A.8) 
Each worker supplies a differentiated labor service and either belongs to a union 
or not. Firms produce with a labor composite Nt that is made up of union labor 
N~ and non-union labor N;-u according to the aggregator 
(A.9) 
where su and snu = 1 - su are fixed weights that pin clown the average wage 
shares of the union sector and the non-union sector; and f..L > 1 is the elasticity 
of substitution determining the extent to which firms can switch between union 
and non-union labor over the business cycle. Union and non-union labor are 
themselves a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the differentiated labor services of union 
l 
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and non-union workers, respectively 
[ ( b ] ~ Ni = .Jo Nf(i) ~' 1 dh for l E {u,nu}. (A.10) 
The elasticities J.lu > 1 and J.lnu > 1 determine the extent to which union workers 
and non-union workers, respectively, are substitutable among each other. Given 
(A.9) and (A.10) , we can find the firms' optimallabor demand for a union worker 
charging wtu(h) and for a non-union worker charging Wtu(h) by solving the fol-
lowing cost-minimization problem 
The first-order conditions are 
(A. 11) 
Thus, the demand for each individual worker i in the union sector is 
Substituting (A. ll ) into the above equation yields 
(A.12) 
Thus we can generalize this labor demand for both union and non-union workers 
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as ( wz (.) ) -~'1 ( 1 wz) -~' Ntt(") = Wt tt~ x t N r l { } • 81 vVt t 10r E u, nu , (A.13) 
where Wtu and wru denote the aggregate union and non-union wage; and Wt is 
the aggregate index of the labor composite Nt that firms use to produce, and can 
be written as 
(A.14) 
(A.15) 
Performance-pay workers in either the union or the non-union sector can adjust 
their wages with time t information. In each period, these workers therefore solve 
the following problem 
for lE { u, nu}, where N:tj(i) is given by (A.l3). The resulting first-order condi-
tion is 
wt,p(i) z 
tp = +-N;·P(i)<PCt for lE {u ,nu}, 
t ,u - 1 
(A.16) 
where Ni·P(i)<PCt is the marginal rate of substitution; and /~ 1 is the optimal 
markup that performance-pay workers command because they provide a differ-
entiated labor service to the firm. The higher ,u1, the more substitutable labor 
services are and thus, the lower the markup. 
vVorkers without performance-pay set nominal wagcs in advance of time t infor-
mation according to a variant of Erceg et al. (2000). In the union sector, the 
fraction of non-performance-pay workers (or equivalently, the fraction of unions) 
that get to reoptimize their nominal wage for next period is 1 - ÇU. In the non-
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union sector, the equivalent fraction is 1 - çnu. For all other non-performance 
pay workers (a fraction çu in the union sector and a fraction çnu in the non-union 
sector), wages are indexed to the steady state growth rate of consumption 1 and 
partially to realized gross inflation Ilt_1; i.e. their nominal wage adjusts according 
to W} ·np ( i) = 1 rrr_ 1 w}_:_ni( i) with w denoting the inflation indexing factor. The 
optimal wage contract of a non-performance-pay worker who gets to reoptimize 
for time t therefore solves 
(A.17) 
subject to labor demand (A.13) and 
j 
Xt ,t+j = IJ 1rrr+s- 1 for j ?: 1 and Xt ,t+j = 1 for j = 0 
s=1 
Alternatively, we can write this problem as 
E Loo ((3 tl)j [W}•np(i)Xt,t+j _ l,np(·)] Nl ,np(·) max t- 1 ., n mrst+j 2 t+j 2 
"Vl ,np ( ') -'•t+ . 
v t t j=O J 
for lE {u,nu} 
subject to same conditions as above, and where mrs~~~ (i) = Ct+jNifJ(i)<l> denotes 
the marginal rate of substitution of worker i in sector l who is not performance-
paid. Now, use constraints in (A.17) and rewrite the problem as 
00 
1 
( l,np . )l -p.1 À . w, (t) Xt, t+j Nl ,np 
t+J . ( l,np)-p. l t+j P,+1 w,+i 
l np _ Jll(l+cf>) 1+</> 
__ 1 (w,· (i)Xt,t+i ) (Nl ,np ) 
1+</> WZ+"l t+J 
forlE{u ,nu} 
155 
The first-order condition is 
0 
The optimal wage that solves the above problem is t hus 
(A.18) 
Notice that expectations are taken w.r.t. to t - 1 by assumption of the tim-
ing described above. Since (by assumption) the reoptimization problem does not 
depend on a household 's prior situation but only on aggregate states, each reopti-
mizing household will set the same optimal wage; i. e. Wt(i) = Wt- Furthermore, 
since the reoptimizing wage setters are chosen at random, the non-reoptimizing 
households have on average a period t wage equal to 1'Wt_ 1rrr_ 1 . The aggregate 
nominal wage for non-performance paid workers is therefore 
(A. 19) 
The rest of the model is standard. Firms produce output Yt with Cobb--Douglas 
technology 
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1 / A N l-aK a I t = tt t> (A.20) 
where At is an exogenous t echnology shock. Each firm's good represents a dif-
ferentiated intermediate that is sold to a wholesaler who turns t he different in-
termediate goods into a final composite using the Kimball (1995) aggregator .l8 
Firm sets priees according to Calvo (1983) partial adjustment mechanism, with 
each firm facing a constant probability in any given period of being able to reop-
t imize its priee. Finally, the government conducts monetary policy according to 
the following interest rate rule 
(A.21 ) 
and limits fiscal policy to a constant spending rule t hat is fully financed by lump-
sum taxes. 
A.6.2 Sorne linearizations 
Before linearizing, we need to normalize the variables to take care of the deter-
ministic growth ('Y) in our model; i.e. from now on we define Àt+j = Àt+jÎ/+] , 
l ,np l,n p j t+j t c • th th · · t mr st+j = mr st+j 'Y , e c. tOI e o er macro aggrega es. 
Next, we linearize the normalized variables of the optimal wage equation around 
18 Kimball 's (1995) aggregator is a generalizat ion of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and 
provides flexibility in mapping micro data on priee adjustment to aggregate inflat ion dynamics . 
See, for example, Eichenbaum and F isher (2007) . 
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the respective steady state values; i.e. 
ln ( wf·np• ( i)) = 
-wf ·np• (i) 
-wi·np• (i) 
00 
(1 - (3Ç1)Et- l L (f3Ç1)j [mr.s~~;(i)- Xt ,t+j + Pt+j], 
j=O 
where hatted variables represent percent deviations from the respective steady 
states . Likewise, linearize Xt ,t+j as 
00 
s=1 
00 
Xt ,t+j W L IT t+s-1 = W ( llt + llt+1 + ... + ITt+j-1 ) 
s=l 
noticing that 
~ ~ ~ 
IIt+j + II t+j-1 + ... + II t; 
and linearize mrs~~j(i) as 
l np( ·) mrstf-j ~ 
-l,np(·) mrst+j ~ 
d N~l np(·) an t.+j ~ 
C N l,np( ·) <!> t+j t+j ~ 
c/JN::J(i) + êt+j 
-~~ (wi·np*(i) + it,t+j- wf:J) + NffJ 
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(A.22) 
---->.. -l,np( ·) - lA, (~wl ,np*(") x~ ~wl ,np) -l,np 
_.,.. mrst+j ~ - -~ '+' t ~ + t,t+j- t+j + mrst+j 
We can thus rewrite the linearized optimal wage as 
~lnp* 
Wt' (i) 
CXl 
(1- (3t,l)Et-l 2..)f3Ç1)1 
j=O 
---- ----where we replaced W}'np* ( i) = W}'np* because the wage set ting history of reopti-
mizing individuals does not matter for the optimal new wage. Finally, the average 
wage for group l, np is 
Linearizing, we get 
(A.24) 
Notice that W}'np is a predetermined variable (i.e. Et_1 W}'np = vV},nr ) because 
w; ,np*) vVtl:._nf and ÎÎt- 1 are predetermined. Renee, we'll use the two expressions 
interchangeably below. 
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Now, rewrite (A.23) as 
(1 + 11-1!/Y )w/·np* = (1- f3çl)Et-1 [11- 1 !/Y~1 ,np + mr:s~·np +.Pt] 
+{3t,IEt-l l)f3çl).i ~ 'f' t+l::_l,np /1- : t+l,t+l+J oo [ tl ,~,wl ,np . _ (1 + l,")X · ] 
j=O +mrst+l+.i + Pt+l+j 
(1- f3 f, 1)Et-1 [11-1!/YW} ·np + mr:s~·np +Pt] 
+(1 + !1-1!/Y)f3 f, 1Et-1W}+i* . 
where we made use of the fact that Xt ,t = O. Next, we use (A.24) to sub out the 
the optimal wage 
~-~ On the left-hand side, expand by (1 - ~t 1 rfy ) 1 ~çl Wt 'np; on the right-hand side, 
expand by (1 - 11-1!/Y )/31:,1 Et_1 12ç1 wf·npto ob tain 
-(1 + /1-l rP )W}•np + (1 + fl- lrP )f3çlW}•np 
+(1 + !1- 1 !/Y ) f3~Et-1 [tJ.w}f i - wfLJ 1- Ç 
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or, after rearranging, 
-t,np ~ _ n t [ - l,np -l,np ~ ] [A -t,np ~ ] 6.Wt - w llt- 1- H Et-l mrst - wt + Pt + f3 Et-l u Wt+l -wiTt . 
with 
nt = (1 - çt) (1 - (3çl) 
çt(1 + f-ll cp) 
(A.25) 
(A.26) 
nt is a measure of wage flexibility; i.e. to what extent wages respond to expected 
changes in the expected rnarkup of the real wage over the marginal rate of sub-
stitution. 
Equation (A.25) is the linearized average nominal wage equation for group l , np. 
It can be rewritten in different ways. Most useful for us is to write it in terms 
of the real wage that firms use to determine their aggregate labor demand; i.e. 
~l np -W1 np P,~ A d h . l -Wt np l . 1 . wt· = t' - t. s oppose to t e nomma wage t' , tus rea wage 1s not 
predetermined because it depends on the realized time t priee level Pt. To obtain 
an expression for the real wage, t ake (A.25) and rewrite it as 
( ~t .np ~l .np) II~ II~ wt - wt-l + t - w t-l = n lE [ -l,np ~t.np] H t-l mrst - wt 
or equivalently 
~l.np + (3 E ~l .np 
wt t-lwt 
(3 E [( ~t .np ~l.np) II~ II~ ] + t- 1 wt+l - wt + t+l - w t 
~l.np II~ II~ nlE -l,np 
wt- l - t + w t-l+ H t-lmrst 
+ f3 Et-l [u{~f + fit+l - w fï t] 
~t .np (3 E [~l .np II~ J 
wt-l + t-1 wt+l + t+l 
-(fit+ (3wEt-l iTt) + wfit-1 +nt Et-l [ ii7/FS~,np- w~·nr] 
After separating expectations from realized terms, we obtain 
( (3 n l) ~l np ~l np (3 E [~l np II~ ] 1 + + H 'Wt' = 'Wt:_l + t-1 'Wt+l + t+l 
- (1 + (3w) ITt + wfit-1 + f21 Et_ 1rnrs~'np 
+((3 + çtl)(w~,np - Et-l'W~,np) 
+(3w( ITt - Et- IÎÎt) 
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(A.27) 
(A.28) 
(A.29) 
. The last two terms t ake into account that workers in group l, np set wages based 
on t - 1 information. Specifically, if w~·nP - Et-I'W~.np < 0 ( ceteris pari bus), th en 
nominal wages (and th us real wages) are set lower because workers expect their 
markup to be higher and future nominal wage growth to be lower. Likewise if 
fi t - Et_ 1fit < 0 (ceteris paribus) , then nominal wages (and thus real wages) are 
set lower because workers expect future optimal wages to be lower. 
Next, we list the various linearized wage setting equations that together drive the 
aggregate real wage of the economy. First, note that the aggregate wage can then 
be described by linearizing (??) and using the steady state demands for unionized 
and non-unionized labor 
(A.30) 
Since w;~" + w;~nu = 1 by definition, this equation also holds in real terms 
wu Nu wnu Nnu ~nu 
WN w~+ WN wt (A.31) 
su~+ (1 - s11 )w~u 
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Next, the average union and non-union wage evolve according to 
f or lE {u,nu} 
or in linearized t erms 
for l E {u,nu } 
But in steady state, H t l ,p = W 1 = vVl ,np . Hence, 
(A.32) 
Combining (A.31) with (A.32) , we obtain 
(A.33) 
u ( u Au ,p + (1 _ u) Au,np) + ( nu , nu ,p + (1 _ nu) Anu,np) S p Wt p Wt p Wt p Wt . 
From here, (A.16) irnplies that the linearized real wage for performance-pay worker 
equals 
w;'P = mrs~'P f or lE { u, nu} (A.34) 
In turn, the linearized real wage for non-performance-pay workers is determined by 
equation (A.27) . ow, we can link these equations for unionized non-performance 
and performance wages to aggregate mrs by using the above loglinearized equa-
t ions 
---u,np 
mrst (A.35) 
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and 
(A.36) 
The analogue system of linearized equations can be derived for the non-unionized 
sector. Equations (A.27) and (A.33)-(A.36) provide a system of equations that 
implicitly defines the link between aggregate mrs and the aggregate wage. The 
sensitivity of this link depends on the weights su , pu, pnu and the slope coefficients 
n u and n nu . 
For the rest of the economy, the log-linearized equations are standard. Specifi-
cally, t he (normalized) first-order conditions for investment in nominal bonds and 
physical capital imply 
Etêt+l - (R~- Et fi t+l) - Li Zt, 
~ k ~k ~ E~Ct+l - (3r EtRt+l - Li Zt. 
The production function, in linearized form is 
(A.37) 
(A.38) 
(A.39) 
From the firms' optimization problem above, the relevant , log-linearized first-order 
conditions are for labor and capital inputs are 
wt - Pt = iiîèt + ~ - Nt 
mCt+~- K:, 
(A.40) 
(A.41) 
where mCt denotes real marginal cost. Finally, the log-linearized optimal pricing 
equation by firms together with the loglinearized equation for the aggregate priee 
~---
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level yield, together, the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) 
(A.42) 
where K, is a non-linear combination of Calvo pricing and Kimball aggregator para-
meters (see for example Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2007). In turn, the loglinearized 
interest rate rule to which monetary policy adheres is 
(A.43) 
A. 7 Mo del analysis 
The simulation exercise in the paper proceeds in four steps. First, we simulate the 
model with all pararneters set to their pre-84 values. Second, we change the shock 
process calibration to the post-84 estimates and assess to what extent the 'good 
luck hypothesis ' can generate an increase in relative wage volatility . . Third, we 
change "~~u, pu and pnu to their post-84 values while keeping the shock processes 
at their pre-1984 estimates to evaluate the e:ffects of deunionization and higher 
incidence of performance-pay. Fourth, we simulate the model with both the shock 
processes and ~~~u, pu and pnu set to their post-84 values to obtain the joint 
effect of all changes. 
To understand the results obtained in the steps above, it is useful to consider 
a graphical illustration of the labor market, with the wage setting curve W 8 
approximating the aggregation of the different optimal wage conditions in (A.33)-
(A.36) and the curve LD representing aggregate labor demand in (A.40) . Figure 
3a depicts the response to a positive technology shock. Starting from point A, 
the technology shock moves labor demand to the right and shifts up the wage 
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setting curve due to the positive income effect on the marginal rate of substitution. 
The new equilibrium establishes at point B. Smaller technology shocks change 
the size of these shifts and thus affect the absolute magnitude of the reaction 
in the real wage and labor. However, since the structure behind the two curves 
remains the same, the relative magnitude of adjustments in the real wage and labor 
remain more or less unchanged. HJ Figure 3b illustrates the effect of a preference 
shock. The preference shock reduces current consumpt ion, implying a negative 
income effect that shifts t he wage setting curve down. Aside from negligible 
equilibrium effects on the average markup, the labor demand schedule remains 
unaffected and thus, the economy adjusts from point A to point B. Similar to the 
t echnology shock, smaller preference shocks result in smaller shifts of the wage 
setting curve. But as long as the slope of this curve remains unchanged, the 
relative magnitude of adjustments in w and n remains approximately the same. 
This explains why changes in technology and preference shocks have hardly any 
effect on the r-elative volatility of wages . By cont rast, changes in the relative 
importance of technology and preference shocks can have important effects on 
the cyclicality of wages and labor productivity. Technology shocks imply that 
both wages and labor productivity co-move with hours whereas preference shocks 
imply exactly the opposite. Hence, when preference shocks become relatively more 
important, the correlation of wages and labor productivity with hours (and thus 
output) falls and may even become negative. The graphical illustration suggests 
that similar conclusions apply for other exogenous shocks that shift either the 
wage setting curve (e.g. labor supply shocks, government spending shocks) or 
labor demand (e.g. monetary policy shocks). We confirm this conjecture in the 
next section of this appendix. 
10 0ur explanation ignores dynamic general equilbrium effects coming thro ugh movements 
in inflation that affect the two curves. 
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In the next st ep, we reset the shocks to their pre-1984 calibrations and change 
the labor parameters ( what we call 11 deunionization" and "increased incidence 
of performance-pay"). It is again useful to consider a graphical illustration to 
understand the mechanisms behind the results obtained in this step. Figure 4a 
depicts the impact of a positive technology shock in a labor market with a rel-
atively st eep and a relatively flat wage setting curve. The relatively fla t wage 
setting curve corresponds to a labor market with widespread unionization and 
litt le performance-pay where movements in the marginal rate of substitution have 
litt le contemporaneous effect on wage setting. A positive technology shock in such 
a situation leads to a relatively small change in equilibrium wages but a large 
change in labor and output (point B). As unionization declines and performance-
pay becomes more widespread, wage setting increasingly depends on the marginal 
rate of substit ution. The wage setting curve st eepens and shifts more with gen-
eral equilibrium incarne effects. As a result, the same posit ive technology shock 
now implies a much larger equilibrium response of wages relative to the equi-
librium response of hours (point C) . Furthermore, the correlation of wages with 
output condit ional on technology shocks increases with wage flexibility because 
the reaction of wages becomes more contemporaneous. Likewise, the conditional 
correlation of labor productivity with output and hours increases with wage flex-
ibility because productivity shocks affect output proport ionally more than hours 
(due to decreasing returns to scale of hours in production). Figure 4b depicts the 
impact of a positive preference shock for the same two labor market situations. 
vVhen unionization is widespread and there is little performance-pay, the incarne 
effect of the preference shock is small. Hence, the economy maves to new equi-
librium point B, where wages adjust rclatively little. Instead, whcn thcre is little 
unionization and performance-pay is widespread, the incarne effect of the prefer-
ence shock is lm·ger and the economy ends up at point C where the response of 
bath wages and hours is larger. The larger shifts in the wage setting curve make 
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wages more countercyclical condit ional on preference shocks and labor produc-
t i vi ty less procyclical (due to decreasing ret urns to sc ale of hours in production). 
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Figure A .3 Labor market responses to a posit ive technology shock (left ) and a 
preference shock ( right) 
A.8 Robustness to other shocks 
Here we present results for the model of Section 4 with three alternative shocks. 
vVe keep the technology shock as it is in the paper, but replace the preference 
shock with first a labor supply shock, then a monetary policy shock, and finally 
a government spending shock. The labor supply shock acts on the household's 
utility function, infiuencing the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure; the monetary policy shock is a stochastic disturbance term to 
the interest rate rule; and finally, the government spending shock renders the 
government transfers ( collected from lump-sum taxes) stochastic. 
w'' 
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4b 
Figure A.4 Labor market responses to a technology shock (left) and a preference 
shock (right) under rigid and flexible wage setting 
For each of the three shocks, we specify an AR(1) process. As described in the 
paper, none of these processes can be estimated easily from the data since we 
are missing observable measures of the shocks (or observable measures cannot be 
easily inferred from model equations). Our calibration strategy therefore consists 
of specifying the respective non-technology shock process such that the model 
generates the pre-84 volatility of output conditional on the pre-84 calibration 
of all model parameters and the technology shock, as described in Table 1. 7 of 
the paper. Then, we change the calibration of t he technology shock process to its 
post-1984 estimate while keeping all other parameters including the parameters for 
the respective non-technology shock process at their pre-1984 calibration values. 
As a result, the relative importance of the technology shock process becomes 
substantially smaller. The main goal of this strategy is to assess whether large 
changes in the relative importance of exogenous shocks can generate an increase 
in the relative volatility of wages. 
169 
As Table A. lü shows, none of the three alternative shock processes change any of 
the results even though there is a large decrease in the relative importance of the 
technology shock in each case. In particular, the relative volatility of the real wage 
remains more or less unchanged. Therefore, we conclude that the results reported 
in the paper are robust to a variety of alternative popular non-technology shocks. 
Table A.lO also shows that the large reduction in the relative importance of the 
US Data La bor Supply Shock Monetary Policy Shock Govt Spending Shock 
Pre·84 calibration, Pre-84 calibration, Pre-84 calibralion, 
Pre-84 Post-84 Relative Post-84 tech shock Relative Post-84 tech shock Relative Post-84 tech shock Relative 
a(y) 2.56 1.28 0.50 1.60 0.62 1.59 0.62 1.61 0 .63 
a(n)la(y) 0.78 1.15 1.47 0.94 1.07 0.94 1.07 0.94 1.07 
a(wJi a(y) 0.24 0.80 3.33 0.31 1.10 0.24 0.95 0.25 0.98 
a(yl n)/ a(y) 0.49 0.59 1.20 0.35 1.06 0.35 1.06 0.34 1.04 
a(nomW)Ia(Y) 0.37 0.82 2.22 0.33 0.69 0.27 0.95 0.27 0.94 
p(y,w) 0.36 -0.14 -0.50 0.30 -0.19 0.61 -0.01 0.54 -0.05 
p(y,yln) 0.65 0.01 -0.64 0.34 -0.16 0.34 -0.16 0.35 -0.16 
p{n,y/n) 0.21 -0.50 -0.71 -0.01 -0.21 -0.01 -0.21 0.01 -0.20 
p(nomW,P) 0.81 0.28 -0.53 0.61 -0.09 0.66 -0.05 0.34 -0.16 
Note ; U.S. data: Total safll)le ex tends from 1953:2 to 2006:4 w lh split in 1984:1. HFlf ilered, quarterty data . PCE-deftated w ages. Non-farm business sector. The 'Relative' 
colurm denotes the PosVPre-84 ratios for standard deviations and the Post-Pre-84 differences for correlations. 
Table A .lO Model simulations: Alternative shocks 
technology shock reduces the cyclicality of labor productivity and wages. This is 
especially true for the labor supply shock case. This is why we state in the paper 
that including additional non-technology shocks that gain in importance relative 
to the technology shock would help our model generate the decrease in cyclicality 
of labor productivity and wages observed in the data. 
APPE DIX B 
SUPPLEMENTAL J\!IATERIAL FOR "RECONCILING THE 
DIVERGENCE IN AGGREGATE U.S. WAGE SERIES" 
B.l Dat a Description 
Here we describe in details the different variables used throughout the second 
chapter. We also provide data sources and series' IDs. 
B.l.l Macro Variables 
The different macro variables used throughout the paper are: 
• Output: Gross Domestic Product, Non-farm business, Chained-$2005. From 
the NIPA tables of the Bureau of Economie Analysis (BEA) . Series ID: 
A358RX1. We divide this series by the U.S. population (see below) to get 
an hours per capita measure. 
• Priee deflator : The main series we use is the Personal Consumption 
Expenditure (PCE) defia tor, from the NIPA tables of the BEA; index, 
2005= 100. Series ID: A002RD3. 
• Population: Non-civilian population, 16 years old and over; from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) pro-
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gram. Series ID: LNUOOOOOOOO. 
B.l.2 Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) 
The Major Productivity and Costs program of the BLS produces labor productiv-
ity and costs (LPC) measures for the private-sector U.S. economy. Below we list 
the variables we use from the LPC dataset. All of them are available quarterly 
(seasonally adjusted) and annually. 
• Compensation: Total compensation from the LPC dataset is comprised 
of a 'wages and salaries' component, and a 'supplements' component. 1 The 
'wages and salaries' component is based on earnings data from the Quar-
terly Cens us of Employment and Wages ( QCEW) , previously known as the 
BLS ES-202 program. The QCEW is " ... a cooperative pTOgram involving the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the U.S. Department of Labor and the 
State Employment S ecurity Agencies (SESAs) ... (and} produces a complete 
tabulation of employment and wage information for workers covered by State 
unemployment insurance (UI) laws and Federal workers covered by the Un-
employment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) pTOgram". This 
represents about 98 percent of all U.S. jobs. The definition of labor earnings 
in the QCEW are very comprehensive. Specifically: "Wage and salary dis-
bursem ents consist of the monetary remuneration of employees (including 
the salaries of corporate officers, commissions, tips, bonuses, and severance 
pay); employee gains from exercising nonqualifi ed stock options; distributions 
from nonqualified deferred compensation plans; and an imputation for pay-
in-kind (such as the m eals furnish ed to the employees of restaurants). " See 
1The proportion of wages and salaries in total compensation has been trending down-
wards in a constant way through t ime, from around 91% of total compensation in the mid-1960s 
to 80% in 2010. 
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http: / /www. bea.gov /regional/ pdf/ spi2005 /Complete_ Methodology. pdf for 
more information. 
The 'supplements' components consists of employer contributions for em-
ployee pension and insurance funds and employer contributions for gov-
ernment social insurance.2 To derive total compensation for the non-fm·m 
business sector, the LPC substracts compensation of employees working in 
public administration offices, in the farm sector, and in non-profit insti-
tutions and private households.3 Moreover, the LPC imputes earnings of 
self-employed individuals using comparable data from workers in the CPS. 
The total compensation measure we use from LPC is series ID: PRS85006063, 
which is in levels and not publicly available (the LPC website of the BLS 
only publishes the corresponding index series). 4 
• Hours: Total hours in the LPC database mainly cornes from the Current 
Establishment Survey (CES) for production and nonsupervisory workers (see 
CES description below), supplemented by other sources to estimate hours of 
workers not covered by the CES. For example, LPC computes an estimate of 
average weekly hours for nonproduction and supervisory workers by applying 
a CPS-based ratio of [nonproduction & supervisory workers] / [production 
& non-supervisory workers] to CES production & nonsupervisory worker 
average weekly hours. The total hours measure we use is LPC series ID: 
PRS84006033. This series is in levels and not publicly available, as for the 
2The estimates for t he 'supplements' portion of total compensation come from various 
sources, such as the IRS , the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, or the American Counsil on 
Life Insurance. The estimates are compi led by t he Bureau of Econom ie Analysis (BEA). 
:1Note that workers employed in 'general government' are not included in the non-farm 
business measure, while workers in 'governement enterprises' are. 
·! We thank Shawn Sprague for supplying us with the leve! series from LPC. 
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total compensation series. 5 
• Total ernployment: We use LPC's employment series PRS85006013, which, 
as for compensation and hours above, is in levels. 
• A ver age weekly earnings: We di vide by 52 the ratio of total compensa-
tion to total employment. 
• A ver age weekly hours: We di vide by 52 the ratio of total hours to total 
employment . 
• A ver age hourly wage: We compute average hourly earnings by dividing 
average weekly earnings with average weekly hours. 
B.1.3 The Current Population Survey (CPS) 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 60,000 house-
holds. It collects a variety of information on households' demographies and em-
ployment .6 Since we analyze (mainly) earnings and hours in this paper, we need 
information on both from the CPS. However, earnings and hours questions are not 
asked to all CPS respondents each month. Specifically, an interviewed individual 
appears in the CPS for two periods of four consecutive months, separated by eight 
months during which the individual is left out of the survey. Between 1973 and 
1978, the CPS asked all the respondents in the sample about weekly earnings and 
weekly hours once a year only. This data was collected in May in what is called 
the 'May supplements'. Starting in 1979, weekly earnings and hours questions are 
5 Further note that when reporting statistics for total hours (e.g . in Table 2, where we 
use total hours as a cyclical indicator), we use LPC series ID: PRS84006033 and di vide it by 
the U.S. population to get an hours per capita measure. 
6 For more documentation on the CPS and in particular the May / ORG extracts, see 
Schmitt (2003); and Roth and Feenberg (2007) . 
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asked each month to the individuals who are at the end of a four-month rotation 
- the 'Outgoing Rotation Group' (ORG). Renee, from 1979 onward, one fourth 
of the CPS sample is asked about earnings and hours each mon th. 7 
Following Abraham et al. (1998) and Lemieux (2006), we use the earnings and 
hours information from the CPS May supplements and the ORG extracts to create 
an annual series of weighted average weekly earnings and weighted average weekly 
hours from 1973 onwards. The individual weights used in this calculation are 
provided by the CPS to make the resulting sample representative of the U.S. 
workforce. 
Since sectoral coverage of the LPC and the CES series differs slightly and the LPC 
coverage cannot be replicated directly, we use a private non-agricultural coverage 
for the CPS that resembles the NIPA and CES coverage (see below) ; i.e. we remove 
from the CPS May / ORGs extracts all unemployed; self-employed; individuals 
under 16 years of age; all government, agricultural and private household workers; 
as well as former armed force personnel. For 1973-1978, the May supplements 
yield an average of 30,406 individual observations per year. For 1979 onward, 
the combination of 12 monthly ORG files yields an average of 139,230 individual 
observations per year. 
Lastly, note that the actual CPS ORG extracts (1979-2011) we use are from the 
Center for Economie Po licy Research ( CEPR). 8 These extracts are based on the 
'Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups' files ('MORGs', i.e. the ORGs, merged in 
annual files) compiled by the National Bureau of Economie Research (NBER) . We 
7In Yrarch of each year , t he CPS also asks a ll inviduals in the sample about their annual 
labor earnings. Extending our earnings analysis using t he CPS March earnings data remains to 
be clone. 
8See Center for Economie and Policy (CEPR) Research. 2012. CPS ORG Uniform 
Extracts, Version 1.7. Washington , DC. (http: / / www.ceprdata.org/) . 
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use the CEPR data because the CEPR modifies the NBER MORGs to make them 
more user-friendly.9 But the greatest advantage with the CEPR datais that they 
provide detailed documentation on the modifications and additions they make to 
the NBER's MORG files. We use this documentation to replicate the CEPR's 
adjustments for the NBER MORG extracts for the CPS May Supplement files so 
as to have consistent variables throughout the whole sample (1973-onwards). 
• Compensation: vVorkers in the CPS May / ORG extracts report earnings 
in two different ways, depending on whether they are salaried or paid by the 
hour. Salaried workers report usual weekly earnings, defined as compensa-
tion normally received, including bonuses, overtime, tips and commissions 
( OTC) if paid and earned each period but exclu ding payments in kind, stock 
options, any other form of irregular bonuses, and any supplements to wage 
earnings. Hourly-paid workers report their usual hourly wage rate, which is 
not supposed to take into account OTC or any form of irregular pay, and are 
also asked their usual weekly earnings, as asked to salaried workers. Hence, 
CPS earnings contain sorne fraction of bonuses and OTC if paid and earned 
each period but no irregular form of compensation. 
To create consistent average hourly (and weekly) earnings series from this 
data, two issues need to be addressed. The first issue concerns topcoding 
of high earnings; the second issue concerns the computation of treatment of 
OTC earnings for hourly-paid workers. 
Topcoding concerns the fact that the CPS limits (i.e. topcodes) publicly 
available data of individuals with high earning to a maximum value that 
varies over t ime and depends on whether a worker reports weekly earnings 
9For instance, the coding of sorne variables in t he CPS survey changes through time, 
e.g. the variable 'education ' . The CEPR ORGs are formatted such that there is consistency in 
each variable through time. 
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or the ho url y wage rate. For the latter, the CPS topcodes the ho url y rate at 
$99.99, a threshold rarely crossed. For the former (i.e. salaried workers), t he 
CPS topcodes weekly earnings at $999 until 1989; $1923 between 1989 and 
1997; and $2884 from 1998 onward. For certain years, this puts a substantial 
share of workers above the topcode, which may lead to earnings disconti-
nuities around topcode changes.10 To reduce this risk of discontinuities, we 
multiply topcoded weekly earnings by a factor of 1.3 before averaging across 
individuals. While this constant-factor adjustment is standard in the labor 
literature ( e.g. Abraham et al., 1998; Lemieux, 2006) , it do es not completely 
eliminate the possibility of discontinuities from topcode changes. Alterna-
tively, one can use more sophisticated adjustment methods that estimate 
mean earnings of individuals above the topcode from the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of earnings below the topcode. The most popular among these 
methods is based on the Pareto distribution which, for certain years, has 
been shown to provide to provide a better approximation of actual earnings 
in confidential CPS samplesY In the paper, we provide a new method to 
account for topcoding, by using data from Piketty and Saez (2003) on the 
top income earners in the U.S. See the next section of this Appendix for 
more details. 
The second issue with creating a consistent average hourly wage series from 
CPS data concerns the treatment of OTC earnings for hourly-paid work-
ers. Prior to 1994, hourly-paid workers were simply asked to report their 
hourly wage rate as well as their weekly earnings. With the redesign of the 
CPS survey in 1994, the CPS introduced an additional question on weekly 
10This could , for example, induce spurious earnings volatili ty in the post-1984 sample, 
since ali topcode changes occur after 1984. 
llSee Feenberg and Poterba (1992) , Polivka (2000) and Schmitt (2003) . 
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OTC earnings for hourly-paid workers but not for salaried workers. 12 The 
consequence of this additional question is a more accurate measurement of 
OTC earnings for hourly-paid workers starting in 1994 (see below for more 
discussion) .13 Due to this discontinuity in earnings reporting, the main sta-
tistics in the paper using CPS earnings data simply use the hourly wage rate 
times the usual hours worked as the measure of weekly earnings for hourly-
paid workers. See below for more details and the treatment of OTC earnings. 
• Hours: Hours in the CPS May / ORGs are recorded as the usual number 
of hours per week worked on the main job. As for compensation above, the 
CPS redesign in 1994 created a small consistency problem with hours; from 
1994 onward, the redesigned CPS allowed respondents to indicate that their 
"hours vary". As a result, starting in 1994, no response for usual weekly 
hours is recorded for these individuals. As Schmitt (2003) notes: "a size-
able share of workers (typically, 6-1%) chose to report that their hours vary. 
Since the distribution of hourly earnings for these workers may differ sys-
tematically from that of workers whose hours generally do not vary, simply 
excluding the group of workers whose hours vary may reduce comparability 
12 Furthermore, the 1994 CPS redesign also affectee! the hours reportee! by individua ls in 
t he ORGs. See hours bullet point below for more informat ion . 
1:3For example, before 1994, hourly-paid workers provided t heir hour ly wage (not incluing 
OTC earnings) , and then were asked to provide t heir usual weekly earnings (supposedly including 
OTC earnings) . Our calculations (see paper) show that workers often did not include OTC in 
weekly earnings and, as a result , the average difference between weekly earnings for hourly-paid 
workers vs. weekly earnings not including it (i.e. hourly wage rate times weekly hours) is small. 
Starting in 1994, the new, more precise question about OTC earnings made t he hourly-paid 
individuals respond more precisely about their weekly OTC earnings. Confirmation of this 
issue cornes from Poli v ka (2000) who concludes: 11 Prior to 1994, workers ident~fied as paid by 
the hour were simply asked to report their hourly rate, the number of hou1'S they worked and 
then a weekly amotmt in addition. The repetitive process of asking these questions irked some 
respondents provo king statements such as, 11 Well, .figure it otd yourself. 11 {Polivka and Rothgeb, 
1993) ." 
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of wage series across the 1994 redesign." The CEPR CPS ORG extracts we 
use in this paper impute weekly hours for these individuals whose hours are 
missing. As a result, we use the CEPR-generated variable 'uhoursi', which 
is a variable created by the CEPR using the variable 'uhourse' in the NBER 
CPS ORG extracts ('uhourse' reports the usual weekly earnings for each 
individual CPS respondent in the NBER ORGs). 'uhoursi' equals 'uhourse' 
for the 1979-1993 period; from 1994-on, it equals 'uhourse' , unless a CPS 
respondent answered that his hours vary. In that case, 'uhoursi' equals the 
hours imputation made by the CEPR.14 
• A ver age weekly earnings: To compute average weekly earnings, we pro-
ceed differently for salaried and hourly-paid workers. For salaried workers, 
we simply use the weekly earnings reported under the variable 'earnwke' 
in the CPS ORGs extracts for t he whole sample. For hourly-paid workers, 
our main results compute weekly earnings as hourly wage rate times weekly 
hours, thus omitting OTC earnings .15 
In the second half of the paper, we account for OTC earnings of hourly-
paid workers as follows. Before 1994, weekly earnings of hourly-paid work-
ers are computed as max(wage_rate * weekly_ hours , weekly_earnings) ; 
from 1994 onward, weekly earnings of hourly-paid workers are computed 
as max(wage_rate * weekly_ hours + OT C, weekly_earnings), where the 
term 'weekly _ earnings' in the brackets refers to the usual weekly earnings 
variable, labeled 'earnwke' in the CPS ORGs. 16 
1
'
1See Schmitt (2003) for more details on the imputation procedure. 
15 As mentioned above, to compute average weekly earnings in t he CPS sample, we use 
a weighted average of individual weekly earnings, where the weights are individual weights 
provided in the CPS May / ORGs extracts. 
16 Note that between 1979 and 1988, the response of hourly-paid workers for the weekly 
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• A ver age weekly hours: To compute average weekly hours, we use a 
weighted average of the variable 'uhoursi' described above. As for average 
weekly earnings, the weights used are individual weights provided in the 
CPS. 
• Average hourly wage: We compute average hourly wages by dividing 
(weighted) average weekly earnings with (weighted) average weekly hours. 
B.1.4 Current Employment Statistics 
The CES is a monthly survey of employment, wages and hours in the private non-
agricultural establishments . The CES grew from about 166,000 to about 330,000 
establishments between 1980 and 1993; and then to over 400,000 establishments 
in 2006. Today, the CES covers about 141,000 firms representing approximately 
486,000 individual worksites. While the CES reports da ta for all employees as far 
back as 1939, it only reports earnings and hours from 1964 onwards and only for 
production workers in the goods-producing sector and nonsupervisory workers in 
the service-providing sectorY 
• Compensation: Chapter 2 of the BLS Handbook of Methods states that : 
"Aggregate payrolls include pay before dedu ctions for Social S ecuri ty, un-
employment insurance, group insurance, withholding tax, salary reduction 
plans, bonds, and union dues. The payroll figures also include overtime pay, 
shijt premiums, and payments for holidays, vacations, sick leave, and other 
leave made directly by the employer ta employees for the pay period reported. 
earnings question has been recorded under another variab le in the CPS ORGs, labeled "uearn-
wke " See Feenberg and Roth (2007). 
17 Note that since .\llarch 2006. the CES also publishes series of weekly earnings and hours 
that cover ali employees in the non-farm business sector . 
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Payrolls exclude bonuses, commissions, and other lump-sum payments {un-
less earned and paid regularly each pay period or month}, or other pay not 
earned in the pay period (such as retroactive pay) . Tips and the value of free 
rent, fuel, meals, or other payments in ki nd are not included. 11 
• Hours: Chapter 2 of the BLS Handbook of Methods states that: 11 Total 
hours during the pay period include all hours worked {including oveTtime 
hours), hours paid foT standby or reporling time, and equivalent hours for 
which employees Teœived pay diTectly from the employer for sick leave, hol-
idays, vacations, and other leave. Overtime and other premium pay hauTs 
are not converled to stmight-time equivalent hours. " 
• A ver age weekly earnings: We downloaded the average weekly earnings 
series from the CES, series ID: CES0500000030. It is computed (in the CES) 
as the weekly average of total carnings divided by total employment . 
• A ver age weekly hours: \71/e downloaded the average weekly hours series 
from the CES, series ID: CES0500000007. It is computed (in the CES) as 
the weekly average of total hours divided by total employment. 
• Average hourly wage: The average hourly wage is computed as the ratio 
of average weekly earnings to average weekly hours. 
B.1.5 National Income and Product Accounts (NIP As) 
The National Income and Product Accounts, produced by the Bureau of Eco-
nomie Analysis (BEA), provide, among several other macroeconomie variables, 
detailed information on compensation of workers at the national and industry 
levels. Contrary to LPC, NIPAs provide compensation of employees series for the 
whole economy (not restricted to the non-farm business sector); moreover, the 
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NIPA t ables provide details on the 'wage and salaries' and 'supplements' parts of 
total compensation (while LPC only provides information on total compensation). 
To calculat e non-fm·m business series for the variables defined below, we take total 
private figures from the NIPA tables and subtract tot al agricult ure, which includes 
farms, agricultural services, forestry, and fishing. Note that this definit ion is 
similar to the CES' non-farm business sector, as well as our CPS non-farm business 
definition; however, it slightly differs from LPC's non-farm business definition (see 
LPC subsection above). The reason for these differences is that from the publicly-
available NIPA tables, we do not have the information to replicate LPC's non-
farm business sector definition. Further note that NIPA private non-agricultural 
series do not include an imputation of self-employed workers' earnings, hours, and 
employment. 
• Compensation: Total compensation in the NIPAs is computed as the sum 
of 'wages and salaries' and 'supplements to wages and salaries'. As in LPC, 
the 'wages and salaries ' portion of total compensation is based on earnings 
data from the Quarter! y Cens us of Employment and Wages ( QCEW), and 
the 'supplements to wages and salaries' is computed by the BEA. 
- The total compensation measure we use from the NIPAs is taken from 
Table 6.2, series ID: A033RCO. 
- The 'wages and salaries' portion of total compensation, available from 
the NIPAs, is taken from Table 6.3 ID: A034RCO. 
• Total employment: Total employment series cornes from NIPA Table 6.4, 
series ID: A4201CO. It includes all full- and part-t ime workers. The BEA 
source for employment is the QCEW.l8 
18The CES actually benchmarks its employment estimates each year to Census data (i.e. 
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• Hours: Total hours are taken from NIPA Table 6.9, series ID: B4701CO. 
Total hours include all hours worked by full- or part- time employees. It is 
computed (by the BEA) as total NIPA employment t imes average weekly 
hours. The source of average weekly hours is LPC and do not include self-
employed workers. 
• A ver age weekly compensation and wages & salaries: We di vide by 
52 the ratio of total compensation to total employment for average weekly 
compensation, and di vide by 52 the ratio of total wages and salaries to total 
employment for average weekly wages and salaries. 
• A ver age weekly hours: We di vide by 52 the ratio of total hours to total 
employment. 
• A ver age hourly compensation and wages & salaries: vVe di vide av-
erage weekly compensation with average weekly hours to get average hourly 
compensation, and divide average weekly wages and salaries by average 
weekly hours to get average hourly wages & salaries. 
B.2 Topcode adjustments: Income data from Piketty-Saez 
We use the dataset on income inequality constructed by Piket ty and Saez (P-
S, thereafter) from IRS data first release with their seminal 2003 QJE paper 
and updated to 2010 since then. This dataset is available on Saez's website at : 
http:/ /elsa.berkeley.edursaezj. P-S provide an analysis of inequality at two lev-
els: 1) at the income level (with and without capital gains) and 2) at the wages 
and salaries level. Since our work focus on the wage portion of incarne, we will use 
their data on "wage inequality" instead of income inequality, because the earnings 
QCEW). 
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concept from the P-S wage inequality data is very similar to the earnings concept 
in the QCEW ( detailed ab ove). 
In their wage inequality dataset, P-S provide wage shares (of total wages and 
salaries), average wages and salaries for the top-10% decile and numerous frac-
tiles within the top-10%, as well as wages and salaries threshold values for these 
fractiles. Below, we will use these average (and thresholds) wages and salaries to 
est imate mean earnings for topcoded observations in the CPS data. 
B .2.1 Using P-S data to estimate means above the topcode in 
the CPS 
We use the information in the P-S dataset on average and threshold wages and 
salaries values for various fractiles within the top-10% of income earners. Then, 
using the proportion of CPS respondents with topcoded earnings each year in 
the CPS May and ORGs, we can impute a value for weekly earnings to these 
respondents using the P-S data. Here are the detailed steps we follow to compute 
the assigned weekly earnings (to topcoded earnings in the CPS May / ORGs) in 
each year: 
1. Gather, for the years 1973 to 2009, average (nominal) annual earnings for 
the top-5%, top-1%, top-0.5%, top-0.1%; and gather threshold values for the 
95th, the 99th, the 99.5th, and the 99.9th percentiles from P-S dataset_lfl 
2. Convert these annual earnings in weekly earnings (di vide annual earnings 
by 52) . 
19 Ideally, we would like to use more precise values (i .e. t hat coïncide exact ly with t he CPS 
densities of observat ions at t he topcode described below) but P-S provide only these average 
and thresholds values for earnings. 
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3. Gather, from the CPS May j ORGs, the densities (%) of workers with 
topcoded weekly earnings in each year.20 
4. Compute the values to assign (from the P-S dataset) in each year to the 
topcode earnings observations in t he CPS May / ORGs. 
Steps (1) to (3) are straighforward, but step (4) is more complicated. There are 
two main reasons why the assignation of P-S values to topcoded observations is 
not simple; first , the P-S average and thresholds earnings values do not correspond 
exactly to the densities of observations with topcoded earnings in the CPS. As 
a result, we need a procedure that uses sorne average and/ or threshold fractiles 
values from P-S and compute an approximative earnings value to assign to CPS 
topcoded observations. 
Second, as mentioned above, the topcode value changes through t ime in the CPS; 
as a result, the densities of observations at the topcode change throughout t he 
sample, especially when the topcode value changes. For example, in 1988, the 
proportion of observations with topcoded weekly earnings (for the whole econ-
omy21) was 4.17%, while in 1989 is drops to 0.45%. The same pattern is observed 
between 1997 and 1998, the other time the topcode value changes in the CPS: 
in 1997, the % of topcoded earnings is 1.50%, while in 1998 it is 0.60%. These 
changes in densities when the topcode values change are important because they 
can guide us in imputing reasonable values to the topcoded observations. For 
example, we assume that it is highly improbable that in 1988 (or before), more 
than 0.45% of individuals made above $1923/ week, since in 1989, only 0.45% of 
20 Note t hat for simplicity, we only consider salaried workers as potential workers with 
topcoded weekly earnings . The reason behind this is t hat t he topcode leve! for the hourly wage 
is 899/hour , a t hreshold almost never crossed throughout t he sample. 
21 As specified in the paper, the whole economy sector is defined as ail workers Jess pri vate 
households and mi litary workers (who are not asked the earnings questions) . 
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individuals made more than $1923/ week. Consequently, even though 4.17% of 
individuals had topcoded earnings (topcoded at $999/ week) in 1988, we assume 
that no more than 0.45% is assigned a value higher than $1923jweek.22 Let us 
now turn to the actual assignment procedure from the P-S dataset . 
• For years where the density (%) of topcoded earnings is lower than 1%, 
we use wage information in P-S for fractiles within the top-1% to impute 
values to these topcoded observations. For example, in 1975, the density 
(%) of topcoded earnings was 0.21%. For this year, we assign to 0.1% of 
observations the top-0.1% average weekly earnings value in P-S (labelled 
"P(99.9 - 100)", for the average weekly earnings of the top-0.1%), and to 
the remaining topcoded values (i.e. 0.21%-0.1% = 0.11%) we assign the 
P-S average earnings value P (99.5- 99. 9), i.e. the average earnings for 
individuals with wages between the 99.5 and 99.9 fractiles, since we do not 
have the exact average earnings value from P-S for those 0.11% observations. 
The detailed formula to compute the assigned weekly earnings in 1975 is 
th us: 
~ * p (99.9- 100) + (0.21 - o.1) * p (99.5- 99.9) 
0.21 0. 21 
• For years where the density (%) of topcoded earnings is higher than 1%, we 
use average earnings value for the top-1% (i.e. P (99- 100)), and a weighted 
average of the P95 and P99 percentiles thresholds for the rest of topcoded 
observations (again, we proceed accordingly because we only have details 
on P(95- 99), P95, and P99 between the 95th and 99th percentiles in the 
22 0f course, this assumption eliminates t he possibility of large swings in high incarnes 
due to business cycles that would change the densi ty of people with topcoded earnings in the 
CPS . The reason we make this assumption is that when we do not take into account these sharp 
drops in densities when the topcode value changes, we obtain unrealistically large decreases in 
CPS average wages in the years aft er the topcode value changes, i.e. a year where t he density 
is very high (e.g. 1988), vs. 1989, when the topcode value changes. 
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P-S data). Take year 2005 as an example (where % topcoded earnings is 
1.20%) ; the detailed formula to compute the assigned weekly earnings (in 
2005) from P-S is thus: 
1 
- * p (99 - 100) 
1.20 
(1.20- 1) * [0.20 * p 95 (4- 0.20) * p 99 ] + 1.20 4 + 4 
where, as ab ove, PX X corresponds to the weekly earnings threshold for the 
X X th percentile. 
• Finally, to be consistent with our assumption abovèl, between 1979-88 and 
1989-97, if the density (of topcoded observations) in any year is higher than 
the density in the year the topcode value subsequently changes (i.e. in 1989 
and in 1998), we do not assignan earnings value from P-S that is higher than 
the "new" topcode value in the CPS (in the year it changes). To illustrate 
this "rule", take an example: in 1988, the topcode density is 4.17%. vVe thus 
use the procedure described above to assign an earnings valu to the top-
0.45% (i.e. the density in 1989 after the topcode value changes in the CPS 
from $999/week to $1923/week); for the rest of the topcoded observations 
(i.e. 4.17%-0.45% = 3.72%), we follow the same procedure as above unless 
the assigned topcode values exceeds $1923/week, the new CPS topcocle value 
in 1989. In that case, we simply use a 1.3 multiplicative factor (times the 
CPS topcocle value in 1988, i.e. $999*1.3). Therefore, the cletailecl formula 
23 Recall that topcode values in the CPS change two t imes throughout the sample , in 1989 
and in 1998. We assume it is improbable that in 1988 (or before), more than 0.45% of individuals 
made above S1923/week, since in 1989, only 0.45% of individuals made more than S1923/week. 
The same analogy applies from 1989 to 1997: in these years, we assume that no more than 
0.60% of individuals made above S2884/ week, since this is the proportion of individuals with 
topcoded earn ings (at 82884/week) in 1998. 
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to compute the assigned weekly earnings in 1998 is: 
0.45 [ 0.1 ( ) (0.45- 0.1) ( )] 
- 7 * 0 45 * p 99.9- 100 + * p 99.5 - 99.9 4.1 . 0.45 
+ (4. 17- 0.45) * 1.3 * 999 
4. 17 
i. e. all observations above 0.45% were assigned $999/week time 1.3 since 
the assigned P-S value found was higher than the CPS topcode value in 
1989 (i.e. $1923/ week). This would mean that more than 0.45% of workers 
in 1988 would have earned weekly earnings above than $1923, even though 
only 0.45% of CPS workers had topcoded earnings in 1989 at $1923/week. 
By using a 1.3 multiplicative factor, we rule out this possibility. 
B.3 Computation of Standard Errors 
See first chapter's appendix above. 
APPENDIX C 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL FOR "BUSINESS CYCLE 
IlVIPLICATIONS OF INCENTIVE PAY IN THE LABOR 
SEARCH lVIODEL" 
C.l Data 
All the data used in Tables 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6 are in quarterly terms. Data 
from Figure 3.1 is taken from Champagne and Kurmann (2013a). 
• Output : Gross Domestic Product, Non-farm business, Chained-$2005. From 
the l\TIPA tables of the Bureau of Economie Analysis (BEA) . Series ID: 
A358RX1. I divide this series by the U.S. population (see below) to get a 
GDP per capita measure. 
• Priee deflator: The main series used is the Personal Consumption Expen-
diture (PCE) deflator, from the NIPA tables of the BEA; index, 2009= 100. 
Series ID: A002RD3. 
• Population: on-civilian population, 16 years old and over; from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Labor Productivity and Costs (LPC) pro-
gram. Series ID: LNUOOOOOOOOQ. 
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The rest of the variables come from the Major Productivity and Costs program 
of the BLS which produces labor productivity and costs (LPC) measures for the 
private-sector U.S. economy. 
• Compensation: Total compensation from the _LPC dataset is comprised 
of a 'wages and salaries' component, and a 'supplements ' component. 1 The 
'wages and salaries' component is based on earnings data from the Quar-
terly Cens us of Employment and Wages ( QCEW), previously known as the 
BLS ES-202 program. The QCEW is 11 ... a cooperative program involving the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the U.S. Department of Labor and the 
State Employment Security Agencies (SESAs) ... [and} produces a complete 
tabulation of employment and wage information for workers covered by State 
unemployment insurance ( UI) laws and Federal workers covered by the Un-
employment Compensation faT Feder-al Employees ( UCFE) progmm". This 
represents about 98 percent of all U.S . jobs. The definition of labor earnings 
in the QCEW are very comprehensive. Specifically: "Wage and salary dis-
bursements consist of the monetaTy remuneration of employees (including 
the salaTies of corporate officers, commissions, tips, bonuses, and severance 
pay); employee gains from exercising nonqualified stock options; distributions 
from nonqualified deferTed compensation plans; and an imputation fo r pay-
in-kind (such as the m eals fumished to the employees of restaurants). " See 
http: j j www. bea.gov j regionalj pdf/ spi2005 j Complete_ Methodology. pdf for 
more information. 
The 'supplements' components consists of employer contributions for em-
ployee pension and insurance funds and employer contributions for gov-
1The proportion of wages and salaries in total compensation has been trending down-
wards in a constant way through t ime, from around 91% of total compensation in the mid-1960s 
to 80% in 2010. 
190 
ernment social insurance.2 To derive total compensation for the non-farm 
business sector, the LPC substracts compensation of employees working in 
public administration offices, in the farm sector, and in non-profit insti-
tutions and priva te households. 3 Moreover, the LPC imputes earnings of 
self-employed individuals using comparable data from workers in the CPS. 
The total compensation measure we use from LPC is series ID: PRS85006063, 
which is in levels and not publicly available (the LPC website of the BLS 
only publishes the corresponding index series) . We thank Shawn Sprague 
for supplying us with this series. 
• Hours: Total hours in the LPC database mainly cornes from the Current 
Establishment Survey (CES) for production and nonsupervisory workers (see 
CES description below), supplemented by other sources to estimate hours of 
workers not covered by the CES. For example, LPC computes an estimate of 
average weekly hours for nonproduction and supervisory workers by applying 
a CPS-based ratio of [nonproduction & supervisory workers] / [production 
& non-supervisory workers] to CES production & nonsupervisory workcr 
average weekly hours. The total hours measure we use is LPC series ID: 
PRS84006033. This series is in levels and not publicly available, as for the 
total compensation series. 
• Total employment: I use LPC's employment series PRS85006013, which, 
as for compensation and hours above, is in levels. 
• Vacancies: I use Regis Barnichon's (2010) vacancies index for the U.S. 
2T he estimates for the 'supplements' portion of total compensation come from various 
sources, such as the IRS, the Medical Expendit ure Panel Survey, or t he American Counsil on 
Life Insurance. The estimates are compiled by the Bureau of Economie Analysis (BEA). 
:1Note that workers employed in 'general government ' are not included in the non-farm 
business measure, while workers in 'governement enterprises' are. 
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economy. 
• Unemployment: Unemployment rate, seasonally acljusted, quarterly series 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey. Series ID: 
L S14000000Q. 
• A ver age weekly earnings: I di vide by 52 the ratio of total compensation 
to total employment. 
• A ver age ho url y wage: I compute average ho url y earnings by dividing 
average weekly earnings with average weekly hours. 
• Vacancies: 
• U nemployment rate: 
C.2 Surplus from employment 
Here I clescribe in details how I derive the householcls' value of having an aclclitional 
member working under each wage bargaining scenario. 
C.2.1 Efficiency-wage sector 
For illustrative purposes, let us assume that all workers and firms bargain over 
efficiency-wage contracts (i. e. p = 0). In that case, the household 's problem 
becomes: 
subject to : 
( 
[ n~~, l + (1 - d)n~w,t] Wew,t+ ) 
+(1 - [ n~w ,t + n~~ ,t] )b + IIew,t 
new,t+l = ((1- s) [(1 - cl)n!w,t + n;~,t] + f ew,ttlew,t ) 
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(C.2) 
where Uew,t = 1- (1- s ) [ (1 - d)n~w,t + n~~,t]. As mentioned in the main text, the 
surpluses from employment are different whether an employed member is shirking 
or supplying effort level e. These surpluses are found by taking the first-order 
conditions of W(D ew,t) with respect to n~w , t and n~~,t' respectively, subject to the 
budget constraint and employment evolution equation above (C.2) . This yields: 
where: 
and: 
8W(Dew,t) 
8n~w, t 
8W(Dew,t) 
8n~~,t 
W{( Dew,t) = (1- cl)wew,t- b 
Onew,t+l = ((1- s) (1- cl) (1 - f ew,t)) 
8n~w,t 
Onew,t+l (( ) ( )) 8 ns = 1 - S 1 - f ew,t . 
new,t 
(C.3) 
(C.4) 
(C.5) 
193 
I ote that the surpluses from employment above are already expressed in terms 
of current consumption, as utility is linear. Rearranging yields: 
(1 - d)wew,t - b (C.6) 
+[3 [(1 - s) (1- d)(1- few,t)] Et [W2 (Dew,t+l)] (C.7) 
el+'~ 
w t-b - ..,------:-
ew, (1+7]) 
+{3 [(1- s)(1- few,t)] Et [W2 (Dew,t+l)] (C.8) 
which are equivalent to the surpluses from employment (3.11) in the main text. 
Incentive compatibility constraint. For workers to exert any effort , firms must 
offer workers a wage that satisfies their incentive compatibility constraint. Define 
this constraint as the 'no- shirking condition' ( SC), expressed as W~'5 (Dew,t) 2: 
W~(Dew , t)· Using (3.11) above, one gets: 
e1+'7 
(1 + "7) ~ d [wew,t + [3(1- s)(1 - f ew,t)Et {Wn(Dew,t+l)}] (C.9) 
or, alternatively: 
(C.10) 
Workers will exert the desired amount of effort e only if on the loss they would 
incur if detected shirking, weighted by the probability of being detected (d) is 
greater or equal to their disutility (in terms of current consumption) of supplying 
e. This loss is the sum of two components: the forgone real wage value if detected 
shirking, plus the expected discounted value of a match in the next period. Con-
sistent with the efficiency-wage literature ( e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Riggi, 
2013), the no-shirking wage is higher when: (i) the level of effort to be supplied 
is higher; (ii) the detection probability (d) is lower; (iii) the exogenous separation 
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rate is higher (i.e. the fact that matches have high probability of being terminated 
in the near future increases the incentive to shirk); (iv) the discount factor {3 is 
lower (since low value on employment next period implies lower loss if worker is 
detected shirking) .4 
C.2.2 Performance-pay wage sec tor 
Again for illustrative purposes, let us assume now that all workers and firms 
bargain over performance-pay wage contracts (i.e. p = 1). The household problem 
becomes: 
(C. ll ) 
subject to : 
(C.12) 
where Upp,t = 1 - (1- s)npp,t · The surplus from employment (or the household's 
value of having an additional member employed) can be derived from the first-
order condition (with respect to npp,t) of the household's problem (C.ll) subject 
1 Another interesting comparative static is the higher the job-finding rate f t, the higher 
the no-shirking wage must be. Using equation (3.11), rewrite (C.lO) as: 
Wew,t 2: (1 + 'IJ) d 
{ 
el+'l ( 1 - d - f ew,t+l ) } 
- ,6(1 -s)E t f ew,t+1Wew,t+l-b+(1 + 1J) cl 
The shorter time it takes to get a job back after being fired, the higher the incentive to sh irk. 
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to (C.12) ; 
8W(S1pp,t) _ ( ) _ e!;,i ; { ( ) 8npp,t+l } 
>;) - w2 npp,t - wpp,t- b- ( ) + f3 Et w2 npp,t+l >;) 
unpp,t 1 + TJ unpp,t 
where: 
Rearranging yields: 
Bnpp,t+I = ((1 - s) (1- fpp ,t)). 
8npp,t 
(C.13) 
(C.14) 
which represents the household's value, in terms of current consumption, of having 
one additional member employed. Equation (C.14) is equivalent to (3.16) in the 
main text. 
C.3 System of equations 
Here I list the system of equations of the model, including the firm-specific equa-
tions and aggregate identities. 
1. Aggregate vacancies: 
Vt = PVpp,t + (1- p)Vew,t 
2. Aggregate job searchers: 
Ut = PUpp,t + (1- p)uew,t 
3. Segment-specifie mat ching function (for i = ew , pp): 
4. Aggregate matching function: 
5. Segment-specifie employment evolution (for i = ew, pp) : 
6. Aggregate Employment: 
nt= pnpp,t + (1- p)neff,t 
7. Aggregate unemployment rate: 
8. Segment-specifie job-finding rate (for i = ew,pp) : 
9. Segment-specifie job-filling rate (for i = ew,pp) : 
10. Segment-specifie market tightness (for i = ew,pp): 
e _ Vi,t i t--
' Ui,t 
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11. Aggregate job-finding rate: 
12. Aggregate job-filling rate: 
13. Aggregate market tightness: 
_14. Efficiency-wage: 
W ew,t [ { y } { "' }] el+') 1 Ç Et_ 1 ewt + (1 - S )Et-1 - + (1 - Ç) ( , ) -d 
new,t qew,t 1 + TJ 
-(1- Ç) [,8(1- s)(1- Et- 1 U ew,t } )Et-1 {[Wn(Dew,t+l )]}] 
15. Surplus from employment, under efficiency-wage scenario: 
16. PPay wage: 
17. Effort condition, PPay: 
18. Production function, efficiency-wage firm: 
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19. P roduction function, PPay firm: 
20. Aggregate Output: 
Yt = PYpp,t + (1 - P)Yef f ,t 
21. Vacancy-creation condit ion (for i = ew, pp): 
"' { Yi ,t+1 r;, } 
- = f3 E t --- Wi ,t+1 + (1 - s)--
qi,t ni,t+ 1 qi,t+ 1 
22. Aggregate average effort (or effort per worker): 
npp,t + (1 ) n ew,t-et = p--e t - p - - e 
nt pp, nt 
23. Aggregate average wage: 
npp,t ( ) new,t Wt = p--Wppt + 1- p --Wewt 
nt , nt , 
24. Aggregate resource constraint: 
Yt = Ct+ K,Vt 
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